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I 
I Abstract 
The widely-accepted response selection bottleneck model of dual-tasking assumes that two 
tasks gain access to the stage of central processing in a strictly serial manner. However, a 
frequent observation that contradicts this assumption is that performance in Task 1 is already 
influenced by certain aspects of Task 2. Such observations were thus termed backward crosstalk 
effects (BCEs). For instance, response times (RTs) in Task 1 are shorter when the required 
Response 1 and Response 2 overlap spatially (the R1-R2 BCE) and when Stimulus 1 and 
Response 2 overlap conceptually (the S1-R2 BCE) than when they do not – the compatibility-
based BCEs. Similarly, RTs in Task 1 are shorter when a Response 2 is given (go-trial) than 
when it is withheld (no-go trial) – the no-go BCE. The main question of the present dissertation 
was:  Can we distinguish different types of backward crosstalk? To answer this question the no-
go BCE was compared to the compatibility-based BCEs based on its underlying processing 
stages (Study 1), the mechanism it is caused by (Study 2), and the way in which task processing 
is adjusted following a no-go trial (Study 3). The results of Studies 1-3 indicate that the no-go 
BCE results from temporal overlap of Task 1 motor execution with Task 2 central stage, that it 
is caused by the inhibition of a prepared Response 2, and that the preparation state for Task 2 
is adjusted following a no-go trial. As the no-go BCE differs fundamentally from the 
compatibility-based BCEs in the three aspects investigated here, both should be seen as two 
different types of BCEs. Furthermore, the R1-R2 BCE and the S1-R2 BCE were compared 
based on their underlying processes (Study 4). Results of Study 4 suggest that even though both 
phenomena arise in Task 1 central stage, they are based on different processes, and hence should 
be seen as two different types of compatibility-based BCEs. To answer the present main 
question: Different types of backward crosstalk can indeed be distinguished. As each type of 
backward crosstalk contradicts the notion of an encapsulated central stage in a different way, 
the present results support capacity-sharing over strictly serial processing.
II 
II Zusammenfassung 
Das zentrale Flaschenhalsmodell nimmt an, dass in Doppelaufgaben beide Aufgaben seriell 
Zugang zur zentralen Verarbeitungsstufe erhalten. Befunde, dass die Performanz in Aufgabe 1 
von bestimmten Aspekten der Aufgabe 2 beeinflusst wird – sogenannte backward crosstalk 
Effekte (BCEs) – widersprechen dieser Annahme jedoch. Beispiele für 
(kompatibilitätsbezogene) BCEs sind die Beobachtungen, dass Reaktionszeiten (RTs) in 
Aufgabe 1 kürzer sind, wenn Reaktion 1 und Reaktion 2 räumlich überlappen (der R1-R2 BCE) 
und wenn Stimulus 1 und Reaktion 2 konzeptuell überlappen (der S1-R2 BCE), als wenn dies 
nicht der Fall ist. Ein weiteres Beispiel ist der no-go BCE, also die Beobachtung, dass RTs in 
Aufgabe 1 kürzer sind wenn Aufgabe 2 eine Reaktion fordert (go Durchgang), als wenn dies 
nicht der Fall ist (no-go Durchgang). Die Hauptfrage dieser Dissertation war: Können 
verschiedene Typen von backward crosstalk unterschieden werden? Um diese Frage zu 
beantworten wurde der no-go BCE mit den kompatibilitätsbezogenen BCEs bezüglich der 
beteiligten Verarbeitungsstufen (Studie 1), dem Mechanismus durch den er verursacht wird 
(Studie 2) und anhand der Verarbeitungsanpassung nach einem no-go Durchgang (Studie 3) 
verglichen. Die Ergebnisse der Studien 1-3 deuten darauf hin, dass der no-go BCE durch 
zeitliche Überlappung der motorischen Ausführung in Aufgabe 1 und der zentralen Stufe in 
Aufgabe 2 ermöglicht, durch die Inhibition einer vorbereiteten Reaktion 2 verursacht und, dass 
der Vorbereitungsstatus für Aufgabe 2 nach einem no-go Durchgang angepasst wird. Da sich 
der no-go BCE in den drei hier untersuchten Aspekten fundamental vom 
kompatibilitätsbezogenen BCE unterscheidet, sollten beide Phänomene als zwei 
unterschiedliche Typen der BCEs angesehen werden. Außerdem wurden der R1-R2 BCE und 
der S1-R2 BCE anhand ihrer zugrundeliegenden Prozesse verglichen (Studie 4). Die Ergebnisse 
von Studie 4 legen nahe, dass beide Phänomene auf unterschiedlichen Prozessen beruhen, 
obwohl beide in der zentralen Stufe entstehen. Daher sollten beide Phänomene als 
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unterschiedliche Typen kompatibilitätsbezogener BCEs gesehen werden. Um die gegenwärtige 
Hauptfrage zu beantworten: Verschiedene Typen von backward crosstalk können unterschieden 
werden. Da jeder dieser Typen der Annahme einer eingekapselten zentralen Stufe auf 
unterschiedliche Weise widerspricht, unterstützen die vorliegenden Ergebnisse 
Kapazitätsverteilungsansätze gegenüber strikt serieller Verarbeitung. 
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1. Introduction 
The dawning of the information age had a massive impact on how humans organize their 
everyday life. Take, for instance, the emergence of computers and artificial intelligence, which 
automatized formerly time-costly tasks and left us with more time for other important duties. 
Nowadays, much time can be saved by, for instance, sending documents via E-mail instead of 
having to pack them, take them to the post office, and wait for them to arrive at the target 
address. However, this new world of digitalization and remoteness may come at costs that are 
yet to fathom. It is expected that the rapid progress of information technology will change our 
everyday and work life forever. Besides the socio-economic consequences, evidence from 
applied psychological fields suggests that the increased degree of automaticity can even affect 
human behavior by fostering situations that allow for multitasking. 
For instance, the emergence of cell phones enabled humans to communicate while doing 
something else. While this may appear as a facilitation of our everyday life, it can also be 
dangerous. Results from applied psychological studies indicate that having a conversation on 
the cell phone while driving decreases driving performance (Strayer & Drews, 2004, 2007) and 
that this was even the case when participants had to manually respond to simple stimuli (Levy 
& Pashler, 2008) across a wide range of stimulus- and response-modalities (Hibberd, Jameson, 
Carsten, 2013). Similar results were observed in educational contexts. Students who engaged 
in media use during educational sessions remembered less content (Hembrooke, & Gay, 2003; 
Wood et al., 2012) and were slower in reading (Bowman, Levine, Waite, & Gendron, 2010). 
Taken together, results from applied research indicate that in everyday life multitasking can 
lead to reduced performance and that it can actually increase levels of subjective strain (Paridon 
& Kaufmann, 2010). But why do performance decrements in multitasking arise? 
The reasons for performance decrements in multitasking have been extensively studied 
in cognitive psychology. Here, what is popularly called multitasking is investigated in dual-task 
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experiments where participants perform two tasks in close temporal succession or 
simultaneously. In Chapter 2 of the present dissertation, I will introduce how dual-tasking 
experiments are usually carried out and how dual-task models explain performance decrements. 
In Chapter 3, I will turn to the phenomenon of backward crosstalk, which in contrary to the 
assumptions made by a popular model of dual-tasking indicates that humans are to some extent 
able to process two tasks in parallel. I will argue for the existence of two types of backward 
crosstalk that differ in the cognitive processing stage in which they arise and in the mechanisms 
they are caused by. In Chapter 4, I will expand on other phenomena arising in dual-tasking 
experiments and explain if and why they are comparable to backward crosstalk, before I will 
lay out the research questions of the present dissertation in Chapter 5. The studies I carried out 
to answer these questions will be presented in Chapter 6, and the respective answers will be 
given in Chapter 7. 
 
3 
2. Dual-tasking and models of dual-tasking 
In cognitive psychology research, multitasking has been primarily investigated with three 
setups that differ in the way two tasks are combined. In the single- vs. dual-task setup 
participants perform blocks comprising only one of the two tasks (single-task blocks), blocks 
in which both tasks are presented as single-tasks in a randomly intermingled fashion (mixed 
blocks), and blocks in which both tasks have to be carried out in a single trial (dual-task blocks; 
e.g., Janczyk, Nolden, & Jolicoeur, 2015; Tombu & Jolicoeur, 2004). In the Psychological 
Refractory Period (PRP) setup (Pashler, 1994; Welford, 1952), participants perform two tasks 
in close temporal succession in each trial, whereas in the task switching setup participants 
perform one of two tasks in each trial but occasionally have to switch between both tasks on a 
trial-by trial basis (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 1996). While all three setups are 
valuable approaches to help identify the cognitive structure and flexibility issues in 
multitasking, the present dissertation focusses on the PRP paradigm where two tasks are 
performed concurrently. 
In the PRP paradigm, participants first give Response 1 to Stimulus 1 and successively 
give Response 2 to Stimulus 2. The dependent variable of interest in the PRP paradigm are 
response times (RTs) to both stimuli, measured from the onset of each stimulus until the 
according response is given. The crucial manipulation in the PRP paradigm is the temporal 
delay between the onset of Stimulus 1 and Stimulus 2 – the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA, 
see Figure 1a for an illustration). The temporal overlap of Task 2 and Task 1 thus increases with 
decreasing SOA. Dual-tasking is known to lead to performance decrements in terms of 
increased RTs for both tasks relative to when they are performed in isolation. Thus, these 
decrements have often been termed dual-task costs. Performance decrements for Task 1, which 
are indicated by longer Task 1 RTs when Task 1 is performed alone relative to in the presence 
of Task 2, were reported by several studies applying the PRP paradigm (Karlin & Kestenbaum, 
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1968; Smith, 1969; for a review, see Herman & Kantowitz, 1970) and by studies applying the 
prioritized processing paradigm (Miller & Durst, 2014, 2015). 1 Whilst Task 1 is usually 
unaffected by the amount of temporal overlap between Task 1 and Task 2, Task 2 RTs are 
longer, the shorter the SOA is – the PRP effect (see Figure 1b for an illustration; Pashler, 1994; 
Telford, 1931) indicating performance decrements for Task 2 (see Janczyk, Pfister, Wallmeier, 
& Kunde, 2014, for possible exceptions). 
 
The PRP effect is usually explained with the widely-accepted response selection 
bottleneck model (RSB; Pashler, 1984). The RSB model assumes that each task is processed in 
three subsequent cognitive stages. First of all, in the perception stage, the according stimulus is 
                                                 
 
1 The prioritized processing paradigm is closely related to the PRP paradigm, and it leads to qualitatively similar 
results (Miller & Durst, 2015). Here participants are also presented with two tasks in close temporal succession. 
In contrast to the PRP paradigm, however, participants are instructed to respond to Task 2 only if Task 1 does not 
require a response.  
Figure 1. (a) Illustration of the Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) paradigm. In this particular example, 
Task 1 requires a manual response to an auditory stimulus, whereas Task 2 requires a pedal response to a 
visual stimulus. While Stimulus 1 is presented immediately at the beginning of each trial, the onset of Task 2 
is delayed by the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). (b) Illustration of a typical results pattern in a PRP 
experiment. (c) Illustration of the response selection bottleneck model by Pashler (1994). 
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perceived. Subsequently, the task is processed in the central stage of processing, before the 
according response is finally carried out in the motor execution stage. The perception and motor 
execution stages are assumed to be capacity unlimited, which means that they can run in parallel 
to all stages of another task. However, the central stage is conceived of as capacity limited, 
which means that it can only process one task at a time while the other task has to wait until the 
central stage is available again. It was assumed that the central stage deals with the translation 
of stimulus codes into the according response codes (e.g., Fagot & Pashler, 1992; McCann & 
Johnston, 1992), and that it is limited to the translation of one stimulus-response rule at a time. 
The central stage can thus be conceived of as structural bottleneck in human cognition. It 
follows that, at a short SOA, Task 2 has to wait until the central stage has been released from 
Task 1. The idle time during which Task 2 waits is called the cognitive slack. Task 2 RTs are 
then accordingly prolonged by the duration of the cognitive slack. At long SOAs, however, 
Task 2 can get access to the central stage without waiting time and Task 2 RTs remain 
unaffected (see Figure 1c for an illustration). 
As an alternative to the strictly serial processing as envisaged by the RSB model, 
capacity sharing accounts suggested that a common cognitive resource is shared between both 
tasks (Navon & Miller, 2002; Tombu & Jolicoeur, 2003; for a review see Fischer & Plessow, 
2015). Thus, in contrast to the RSB model, capacity sharing accounts allow parallel processing 
by assigning a certain amount of resources to each task. The efficiency at which each task is 
processed then depends on the amount of resources assigned to the according task, as both tasks 
only get a share of the available resources. Thus, capacity sharing accounts still allow for serial 
processing, if one of both tasks is assigned all available resources. Recent evidence indicates 
that the distribution of capacity between tasks is adjusted in order to increase overall 
performance (Miller, Ulrich, & Rolke, 2009) and by the prerequisites of the dual-tasking 
paradigm in use (Mittelstädt & Miller, 2017).  
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A further, perhaps less known account was proposed by Navon and Miller (1987). 
According to their crosstalk account, each task “produces outputs, throughputs, or side effects” 
(Navon & Miller, 1987, p. 435) that can affect processing of the respective other task (see also 
Pashler, 1994, for a distinction into serial processing, capacity sharing and crosstalk models). 
The crosstalk model is supported by results of conflict task experiments, where one stimulus 
(or stimulus feature) requires a particular response, while another task-irrelevant stimulus (or 
stimulus feature) requires the same or a different response (e.g. the Simon task, Simon & 
Rudell, 1967; the Eriksen flanker task, Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; the Stroop task, Stroop, 1935). 
In these studies usually shorter RTs are observed when both stimuli (or stimulus features) 
require the same compared to different response. According to Navon and Miller (1987), such 
crosstalk effects should be even larger when the second stimulus at some point becomes task-
relevant. This is, for instance, the case in dual-task studies in which the similarity of stimulus 
and response codes varies on a trial-by trial basis. Such studies usually observe that 
performance of Task 1 is influenced by aspects of Task 2 – the so-called backward crosstalk 
effects (BCEs).  
While BCEs seem well in line with the crosstalk account, they pose theoretical problems 
for other dual-task models, because they indicate that to some extent response related output or 
response codes of Task 2 must have already been available in order to influence performance 
in Task 1. While at first glance this appears to be in line with capacity sharing accounts, these 
accounts would still have to be extended to account for BCEs. For instance, the way in which 
stimulus and response codes are passed on between tasks and how exactly they influence 
performance of the according task would need to be specified. Even more so, the BCEs 
challenge the assumption of strictly serial processing as made by the RSB model. In the 
following chapter, I will explain under which preconditions BCEs arise, how they manifest, and 
how the RSB model was extended in order to account for BCEs. 
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3 Backward Crosstalk 
A large body of studies observed influences of several aspects of Task 2 on RTs of Task 1. In 
the following I will introduce the classic experimental paradigms in which each type of BCE 
was observed, followed by the available theoretical explanations for each type of BCE. I will 
begin with two types of compatibility-based BCEs – namely the R1-R2 BCE and the S1-R2 
BCE – and will then turn to the no-go BCE. 
 
3.1 The compatibility-based BCEs:  
A frequent observation in dual-task experiments is that performance in Task 1 depends on the 
dimensional overlap of Task 1 with Task 2 (for a detailed consideration of dimensional overlap, 
see Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990). Usually, RTs in Task 1 are shorter when 
dimensional overlap between both tasks is given relative to when there is no dimensional 
overlap – the compatibility-based BCEs (see Figure 2 for an idealized illustration of the related 
result pattern). This was observed in two cases: (1) when dimensional overlap of Response 1 
and Response 2 was present (the R1-R2 BCE) and (2) when dimensional overlap of Stimulus 1 
and Response 2 was present (the S1-R2 BCE).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the idealized result patterns, as they are expected for (a) the R1-R2 or S1-R2 BCE, 
and (b) the no-go BCE. 
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3.1.1 Experimental setups 
Compatibility-based BCEs were first reported by Hommel (1998). Hommel investigated 
whether translations from stimulus to response can occur concurrently. He reasoned that 
parallel stimulus-response translations in both tasks would be indicated by an influence of 
dimensional overlap of both tasks on RTs in Task 1. Precisely, when features of both tasks 
overlap in a common dimension, Hommel expected shorter RTs in Task 1 relative to without 
dimensional overlap. 
In Experiment 1, Hommel (1998) presented his participants with the letters ‘H’ or ‘S’ 
colored in red or green in each trial. Participants were instructed to first respond to the color of 
the letter with a left vs. right index finger keypress in Task 1, and to subsequently respond to 
the identity of the letter with a vocal ‘links’ (German for ‘left’) vs. ‘rechts’ (German for ‘right’) 
utterance in Task 2 (see Figure 3a for an illustration). This enabled spatial overlap of both 
responses: If Response 1 and Response 2 overlapped, both responses were compatible (e.g., a 
left index finger keypress and a vocal ‘left’ response), whereas Response 1 and Response 2 
were incompatible if they did not overlap (e.g., a left index finger keypress and a vocal ‘right’ 
Figure 3. (a) Illustration of the trial structure of Hommel’s (1998) Experiment 1. This setup allows for spatial 
overlap of both responses, and thus the R1-R2 BCE is enabled. (b) Illustration of the trial structure of 
Hommel’s (1998) Experiment 2. This setup allows for a conceptional overlap of Stimulus 1 (the color) and 
the vocal response, and thus the S1-R2 BCE is enabled. 
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response). 2 Hommel observed shorter RTs in Task 1 (and also in Task 2) when both responses 
were spatially compatible relative to when they were incompatible – the R1-R2 BCE.  
In Experiment 2, stimuli and responses were the same as in Experiment 1. However, 
now participants were instructed to respond to the identity of the letter with the vocal utterance 
‘rot’ (German for ‘red’) vs. ‘grün’ (German for ‘green’). This enabled conceptual overlap 
between the color of Stimulus 1 and the vocal utterance in Response 2: Stimulus 1 and Response 
2 were compatible when the color of Stimulus 1 matched the word uttered in Response 2 (e.g., 
a letter colored in red and the word ‘rot’ uttered), whereas Stimulus 1 and Response 2 were 
incompatible when the color of Stimulus 1 did not match the word uttered in Response 2 (e.g., 
a letter colored in red and the word ‘grün’ uttered). Similar to Experiment 1, RTs in Task 1 (and 
also in Task 2) were shorter when Stimulus 1 and Response 2 were compatible relative to when 
they were incompatible – the S1-R2 BCE (see Figure 3b). 
Compatibility-based BCEs have been reported by a wide range of studies applying 
different types of dimensional overlaps and response modalities. For instance, the R1-R2 BCE 
was observed when spatial overlap between two manual responses was enabled (Janczyk, 
Pfister, Hommel, & Kunde, 2014; Lien & Proctor, 2000; Miller & Durst, 2014, 2015; Thomson, 
Watter, & Finkelshtein, 2010; Watter & Logan, 2006) or between manual and pedal responses 
(Janczyk, 2016; Durst & Janczyk, 2019; Renas, Durst, & Janczyk, 2018). The S1-R2 BCE was 
observed when conceptional overlap was enabled between the color of a stimulus and a vocal 
                                                 
 
2 Note that I labeled the dimensional overlap between both tasks as spatial in line with previous studies (e.g. 
Janczyk, Renas, & Durst, 2018). However, it could be argued that the vocal “left” or “right” response in this case 
is not spatial per se, as the participants did not turn their head to respond in the corresponding direction while 
uttering the response. Watter and Logan (2006) suggested that the need to utter such responses could involve 
“more abstract conceptual representation of left and right” (p. 256, emphasized as in the original). If these 
conceptual representations of left and right are activated (e.g., by perceiving the identity of the letter), they would 
dimensionally overlap with the semantic information associated with a left vs. right Response 1. The dimensional 
overlap would in this case be of semantic nature. Note, however, that the true nature of the dimensional overlap in 
this case is unknown, as the semantic dimension of Response 2 could also overlap with the spatial dimension 
associated with Response 1. 
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response (Ellenbogen & Meiran, 2008; Hommel & Eglau, 2002) and auditorily presented spatial 
stimuli and manual responses (Lien, Ruthruff, Hsieh, & Yu, 2007). 
3.1.2 Theoretical explanation 
These observations indicate that Response 2 must have been “at least activated to some degree 
at the time the primary response was selected” (Hommel, 1998, p. 1373). Hommel argued that 
parallel stimulus-response translation could only be reconciled with the RSB model, if the 
central stage would be split into two substages of response activation and response selection. 
He suggested that an automatic and capacity unlimited response activation stage occurs right 
after the stimulus was perceived. The response activation stage is responsible for increasing the 
activation level of the according response to a certain degree. In the following response 
selection stage the activation level of the response is driven above its selection threshold and 
the response can then be executed in the motor stage (see Figure 4a; see also, Lien & Proctor, 
2002). Thus, response selection “may well rely on translation, but this does not mean that all 
translation processes subserve selection” (Hommel, 1998, p. 1381). The model suggested by 
Hommel (1998) assumes that only at a sufficiently short SOA response activation stages of both 
tasks overlap, and only then backward crosstalk occurs.   
Figure 4. (a) Illustration of the modified RSB model as suggested by Hommel (1998; see also Lien and 
Proctor, 2002). (b) Illustration of the modified RSB model as suggested by Thomson et al. (2015; see also 
Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018). (P = perceptual stage; RA = response activation; RS = response selection; M = 
motor stage) 
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One possible way in which this model can explain the prolonged Task 1 RTs is that the 
Task 1 stage in which backward crosstalk occurs, is prolonged in incompatible relative to 
compatible trials. The prolongation of a certain Task 1 stage accordingly delays the onset of the 
following processing stages, and thus prolongs Task 1 RTs in incompatible relative to 
compatible trials. In the following, I will thus conceive of the Task 1 stage in which the BCE 
arises as the locus of the BCE. 
As an alternative to the model suggested by Hommel (1998), Thomson, Danis, and 
Watter (2015) suggested that Task 1 response selection starts directly after stimulus 
identification. In Task 2, however, response activation only occurs if Task 2 does not gain direct 
access to the bottleneck (see Figure 4b for an illustration). Thomson et al. trained their 
participants in a dual-task, which is assumed to shorten the response selection stage in both 
tasks (Strobach, Liepelt, Pashler, Frensch, & Schubert, 2013). If the locus of the BCE is in Task 
1 response selection, the authors expected that a shortened Task 1 response selection stage 
should lead to a decreased BCE due to less temporal overlap with Task 2 response activation. 
In line with this assumption, Thomson et al. observed that the BCE decreased with training. 
They concluded that response information, generated automatically in Task 2 response 
activation, feeds into Task 1 response selection and is added to this controlled process. 
In order to distinguish between the models suggested by Hommel (1998) and Lien and 
Proctor (2002) and the model suggested by Thomson et al. (2015), Janczyk, Renas et al. (2018) 
recently investigated the locus of the compatibility-based BCEs by applying the locus of slack 
(Schweickert, 1978) and the effect propagation logic to an extended PRP paradigm. Note that 
their logic hinges on the assumption that response activation and response selection are 
sequential processing stages, which is well accepted in the literature (see Janczyk, Renas et al., 
2018, for details; see also, e.g., Paelecke & Kunde, 2007; Schubert et al., 2008). In Experiment 
1, Janczyk, Renas et al. applied the locus of slack logic to investigate whether the R1-R2 BCE 
arises (a) in a stage before or (b) during or after the bottleneck. Because evoking compatibility-
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based BCEs already requires two tasks, a third task had to be added to enable the locus of slack 
logic: Task 1 occupied the bottleneck, Task 2 was the task in which the BCE was observed, and 
Task 3 was the task causing the BCE in Task 2. Each trial started with the presentation of a low 
or high tone requiring a vocal “tip” vs. “top” response (Task 1). After a variable SOA, a red or 
green “H” or “S” was presented as integral stimulus. The color required an index-finger 
keypress of the left vs. right hand (Task 2), whilst the letter identity required a pedal press of 
the left vs. right foot (Task 3). 
First, consider the assumption that the BCE arises in a prebottleneck stage, such as the 
response activation stage. At a sufficiently short SOA, the amount by which Task 2 response 
activation is prolonged in incompatible trials reaches inside the cognitive slack and does not 
exceed it – it is absorbed into slack. Thus, the following stages are not further postponed by 
any prolongation of response activation. Consequently, Task 2 RTs are not prolonged (see 
Figure 5a) in incompatible trials. In this case an underadditive interaction of SOA and the BCE 
is predicted. At a sufficiently long SOA, however, the BCE should be observed, as the 
prolonged Task 2 response activation stage in incompatible trials in turn also postpones the 
Figure 5. Illustration of the locus of slack logic applied to an extended PRP paradigm. Panel (a) illustrates the 
case when the compatibility-based BCE arises from a prolonged response activation. Panel (b) illustrates the 
case when the compatibility-based BCE arises from a prolonged response selection stage (the predictions for 
a prolonged motor execution stage are the same). Task 3 was omitted in this illustration. (P = perceptual stage; 
RA = response activation; RS = response selection; M = motor stage) 
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subsequent stages. This accordingly leads to longer RTs in Task 2 (see Figure 5a). Under the 
assumption that the BCE arises during the bottleneck or later, it is predicted that a prolongation 
in the response selection or motor execution stage leads to the same RTs. Thus, the BCE is 
expected to be of the same size at the short and long SOA (see Figure 5b), and accordingly an 
additive pattern of Task 2 RTs is expected. 
Janczyk, Renas et al. (2018) indeed obtained no significant interaction of SOA and BCE 
for the R1-R2 BCE in Experiment 1 and for the S1-R2 BCE in Experiment 3. They also 
replicated this result for the R1-R2 BCE in their Experiment 2 where only two responses were 
required in each trial (in Task 1 and in Task 2 or Task 3), which supports the assumption that 
S2-R2 translation is automatic for compatibility-based BCEs (see Hommel, 1998, Experiment 
5). Janczyk, Renas et al. concluded that compatibility-based BCEs arise in a stage during or 
after the bottleneck. To further distinguish between response selection and motor execution, the 
effect propagation logic was used in Experiment 4. 
To this end, the same tasks were used but in reversed order. In Experiment 4, Task 1 
was the task in which the BCE was observed (manual response to the color of the letter), Task 
2 was the task causing the BCE (pedal response to the identity of the letter), and Task 3 was the 
non-related task (vocal response to the frequency of a tone) which was presented after a variable 
SOA. First consider the assumption that the BCE has its locus in or before the bottleneck. At a 
sufficiently short SOA, the amount by which any central or precentral stage in Task 1 is 
prolonged, accordingly delays the onset of the response selection and motor execution stages 
of Task 2 and Task 3 by the same amount of time. It follows that the BCE observed in Task 1 
is also observed in Task 2 and Task 3, and thus fully propagates to Task 3 (see Figure 6a). At a 
sufficiently long SOA, however, the BCE should not propagate to Task 3, as the onset of Task 
3 response selection is not delayed. Under the assumption of a locus after the central stage, any 
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prolongation of the motor stage of Task 1 should not delay the onset of response selection of 
Task 2 and Task 3, and thus no propagation to Task 3 should be observed (see Figure 6b). 
Janczyk, Renas et al. (2018) observed that the BCE indeed fully propagated to Task 3 
and concluded that the compatibility-based BCEs have their locus in a stage at or prior to the 
bottleneck (for further evidence from a different paradigm, see Experiment 5 of Janczyk, Renas 
et al., 2018). Taken together, a locus prior to the bottleneck was ruled out applying the locus of 
slack logic, and a locus after the bottleneck was ruled out applying the effect propagation logic. 
Thus, compatibility-based BCEs have their locus inside the central stage, which contradicts the 
assumption that the compatibility-based BCEs are located in a capacity-unlimited response 
activation stage that precedes the central stage. 
As the compatibility-based BCEs have their locus in the capacity-limited stage of 
processing (which is the response selection stage according to Pashler, 1994), Janczyk, Renas 
et al. (2018) concluded that the assumption of a response activation stage preceding the central 
stage in Task 1 is not needed (see also Thomson et al., 2015). However, automatic stimulus to 
response translation still seems to occur in Task 2. Janczyk, Renas et al. thus suggested that a 
response activation stage in Task 2 occurs, if Task 2 has to wait to gain access to the bottleneck. 
Figure 6. Illustration of the effect propagation logic applied to an extended PRP paradigm. Panel (a) illustrates 
the case of the full propagation of the compatibility-based BCE. Panel (b) illustrates the case when the 
compatibility-based BCE does not propagate to Task 3. The long SOA was omitted here. (P = perceptual stage; 
RA = response activation; RS = response selection; M = motor stage; the subscript indicates Task 1, Task 2, 
and Task 3, respectively) 
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Then, Stimulus 2 activates the according response to some degree without leading to the 
emission of the response, similar to what is known from conflict tasks such as the Eriksen 
flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1988). 
The automatic activation for Response 2 is then added to the controlled Task 1 processing, 
yielding a net activation. Similar mechanisms have, for instance, been suggested by 
computational models, such as the theory of visual attention (ECTVA; Logan & Gordon, 2001) 
and the diffusion model for conflict tasks (DMC; Ulrich, Schröter, Leuthold, Birngruber, 2015). 
As Task 2 response activation causes the BCE, response activation will in the following be 
conceived of as the source of the compatibility-based BCEs. 
In a nutshell, Janczyk, Renas et al. (2018) located both compatibility-based BCEs inside 
the central stage and thus argued in favor of the model suggested by Thomson et al. (2015). Up 
to this point, it seems as if both compatibility based BCEs share a common locus and source, 
even though they arise under different preconditions. Whether both compatibility-based BCEs 
are indeed based on the same processes will be closer investigated in Study 4 of the present 
dissertation.  
 
3.2 The no-go BCE: 
So far, compatibility-based BCEs have received the most attention in the literature. However, 
BCEs can even be observed without dimensional overlap. One example is the observation that 
RTs in Task 1 are shorter when Task 2 requires a response relative to when it does not require 
a response – the no-go BCE (see Figure 2b for an idealized illustration of the related result 
pattern).  
3.2.1 Experimental setup 
Miller (2006) investigated whether the phenomenon of backward crosstalk is restricted to 
certain very specific combinations of tasks in between which dimensional overlap is given, or 
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whether it is a rather general phenomenon. To this end, Miller avoided overlap in stimuli, 
stimulus-response rules or responses in both tasks. In Experiment 1 and 2 a manual two-choice 
Task 1 was combined with a manual go/no-go Task 2 (see Donders, 1969). While participants 
responded with the index or middle finger of the left hand in Task 1, they were instructed to 
either respond with a keypress of their right index finger or to withhold this response in Task 
2. Miller reasoned that the inhibition needed to withhold the response in a no-go Task 2 could 
spill over to Task 1. If this were the case, Task 1 RTs should be prolonged when Task 2 is a no-
go relative to go task. The observation of a no-go BCE would indicate that backward crosstalk 
is a rather general than a specific phenomenon. 
In Experiment 1, Miller (2006) presented the letters ‘X’ and ‘O’ which were followed 
by a high vs. low tone after a variable SOA (of 100, 200, or 400 ms). Participants were 
instructed to first respond to the identity of the letter with a middle vs. index finger keypress of 
the left hand in Task 1, and to subsequently respond to the frequency of the tone with an index 
finger keypress of the right hand or by withholding the response in Task 2. Trials in which a 
response was given in Task 2 were considered go-trials, whereas trials in which the response in 
Task 2 was withheld were considered no-go trials (see Figure 7). Task 1 RTs were shorter in 
go relative to no-go trials. However, the no-go BCE did not decrease with increasing SOA. This 
observation can be taken as evidence that compatibility-based BCEs and the no-go BCE are 
based on different processes. I will elaborate on this issue in Study 1 of the present dissertation.  
Figure 7. Illustration of the trial structure of a no-go BCE experiment similar to Miller (2006). 
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The no-go BCE was replicated in several more recent studies. For instance, with a pedal 
go/no-go Task 2 (Ko & Miller, 2014), and in the prioritized processing paradigm (Miller & 
Durst, 2014, 2015). However, the processes underlying the no-go BCE as well as its locus and 
source are still debated. 
3.2.2 Theoretical explanation 
The inhibition hypothesis is based on the assumption that withholding a response in a no-go 
trial involves active inhibition of this response (see Brunia, 1983; Heil, Osman, Wiegelmann, 
Rolke, & Hennighausen, 2000; Sasaki, Gemba, Nambu, & Matsuzaki, 1993). Miller (2006) 
suggested that the already prepared response in Task 2 of no-go trials thus also has to be actively 
inhibited (see also Miller & Durst, 2014, 2015). 3 According to the inhibition hypothesis, the 
amount of inhibition needed to inhibit an already prepared response depends on the degree to 
which the response has already been prepared. It follows that, in the case of a well prepared 
response, more inhibition is needed to withhold it. This assumption was recently supported by 
Janczyk and Huestegge (2017), who only observed the no-go BCE when Task 2 was a simple 
go/no-go task, and thus very easy to prepare. The inhibition needed to withhold the response in 
Task 2 then spreads to Task 1 where it prolongs motor execution (Ko & Miller, 2014) and 
accordingly Task 1 RTs. Miller (2006) suggested that the no-go BCE could result from a “rather 
general crosstalk between response selection and/or execution processes of the two tasks” 
(Miller, 2006, p. 492). Thus, from an inhibition hypothesis view, it is reasonable to assume 
                                                 
 
3 The inhibition needed to withhold an already prepared response in a no-go trial has often been equated with the 
inhibition required to stop responding in stop trials of the stop-signal paradigm (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Even 
though it was suggested that inhibition in both paradigms arises in the same processing stage (Bissett, Nee, & 
Jonides, 2009), other evidence suggests that inhibition in the go/no-go paradigm arises automatically, whereas it 
arises in a controlled manner in the stop-signal paradigm (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). As the evidence for the 
equity of inhibition in both paradigms is mixed, I do not wish to intermingle both paradigms in the present 
dissertation. 
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Task 1 motor execution as the locus and Task 2 central stage as the source of the no-go BCE 
(see Figure 8). 
 
 
 
 
As an alternative Rötter and Haider (2017) suggested that the no-go BCE arises through 
automatic response feature activation, similar to what was suggested for the compatibility-
based BCEs. The automatic activation hypothesis is based on the assumption that over the 
course of an experiment, constant stimulus-response parings establish associations of the 
according stimulus with rather abstract goal representations of giving and withholding 
responses. Such abstract goal representations could, for instance, be the sensory consequences 
of not pressing a key (see Kühn, Elsner, Prinz, & Brass, 2009). Henceforth, the no-go stimulus  
can automatically activate the abstract representations of withholding the response (Verbruggen 
& Logan, 2008). It follows that, in a no-go trial, the abstract representations of withholding the 
Task 2 response (e.g., the sensory consequences of not responding) are incompatible with the 
abstract representations of giving the Task 1 response (e.g., the sensory consequences of 
responding) and thus prolong RT1s similar to what has been observed for the compatibility-
based BCEs. Röttger and Haider tested the response activation hypothesis by comparing the 
no-go BCE resulting in blocks identical to Miller’s (2006) Experiment 1 (forced-choice 
condition) with blocks in which participants were free to give or withhold their response in 
Task 2 (free-choice condition). They only observed the no-go BCE when participants were 
forced not to respond. Röttger and Haider concluded that the no-go BCE is not caused by 
Figure 8. Illustration of a modified RSB model where no-go backward crosstalk arises from the temporally 
overlapping stages of Task 2 response selection and Task 1 motor execution (Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017; 
Miller, 2006, see General Discussion for a tentative suggestion). (P = perceptual stage; RS = response 
selection; M = motor stage) 
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inhibition, but rather by automatic response feature activation, because the association of an 
abstract goal representations with a stimulus cannot be established in free-choice blocks where 
no constant stimulus-response pairings exist. Taken together, Röttger and Haider assumed that 
the perception of a no-go stimulus in Task 2 automatically impairs performance of Task 1 
because of the incompatibility with the sensory consequence of a go response or because of an 
incompatibility of abstract “go- and no-go representations” via overlapping response activation 
stages of both tasks. It follows that the no-go BCE arises in the response activation stage of 
Task 1 or in the central stage (against the background of the Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018; 
Thomson et al., 2015, studies). 
In summary, two hypotheses suggest different models for the no-go BCE. The inhibition 
hypothesis assumes that the inhibition needed to withhold an already prepared response in Task 
2 central stage (the source) also affects Task 1 motor execution (the locus). The automatic 
activation hypothesis, on the other hand, assumes that the automatic activation of incompatible 
response features in Task 2 response activation (the source) feeds into the controlled central 
stage of Task 1 (the locus). 
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4 Comparable phenomena 
Besides the compatibility-based and the no-go BCE, influences of several other aspects of Task 
2 on RTs and motor execution of Task 1 have been reported. In the following, I will briefly 
introduce these BCE-like effects and I will get back to them in the General Discussion, where 
they will be related to the BCEs under investigation here. Insights about the relations between 
these comparable phenomena and the BCEs can deliver important implications for dual-tasking 
research in general. 
 
4.1 The category match effect 
One phenomenon akin to the compatibility-based BCEs is the observation that RTs in Task 1 
are shorter when the Stimulus in Task 2 is from the same relative to different semantic category 
– the category match effect. This effect was first reported by Logan and Schulkind (2000), who 
investigated whether parallel memory retrieval between two tasks is possible. If parallel 
memory retrieval is possible, RTs in both tasks should be shorter if Stimulus 1 and Stimulus 2 
are of the same semantic category (e.g., if both are digits), relative to when they are not (e.g., 
Stimulus 1 is a digit and Stimulus 2 is a letter). In their Experiment 1, participants had to 
distinguish between a letter and a digit in Task 1 and in Task 2. Logan and Schulkind observed 
that RTs in both tasks were indeed shorter when both stimuli were from the same semantic 
category than when they were from different semantic categories. The authors replicated this 
result for parity vs. magnitude judgments in their Experiments 2, and for words vs. non-words 
as semantic categories in Experiment 3 and 4. Logan and Schulkind concluded that parallel 
memory retrieval is possible. However, the category match effect could not be obtained when 
different types of stimulus categorizations were needed for both tasks (e.g. when Stimulus 1 
required a size judgment and Stimulus 2 required a parity judgment; Logan & Schulkind, 2000, 
Experiment 2 and 3), and thus seems to depend on a common task set applied in both tasks.  
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More recent studies support the notion that the category match effect depends on a common 
task set, even though parallel memory retrieval still occurs when both task sets differ (e.g., when 
Task 1 is a size judgment task and Task 2 is a parity judgment task; Fischer, Miller, & Schubert, 
2007; Oriet, Tombu, & Jolicoeur, 2005). The category match effect was replicated by several 
other studies (e.g., Logan & Gordon, 2001; Fischer & Hommel, 2012; Plessow, Schade, 
Kirschbaum, & Fischer, 2012), and it was also observed when participants retrieved episodic 
memory content (Logan & Delheimer, 2001).  
 
4.2 Response congruency in task switching 
A BCE-like phenomenon can also be observed in the task switching paradigm, where RTs are 
shorter for stimuli that were assigned the same relative to different responses for both tasks. For 
instance, Kiesel, Wendt, and Peters (2007) instructed their participants to respond with a left 
index finger keypress if the digit stimulus was smaller than 5 and to respond with a right index 
finger keypress if it was larger than 5 in the magnitude task. In the parity task they instructed 
half of their participants to respond with a left index finger keypress if the digit stimulus was 
odd and to respond with a right index finger keypress if it was even (and vice versa for the other 
half of participants). Kiesel et al. (2007) observed shorter RTs for stimuli that were assigned 
the same responses (congruent stimuli) relative to different responses (incongruent stimulus) in 
both tasks (see also Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Such a response congruency effect 
appears to be based on the spatial overlap of the responses afforded by the stimulus, and it was 
even suggested that the response congruency effect “presumably reflects response-activation 
according to the irrelevant task’s S-R rules” (Kiesel et al., 2007, p. 118). Thus, the response 
congruency effect in task switching is structurally similar to the compatibility-based BCEs.  
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4.3 Motor related crosstalk phenomena 
Miller (2006, Experiment 3) investigated the influence of increased motor complexity by 
comparing a single index finger-keypress as response with three index finger-keypresses as 
response in Task 2 (cf. Hackley & Miller, 1995; Henry & Rogers, 1960; Stief, Leuthold, Miller, 
Sommer, & Ulrich, 1998). He observed longer Task 1 RTs when Task 2 required three-
keypresses relative to a single-keypress and concluded that response complexity in Task 2 “has 
an at least partially global effect on motor processes” (p. 491). 
Another example for the influence of motor aspects of Task 2 on motor execution of 
Task 1 was reported by Miller and Alderton (2006). In Experiment 1, participants had to 
respond to the color of a letter with a left index or middle finger keypress in Task 1 and 
subsequently to the identity of the letter in Task 2 with a soft vs. hard keypress of the right 
index finger. These authors observed harder keypresses in Task 1 when the response required 
in Task 2 was a hard relative to soft keypress. This result was replicated with two separate 
stimulus objects separated by a variable SOA in Experiment 2, where the BCE-like effect of 
Response 2 force on Response 1 force was not modulated by SOA. In Experiment 3, Miller and 
Alderton applied a flanker paradigm, in which only one of both possible responses had to be 
carried out, while the other served as a distractor in each trial. Thus, the Task 2 central stage 
was eliminated in trials where Task 2 was task irrelevant. As the BCE-like effect was no longer 
observed, the authors concluded that it has its source in Task 2 central stage and its locus in 
Task 1 motor execution. Note that Miller and Alderton (2006) excluded a motor source, as peak 
force in Task 1 was usually reached before the onset of Response 2 force (for more arguments 
see; Miller & Alderton, 2006, General Discussion). 
In order to closer investigate the locus and source of such BCE-like motor crosstalk, 
Ruiz Fernández and Ulrich (2010) used a continuous lever movement in Task 2. In Task 1 
participants responded with the left index or middle finger, while in Task 2 participants 
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responded with a short or long ballistic lever movement. In Experiment 1, they observed longer 
Task 1 RTs when the lever movement was short relative to long – the opposite of what they 
expected. As the inverted BCE-like effect could have been caused by a force coupling of 
Response 2 with Response 1, the authors also measured movement times in Task 1 of 
Experiment 2, where they replicated the BCE-like effect. However, it was also observed that 
participants pressed the response key for Task 1 longer when the Task 2 lever movement was 
long relative to short. Ruiz Fernández and Ulrich concluded that the BCE-like effect they 
observed in both experiments was indeed caused by a force coupling of Response 2 and 
Response 1 after both responses were selected. Thus, for now, this phenomenon should be 
treated as unrelated to backward crosstalk. 
 
4.4  Miscellaneous phenomena 
There are even more examples of BCE-like phenomena that have not attracted much attention 
in the literature yet. Examples for such phenomena are, for instance, a BCE-like effect based 
on overlap of the emotional valence of stimuli (Eder, Pfister, Dignath, & Hommel, 2016; Allen, 
Lien, & Jardin, 2017) and cross-task compatibility (Koch & Prinz, 2002; Grabbe & Allen, 
2012).  
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5 Research questions 
Previous research often generically labeled interference effects in dual-tasks as “backward 
crosstalk”. However, such phenomena occur under a wide range of different preconditions and 
it is conceivable that different cognitive processes underlie different types of backward 
crosstalk. This applies particularly to the compatibility-based BCEs and the no-go BCE, which 
seem to differ fundamentally in their underlying cognitive processes and in the way they 
manifest in performance and neurophysiological activity. The compatibility-based BCE has its 
locus in Task 1 central stage, its source in Task 2 response activation, and it is caused by 
automatic response feature activation spilling over from Task 2 to Task 1 (for behavioral 
evidence see, Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018; Thomson et al., 2015; for evidence from the LRP, 
see Lien, Ruthruff, Hsieh, & Yu, 2007; Miller, 2017). For the no-go BCE, the majority of 
studies suggested Task 1 motor execution and Task 2 central stage as locus and source, 
respectively (Miller, 2006; Ko & Miller, 2014), and that the no-go BCE is caused by the 
inhibition of a prepared Response 2 which spills over to Task 1 (Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017; 
Miller, 2006; Miller & Durst, 2014, 2015). However, these hypotheses regarding the no-go 
BCE have not yet been tested. 
Another open question is whether the compatibility-based BCEs are actually based on 
the same cognitive processes. Available evidence for the R1-R2 BCE is in line with the notion 
that S1-R1 translation is affected by automatic S2-R2 translation. However, it is hard to imagine 
that the same process underlies the S1-R2 BCE when there is no dimensional overlap in the 
response codes activated by both stimuli (e.g., when S1 translates into a manual left index finger 
vs. right index finger response, whereas S2 translates into a verbal “red” vs. “green” response). 
On the other hand, both compatibility-based BCEs appear to share the same locus and source 
(see Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018) and both are based on similar working memory structures 
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(Thomson et al., 2010; Ellenbogen & Meiran, 2008) which suggests that both BCEs could 
indeed be based on the same processes.  
The main question of the present dissertation was: 
 
To address this question the following two subordinate research questions were 
answered in Studies 1-4 (see Figure 9). The primary research question was: Can we distinguish 
the no-go BCE from the compatibility-based BCEs, based on its underlying cognitive processes 
(Study 1), the mechanism it is caused by (Study 2), and the way in which characteristics of the 
previous trial lead to processing adjustments in the present trial (Study 3)? The secondary 
research question was: Can we distinguish the S1-R2 BCE from the R1-R2 BCE based on their 
underlying processes (Study 4)?  
 
 
Figure 9. Illustration of the main research question and the subordinate research questions. 
 
Can we distinguish different types of backward crosstalk? 
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6 Studies 
The research questions addressed by each of the studies carried out during the course of the 
present dissertation are illustrated in Figure 9. In the following, each study is summarized. 
 
6.1 Study 1: The no-go BCE is located in motor execution 
Evidence for the locus and source of the no-go BCE is still mixed. One line of reasoning 
suggests that in the case of a no-go trial an already prepared Response 2 has to be inhibited 
(Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017; Miller, 2006), and that this inhibition spills over from Task 2 
response selection to Task 1 motor execution (Ko & Miller, 2014). Evidence from these studies 
suggest a model with the locus in Task 1 motor execution and the source in Task 2 response 
selection (see Figure 8). As an alternative, Röttger and Haider (2017) suggested that the no-go 
BCE is caused by (in)compatibility on a more abstract level because the “go representation” of 
Task 1 is incompatible to the “no-go representation” of Task 2 in a no-go trial. Thus, the 
perception of a no-go Stimulus 2 should automatically prolong RT1s in the same way the 
compatibility-based BCE is caused. Study 1 investigated whether the no-go BCE has its locus 
inside Task 1 motor execution or whether the no-go BCE is rather located in Task 1 response 
activation or central stage (and is thus based on similar cognitive mechanisms as the 
compatibility-based BCE). 
In Experiment 1, the locus of slack logic was applied to distinguish whether the no-go 
BCE is located (1) before or (2) at or after the bottleneck (for the same reasoning applied to the 
compatibility-based BCE, see Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018, Experiment 1). To this end, three 
tasks were applied in a PRP-like paradigm. Stimulus 1 always arrived first and was followed 
by Stimulus 2 and 3 after a variable SOA of 50 vs. 1000ms. Task 1 required a vocal response 
(“tip” vs. “top”) to a high or low tone, Task 2 required a manual response (left index vs. middle 
finger) to a blue or yellow letter, and Task 3 was a go/no-go task requiring a response with the 
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right index finger or requiring no response to the identity of a “H” or “X”. Thus, Task 1 central 
stage created cognitive slack for the following tasks, Task 2 was the task in which the no-go 
BCE was observed, and Task 3 was the task causing the no-go BCE. At the long SOA of 
1000ms a no-go BCE was expected to be obtained in Task 2 because a prolongation of any 
Task 2 stage would prolong RT2s equally (see Figure 10). At a short SOA of 50ms, an absence 
of the no-go BCE in Task 2 would indicate a locus before the bottleneck, as any prolongation 
of a stage before the bottleneck would be absorbed into slack without any chance to postpone 
the onset of subsequent stages. This should manifest in an underadditive pattern in RT2s. If, 
however, a no-go BCE is observed at the 50ms SOA, a locus at or after the bottleneck would 
be indicated, which would manifest in an additive pattern. Indeed, the RT2 pattern was additive 
which indicates that the no-go BCE has its locus in Task 2 response selection or motor execution 
(for an illustration see Figure 4 of the attached Study 1). 
In Experiment 2, a variant of the effect propagation logic was applied to distinguish 
between a locus (1) before or at the bottleneck or (2) after the bottleneck (for a similar reasoning 
applied to the compatibility-based BCE, see Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018, Experiment 4). To this 
Figure 10. Illustration of the locus of slack logic applied in Experiment 1 of Study 1. (a) Illustration of the 
case where the no-go BCE arises in Task 2 response activation. (b) Illustration of the case where the no-go 
BCE arises in Task 2 response selection. Note, that the predictions for a prolonged motor execution stage are 
the same. (P = perceptual stage; RA = response activation; RS = response selection; M = motor stage; Task 3 
has been omitted in this illustration) 
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end, the order of the tasks in Experiment 1 was reversed, and the two tasks which enabled the 
no-go BCE arrived first. Task 1 (the identity task) was the task in which the BCE was observed, 
while Task 2 (the color task) was the task causing the no-go BCE in Task 1. Both tasks were 
followed by Task 3 (the tone task) after the SOA. For the logic applied here, first only consider 
the 50ms SOA. It is important to note that the central stage in no-go trials is shorter than in go 
trials (de Jong, 1993; Van Selst & Johnston, 1997), which counteracts the propagation that 
would usually be expected in an effect propagation paradigm. If the no-go BCE is located in 
the central stage, two situations are possible: (1) Task 2 central stage is strongly shortened 
allowing an earlier onset of Task 3 central stage in no-go relative to go trials, and thus the no-
go BCE observed in Task 3 would be inverted (see Figure 5a in the attached Study 1, left panel). 
(2) Task 2 response selection is moderately shortened leading to a reduction of the no-go BCE 
in Task 3 relative to Task 1 (see Figure 5b of the attached Study 1, left panel).  
If the locus of the no-go BCE is in motor execution, the prolongation of this stage would 
only affect RT1. Thus, RT3s would be shorter in no-go relative to go trials, irrespective of the 
length of Task 2 central stage (see Figure 5a and 5b in the attached Study 1, right panel 
respectively). At the long SOA of 1000ms, RT3s should be unaffected by the go/no-go 
manipulation in Task 2. 
In a nutshell, a propagation of the no-go BCE from Task 1 to Task 3 would indicate a 
locus in the central stage. An inverted no-go BCE, on the other hand, would be compatible with 
a locus in the central stage or in motor execution and thus would not allow to distinguish 
between both possible loci. Indeed, the no-go BCE in Task 3 was inverted at the 50ms SOA 
and not present at the 1000ms SOA, which could be interpreted as first evidence for a motor 
locus (see Figure 6 in the attached Study 1). 
To corroborate this conclusion, a baseline condition was added against which the 
inverted no-go BCE in Task 3 of the triple-task condition could be compared in Experiment 3. 
In the baseline condition Task 1 of the triple-task was omitted. Thus, shorter RT3s in no-go 
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relative to go trials – the inverted no-go BCE – could be entirely ascribed to the earlier onset of 
Task 3 response selection, excluding any influence of a possible propagation from Task 1. 
Likewise, under the assumption of a motor locus in the triple-task, the onset of Task 3 response 
selection and thus the size of the no-go BCE is not influenced by any propagation from Task 1. 
Thus, a motor locus would lead to the same size of the inverted no-go BCE in the triple task as 
in the dual-task baseline as illustrated in Figure 11. Under the assumption of a response 
selection locus, however, the onset of Task 3 response selection is delayed, leading to a smaller 
inverted no-go BCE as compared to the dual-task baseline. The number of tasks (triple- vs. 
dual-task condition) was manipulated block-wise and the integral stimulus for Task 1 and Task 
2 was changed to two separate stimuli, to allow for an omission of Stimulus 1 without also 
omitting Stimulus 2 in the baseline condition. The white letter (Stimulus 1) was now surrounded 
by a colored square (Stimulus 2). The only change in the procedure, relative to Experiment 2, 
was the use of a constant SOA of 50ms was used. The size of the inverted no-go BCE did not 
differ between the triple-task condition and the dual-task baseline condition. Thus, the results 
Figure 11.  Illustration of the effect propagation logic applied in Experiment 3 of Study 1. The left side of the 
panel illustrates the predictions for the inverted no-go BCE in Task 3 for the triple-task condition. The 
predictions are based on the assumption of either a response selection or motor locus. The right side of the 
panel illustrates the prediction for the inverted no-go BCE in Task 3 for the dual-task baseline. (P = perceptual 
stage; RA = response activation; RS = response selection; M = motor stage; the subscript indicates Task 1, 
Task 2, and Task 3, respectively) 
 
30 
of Experiment 3 indicate that the no-go BCE is located inside motor execution (see Figure 8 in 
the attached Study 1). 
Taken together, Experiment 1 ruled out a locus before the bottleneck, Experiment 2 
provided first evidence for a locus in motor execution, and Experiment 3 ruled out a locus at or 
before the bottleneck and thus confirmed the locus inside Task 1 motor execution. A locus 
inside motor execution rules out the model suggested by Röttger and Haider (2017), which 
assumes the locus in Task 1 central stage and the source in Task 2 response activation. In 
general, it seems unlikely that the no-go BCE has its source in Task 2 response activation, as 
this stage does not temporally overlap with Task 1 motor execution. Against the background of 
the present results, the most plausible model is one assuming the locus in Task 1 motor 
execution and the source in Task 2 central stage (see Figure 8; Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017; see 
Miller, 2006, General Discussion for a tentative suggestion). Such a model differs qualitatively 
from the model for the compatibility-based BCE illustrated in Figure 4b which assumes a locus 
in Task 1 central stage and the source in Task 2 response activation (Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018; 
Thomson et al., 2015). While this model for the no-go BCE suggests that the no-go BCE is 
caused by a controlled process occurring during Task 2 central stage, the design of Study 1 does 
not allow to investigate the nature of this process. Against the background of what has been 
suggested by previous studies (Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017; Ko & Miller, 2014; Miller, 2006; 
Miller & Durst, 2014, 2015), it is conceivable that this process is the inhibition of an already 
prepared response. However, the inhibition hypothesis has not been tested directly. This was 
the purpose of Study 2. 
 
6.2 Study 2: The no-go BCE is based on the inhibition of prepared responses  
Study 2 aimed to test the inhibition hypothesis. To this end, a two-choice Task 1 was combined 
with a choice/no-go Task 2, which either required one of two manual go responses or a no-go 
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response. The critical manipulation was the frequency of the Task 2 go-stimuli. In half of the 
blocks, both go-stimuli occurred equally often, which should not encourage participants to 
prepare a specific response in advance (unbiased blocks). In this case no, or even a reversed no-
go BCE was expected (see also Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017, for this observation) because no 
Task 2 response was prepared, and thus no inhibition was needed to withhold the according 
response. In the other half of blocks, one go-stimulus occurred in 90% of all go-trials, which 
should encourage participants to prepare the according response in advance (biased blocks). In 
this case, the inhibition hypothesis predicts that the no-go BCE emerges, because the response 
prepared in advance has to be inhibited. 
RTs in both tasks were shorter in biased relative to unbiased blocks, indicating that 
participants indeed prepared the more prepotent Task 2 response in advance (see Figure 2 of 
the attached Study 2). The no-go BCE was obtained in biased blocks, and it was even inverted 
in unbiased blocks. These results support the assumption that the inhibition of an already 
prepared response is the mechanisms that causes the no-go BCE.  
 
6.3 Study 3: Distinguishing the no-go BCE from the compatibility-based 
BCEs: Evidence from the diffusion model 
Taken together, the results of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that the no-go BCE can be distinguished 
from the compatibility-based BCE in several aspects: (1) The no-go BCE has its locus in Task 
1 motor execution and its source in Task 2 response selection, and (2) the no-go BCE is caused 
by the inhibition of an already prepared Task 2 response. These results indicate that both BCEs 
are based on fundamentally different processes and that they are caused by different 
mechanisms, which suggests that both BCEs can actually be distinguished as two different types 
of BCEs. However, one aspect in which both BCEs can also potentially differ is the way in 
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which previous trials influence the size of each BCE in the present trial – and thus, the way in 
which cognitive control adjusts processing in both BCEs. 
Adjustment from cognitive control has frequently been assessed by sequential 
modulations, which is the influence of a previous trial on compatibility effects in the present 
trial. Recent studies observed that the size of compatibility-based BCEs in Trial n depended on 
the compatibility-status of the previous Trial n-1 (Janczyk, 2016; Renas et al., 2018; 
Scherbaum, Gottschalk, Dshemuchadse, & Fischer, 2015; see also Schuch, Dignath, 
Steinhauser, & Janczyk, 2019). In these studies, the compatibility-based BCE was present 
following compatible trials, whereas it was absent (or sometimes even reversed) following 
incompatible trials. The sequential modulations reported for the compatibility-based BCEs are 
similar to what was frequently observed in conflict tasks (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; for 
evidence for the Simon effect see e.g., Praamstra, Kleine, & Schnitzler, 1999; see also Janczyk 
& Leuthold, 2018; Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002) and they have 
frequently been interpreted as evidence for adaptation to just experienced conflict (for a review, 
see Egner, 2007). According to the conflict monitoring hypothesis (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen, 2001), conflict registered in a trial leads to an optimized task processing in 
the following trial. It was suggested that the reduced compatibility-based BCE following 
incompatible trials is caused by shielding Task 1 against influences of Task 2 (Fischer, 
Gottschalk, & Dreisbach 2014; Janczyk, 2016). As an alternative, Task 2 response activation 
might become suppressed after incompatible trials, and thus Task 1 is less influenced by Task 
2. While several studies observed sequential modulations for the compatibility-based BCE, so 
far no study assessed sequential modulations for the no-go BCE. 
The goal of Study 3 was to (1) investigate sequential modulations for the no-go BCE, 
(2) to reveal the reasons for sequential modulations in both BCEs, and (3) to further test the 
models visualized in Figure 4b and 8. While behavioral data was sufficient to investigate 
sequential modulations of the no-go BCE, a diffusion model was fitted to these data to reveal 
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the reasons for the sequential modulations in both BCEs and to test the models suggested for 
both BCEs.  
The diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978) is a mathematical model of human decision making 
in binary tasks (for an illustration see Figure 12). It assumes that a participant accumulates 
evidence for a decision until one of two decision thresholds is hit. When the decision threshold 
is reached, the decision is made and the according response is given. The standard diffusion 
model comprises three main parameters: The drift rate (v) reflects the speed and direction of 
the accumulation process, non-decision time (t0) reflects the duration of processes occurring 
before and after the decision process (such as perceptual and motor processes), and threshold 
separation a reflects the amount of information needed to reach a decision. The accumulation 
process usually starts between both thresholds. From there, drift rate drives the information into 
one direction, while random noise is added. This random noise causes the accumulation process 
to reach the correct threshold at varying points in time, and can also cause the diffusion process 
to reach the wrong threshold leading to an error.  
 
In the following, I will present the hypotheses separately for both BCEs and for 
behavioral measures and diffusion model parameters of Task 1, starting with the compatibility-
based BCEs. For the behavioral measures, a sequential modulation signified by a larger BCE 
Figure 12. Exemplary illustration of decision processes in the diffusion model. The two thresholds (here 
associated with correct [a] and erroneous responses [0]) are separated by the threshold separation a. The 
accumulation process moves with drift rate ν from the starting point (here centered between thresholds) until 
it reaches the upper or lower threshold. To the decision process depicted in the figure add non-decisional 
processes (e.g., encoding of information, motoric response execution). The green line illustrates a decision 
process leading to a correct response and the red line illustrates a decision process leading to a wrong response. 
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following compatible relative to incompatible trials was expected (e.g., Janczyk 2016). As the 
compatibility-based BCEs are located in the central stage (Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018; 
Thomson et al., 2015), and because v is known to be larger in compatible relative to 
incompatible trials (Janczyk, Mittelstädt, & Wienrich, 2018), sequential modulations in 
behavioral data were expected to be reflected in sequential modulations of v.  
For the no-go BCE a sequential modulation in the behavioral data was expected, with a 
no-go BCE only following go trials. Against the background of Study 1 and 2, it was assumed 
that participants would adjust their preparation state in Trial n according to the nature of Trial 
n-1. This means that following go-trials participants would again prepare the Task 2 response, 
which should lead to a no-go BCE in case of a no-go trial. Following no-go trials, however, the 
Task 2 response should not be prepared, and thus no no-go BCE should be observed, as there 
is nothing to inhibit. Against the model suggested in Study 1 (see Figure 8), the sequential 
modulation was predicted to be reflected in a sequential modulation of t0.  
By and large, the predicted results were obtained (see Figures 4, 6, and 10 in the attached 
Study 3). For the compatibility-based BCEs a sequential modulation was observed in the 
behavioral data and in the diffusion model parameter v. 4 These results support the model 
assuming that the compatibility-based BCEs have their locus inside Task 1 central stage and 
their locus in Task 2 response activation (see Figure 4b; Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018; Thomson 
et al., 2015). Parameter effects for Task 2 were either absent, small, and/or unreliable, and thus 
                                                 
 
4 As an additional, albeit subsidiary, hypothesis, an interaction of compatibility in Trial n and Trial n-1 was 
predicted for t0. This prediction is due to the trial to trial transitions from incompatible to incompatible and 
compatible to compatible trials, which entail 50% of exact repetitions of the same two responses (see also Figure 
1 in Janczyk, 2016). Such exact repetitions can lead to shorter RTs due to re-usage of motor programs (e.g., 
Rosenbaum, Weber, Hazelett, & Van Hindorff, 1986). This interaction was indeed observed and thus data from 
Experiment 3 in Janczyk (2016), where the aforementioned transitions were avoided, were reanalyzed. As was 
expected the sequential modulation in v was replicated, but not in t0. 
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the present results are in line with the assumption that Task 2 was not suppressed. Rather, 
following an incompatible trial, Task 1 is shielded against influences of Task 2.  
For the no-go BCE, a sequential modulation was observed in the behavioral data and in 
t0. This supports the model suggested in Study 1, assuming that Task 1 motor execution is the 
locus and Task 2 central stage is the source of the no-go BCE (see Figure 8). For Task 2, RTs 
were shorter following go than no-go trials and v was larger following go than no-go trials. These 
results support the assumption that Response 2 preparation was increased following go trials. 
In a nutshell, the results of Study 3 provided converging evidence for a qualitative 
distinction of the compatibility-based BCEs and the no-go BCE, as both BCEs appear to have 
different loci and sources. Furthermore, both BCEs differ fundamentally in the way cognitive 
control is adjusted. While in the compatibility-based BCE, cognitive control appears to adjust 
shielding of Task 1 from influences of Task 2, in the no-go BCE cognitive control seems to adjust 
the preparation state for Response 2. 
 
6.4 Study 4: Distinguishing two types of compatibility-based backward 
crosstalk  
Studies 1-3 provided evidence that the compatibility-based BCEs differ qualitatively from the 
no-go BCE. However, it is also conceivable that two types of compatibility-based BCEs, 
namely the R1-R2 BCE and the S1-R2 BCE, differ qualitatively, as they result from different 
types of dimensional overlap. The R1-R2 BCE is based on spatial overlap of response features, 
whereas the S1-R2 BCE is based on overlap of stimulus and response features. Further, it should 
be noted that in Experiment 3 of Janczyk, Renas et al. (2018) a descriptive trend towards 
underadditivity was obtained for the S1-R2 BCE, which suggests that the S1-R2 BCEs could 
actually arise in the perceptual instead of central stage. Therefore, it remains possible that both 
compatibility-based BCEs are based on different processes. Study 4 investigated whether both 
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compatibility-based BCEs indeed arise in the central stage (see Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018), 
and whether they are based on the same or different processes in three experiments. 
If both BCEs would not be located in the same processing stage, different underlying 
processes for both compatibility-based BCEs would be indicated. Experiment 1 investigated 
whether either the R1-R2 BCE or the S1-R2 BCE have a precentral locus. To this end the 
brightness of Stimulus 1 was varied trial-by trial in blocks of R1-R2 BCE tasks and S1-R2 BCE 
tasks. In general, longer RTs for trials with a dark relative to bright Stimulus 1 were expected. The 
main hypothesis was based on Sternberg’s (1969) additive factors logic: A significant interaction 
of two experimental factors indicates that both factors affect the same processing stage, whereas an 
additive combination of both factors is more in line with the assumption that two different 
processing stages are affected. As the R1-R2 BCE is located in the central stage, the manipulation 
of a perceptual feature like Stimulus 1 brightness should not modulate the R1-R2 BCE. Accordingly 
an additive combination of Stimulus 1 brightness and R1-R2 compatibility status was expected. For 
the S1-R2 BCE, a significant interaction of S1-R2 compatibility status with Stimulus 1 brightness 
would indicate that the S1-R2 BCE arises in the perceptual instead of central stage. If, however, 
S1-R2 compatibility status does not interact with Stimulus 1 brightness, a locus in the perceptual 
stage can be ruled out for the S1-R2 BCE. As predicted, longer RT1s were observed when Stimulus 
1 was dark relative to bright. Crucially, Stimulus 1 brightness only combined additively with both 
BCEs (see Figure 2 of the attached Study 4), and thus results of Experiment 1 indicate that both 
compatibility-based BCEs arise in the same processing stage, namely the capacity-limited central 
stage of processing (Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018). 
However, it is still conceivable that different capacity-limited processes underlie both 
compatibility-based BCEs (see Hommel, 1998, p. 1374). Experiments 2 and 3 asked whether 
this is the case. To this end, the R1-R2 BCE and the S1-R2 BCE were both enabled in each trial 
to investigate sequential modulations within and between both compatibility-based BCEs. 
While sequential modulations within each compatibility-based BCE were expected (even 
though they have not yet been demonstrated for the S1-R2 BCE), possible sequential 
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modulations between both compatibility-based BCEs were of main interest. For the main 
hypothesis, consider a model in which the central stage comprises two subsequent capacity-
limited processes, each responsible for one of the BCEs. Such a model assumes that a capacity-
limited process should only be adjusted in Trial n if the same process was subject to conflict in 
the previous Trial n-1. Precisely, a sequential modulation of a particular BCE should only occur, 
if the compatibility status of the same BCE was incompatible in Trial n-1. Thus, if only 
sequential modulations within each BCE would be obtained, two different processes for both 
compatibility-based BCEs would be indicated. Mutual sequential modulations of both 
compatibility-based BCEs, however, would indicate that both compatibility-based BCEs are 
based on the same capacity-limited process and that the model should be rejected. 
To facilitate mutual sequential modulations, stimulus and response features for both 
BCEs were kept as similar as possible (Braem, Abrahamse, Duthoo, & Notebaert, 2014). In 
each trial, the letters “H” and “S”, colored in red or green, were presented above or beneath the 
screen center (for an illustration of the trial structure, see Figure 13). In Experiment 2, the 
position of the letter served as Stimulus 1, the identity of the letter served as Stimulus 2, and 
the color served as response-cue for the response to Stimulus 2. Participants were instructed to 
first respond to Stimulus 1 in a pedal two-choice task, and to subsequently respond to Stimulus 
2 in a manual two-choice task by pressing an upper or lower key. There was an upper and lower 
key on each side of the participant, and a home-key was placed between the response-keys on 
both sides. The home-keys were to be kept pressed from the beginning of the trial. The side on 
which the upper or lower key had to be pressed was determined by the color of the letter. The 
participants were instructed to let go of the respective home-key when they decided which key 
to press on the according side. A trial was considered R1-R2 compatible when the pedal and 
manual response were given on the same side (e.g., a left pedal response and a left manual 
response), whereas a trial was considered R1-R2 incompatible when both responses were given 
on different sides (e.g., a left pedal response and a right manual response). Thus, the color 
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determined R1-R2 compatibility in Trial n. A trial was considered S1-R2 compatible when the 
letter location and the location of the response matched (e.g., a letter presented above fixation 
and a response with an upper key), whereas a trial was considered S1-R2 incompatible when 
the letter location and the location of the response did not match (e.g., a letter presented above 
fixation and a response with a lower key). The only change in Experiment 2 was that the color 
now determined S1-R2 compatibility, instead of R1-R2 compatibility (for an illustration of the 
trial structure, see Figure 13). 
By and large, very similar results were obtained in Experiment 2 and 3. As expected, 
sequential modulations within each BCE were present. Most importantly, in both experiments 
no mutual sequential modulations of both BCEs were obtained (see Figures 7 and Figure 9 in 
the attached Study 4). This result suggests that both compatibility-based BCEs are based on 
different processes, and is thus in line with a model assuming two (subsequent) capacity-limited 
processes in the central stage (see Figure 15). In other words, if conflict is experienced in one 
of both BCEs in Trial n-1, the process responsible for the respective BCE is adjusted in Trial n. 
However, at this point the true nature of these two processes remains unknown.  
Against the background of previous studies, it is conceivable that the R1-R2 BCE is 
based on the central process of response selection, which receives the activation resulting from 
automatic stimulus-response translation in the Task 2 response activation stage (for behavioral 
Figure 13. Graphical illustration of the trial structure and the tasks in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 of Study 
4. In Experiment 2 the color cue determines R1-R2 compatibility, whereas in Experiment 3 the color cue 
determines S1-R2 compatibility. 
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evidence, see Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018; Thomson et al., 2015; for evidence from the LRP, 
see Lien et al., 2007; Miller, 2017). For the S1-R2 BCE, this assumption is implausible, as this 
BCE is based on the overlap of Stimulus 1 with Response 2.  Instead, it appears plausible that 
a process responsible for Stimulus 1 processing receives the stimulus-response translation 
resulting from Task 2 response activation (for a similar suggestion see, Hommel, 1998, p. 
1374). 
Taken together, results of Study 4 support the assumption that the R1-R2 BCE and the 
S1-R2 BCE are located in the capacity-limited stage. However, both compatibility-based BCEs 
appear to be based on two different capacity-limited processes. In the General Discussion, I will 
suggest a model that can account for both compatibility-based BCEs.   
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7 General Discussion 
Dual-tasking, that is performing more than one task in close temporal succession, is known to 
lead to decrements in the performance of both tasks involved compared to when they are 
performed in isolation. The decrements arising in the second of two subsequently performed 
tasks have frequently been explained with a structural bottleneck in human cognition. This 
bottleneck only allows central processing for one task at a time, while processing of the other 
must wait until the bottleneck is available again. However, this widely accepted view of strictly 
serial processing in dual-tasking has recently been challenged by observations, in which aspects 
of Task 2 already influenced performance of Task 1, even though Task 2 was still waiting for 
access to the bottleneck. Such backward crosstalk effects can, for instance, be observed when 
features of Task 1 overlap with features of Task 2 – the compatibility-based BCEs – but also 
when no dimensional overlap between both tasks is given, as is the case the no-go BCE.  
The main question of the present dissertation was: Can we distinguish different types of 
backward crosstalk? To address this question, the following two subordinate research questions 
were answered in Studies 1-4 (see Figure 9). The primary research question was: Can we 
distinguish the no-go BCE from the compatibility-based BCEs, based on its underlying 
cognitive processes (Study 1), the mechanism it is caused by (Study 2), and the way in which 
characteristics of the previous trial lead to processing adjustments in the present trial (Study 3)? 
The secondary research question was: Can we distinguish the S1-R2 BCE from the R1-R2 BCE 
based on their underlying processes (Study 4)? 
In the following, I will first answer the primary research question based on the results 
of Studies 1-3. Then I will answer the secondary research question and suggest a model that 
can account for both compatibility-based BCEs based on the results of Study 4. To anticipate, 
all these studies indicate that different types of backward crosstalk should be distinguished. 
Subsequently, I will discuss in how far backward crosstalk effects and related phenomena can 
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be integrated. I will continue with implications for theories of dual-tasking and end with a 
general conclusion regarding the main research question. 
 
7.1 Summary of results 
7.1.1 Can the no-go BCE be distinguished from the compatibility-based BCE? 
Studies 1, 2, and 3 were dedicated to distinguish the no-go BCE from the compatibility-based 
BCE. Study 1 aimed to distinguish the no-go BCE from the compatibility-based BCE based on 
its underlying locus and source. Applying the locus of slack and effect propagation logic, the 
locus of the no-go BCE was identified in motor execution of Task 1. The most plausible model 
that can account for the no-go BCE is one that assumes that the no-go BCE has its locus in Task 
1 motor execution and its source in Task 2 central stage (for an illustration see Figure 14a; for 
a similar suggestion see, Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017; see Miller, 2006, General Discussion for 
a tentative suggestion). Such a model implies that the no-go BCE is enabled when Task 1 motor 
execution and Task 2 central stage temporally overlap and thus the no-go BCE differs 
qualitatively from the compatibility-based BCEs, which have their locus in Task 1 central stage 
and their source in Task 2 response activation (see Figure 14b; Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018; 
Thomson et al., 2015).  If in a no-go trial temporal overlap is given between Task 1 motor 
execution and Task 2 central stage, a controlled process in Task 2 central stage causes the no-
Figure 14. Illustration of the locus and the source of the (a) no-go BCE and the (b) compatibility-based BCEs 
(Janczyk Renas et al., 2018; Thomson et al., 2015). (P = perceptual stage, RS = response selection, RA = 
response activation, M = motor stage, the subscript indicates Task 1 and 2, respectively).  
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go BCE in Task 1. Several studies suggested that this controlled process is the inhibition of an 
already prepared Response 2 spilling over to Task 1 (Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017; Ko & Miller, 
2014; Miller, 2006; Miller & Durst, 2014, 2015).  
Study 2 examined whether an overspill of inhibition, needed to overcome an already 
prepared Response 2, is the mechanism that causes the no-go BCE. To this end, preparation for 
one of two go-responses of a two-choice/no-go Task 2 was either encouraged in biased blocks 
or was not encouraged in neutral blocks, where the no-go BCE was even inverted (see also 
Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017, for this observation). This suggests that no inhibition occurred in 
no-go trials, as the unprepared Response 2 did not have to be inhibited. As predicted, the no-go 
BCE reemerged in biased blocks. This supports the assumption that in no-go trials inhibition is 
recruited to withhold an already prepared Response 2. Against the background of the model 
suggested in Study 1, results of Study 2 deliver first behavioral evidence that the mechanism 
causing the no-go BCE is indeed the inhibition of a prepared Response 2 spilling over to Task 
1. Note that this can be taken as further evidence against the alternative model suggested by 
Röttger and Haider (2017). In a similar vein, the present results help to further distinguish the 
no-go BCE from the compatibility-based BCEs, which are assumed to be caused by automatic-
response feature activation occurring in Task 2 (e.g., Hommel, 1998; Janczyk, Renas et al., 
2018; Lien & Proctor, 2000; Thomson et al., 2015).  
The results of Study 1 and 2 suggest that the no-go BCE differs from the compatibility-
based BCEs not only in its locus and source, and thus in its underlying cognitive processes, but 
also in the mechanism it is caused by. As a consequence, two different models are needed to 
account for both types of BCEs. To further test the validity of the model suggested for the no-
go BCE in Study 1 and the model for the compatibility-based BCEs (Janczyk, Renas et al., 
2018, Thomson et al., 2015), Study 3 employed the diffusion model. Additionally, this approach 
allowed to further delineate the no-go BCE from the compatibility-based BCEs based on the 
way processing is adjusted depending on characteristics of the previous trial, as sequential 
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modulations of the model parameters can be interpreted as indicators for the respective 
processing stage in which the adjustment is made. For the no-go BCE sequential modulations 
were expected to be reflected in non-decision time t0. For the compatibility-based BCEs, recent 
evidence suggests that sequential modulations should be reflected in drift rate v, as these BCEs 
have their locus in the central stage (Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018; Thomson et al., 2015; for first 
evidence from the diffusion model see, Janczyk, Mittelstädt et al., 2018). Indeed, for the no-go 
BCE sequential modulations were reflected in t0, whereas the sequential modulations of the 
compatibility-based BCE were reflected in v. These results are in line with the models that were 
suggested for the no-go BCE (Figure 14a) and for the compatibility-based BCEs (Figure 14b). 
Thus, the present results provide additional evidence for a qualitative distinction of the no-go 
BCE and the compatibility-based BCE based on their underlying processing stages.  
Data for Task 2 of Study 3 allowed for a first exploratory investigation of how 
characteristics of the previous trial lead to processing adjustments in both types of BCEs. For 
the compatibility-based BCE cognitive control could adjust two – not necessarily mutually 
exclusive – mechanisms of shielding Task 1 from influences of Task 2 (e.g., Fischer et al., 
2014; Janczyk, 2016), and suppression of Task 2 response activation (similar to what has been 
suggested to occur in standard conflict tasks; e.g., Janczyk & Leuthold, 2018; Stürmer et al., 
2002; Stürmer & Leuthold, 2003). However, Task 2 diffusion model parameter data were not 
that clear cut. As Task 2 processing was unaffected, it can tentatively be suggested that Task 2 
response activation was not suppressed. Instead, results for Task 2 rather suggest that Task 1 
processing was adjusted, which is in line with the notion that Task 1 is shielded. It should be 
noted that the concept of task shielding is still underspecified, as it is unknown how exactly 
task shielding alters processing of both tasks. Future studies should investigate whether the 
concept of task shielding could be specified or maybe even entirely replaced by the concept of 
task-set activation (Goschke, 2003, Dreisbach & Haider, 2008, 2009), increased attention 
allocated to Task 1 (similar to how Botvinick et al., 2001, conceptualized cognitive control to 
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operate in the Stroop task), or a facilitated perceptual processing in Task 1 (Stelzel, Brandt, & 
Schubert, 2009). 
Processing adjustment via task shielding appears implausible for the no-go BCE, as its 
locus is in motor execution. Instead, it seems reasonable to assume that sequential modulations 
of the no-go BCE depend on the preparation state for Response 2. According to this assumption, 
participants would continue to prepare Response 2 following go trials, whereas following no-
go trials preparation for Response 2 should be decreased or even absent. These assumptions 
were supported by the observations that RT2s where shorter following go relative to no-go trials 
and that v was larger following go than no-go trials. This suggests that indeed the status of 
Response 2 preparation is either “prepared” (following go trials) or “unprepared” (following 
no-go trials) in an all or nothing manner in the no-go BCE. The notion of this all or nothing 
adjustment, however, is in contrast to the assumption that cognitive control scales processing 
adjustments continuously, depending on the degree of just experienced conflict (Botvinick et 
al., 2001, p. 630). This raises the question whether cognitive control even adjusts the 
preparation state for Response 2, or whether such adjustments can be made more efficiently by 
simply re-using the motor programs needed in the previous trial. Taken together, results for 
Task 2 of Study 3 indicate that compatibility-based BCEs and the no-go BCE differ in the way 
processing adjustments are made. In the compatibility-based BCEs task processing is 
presumably adjusted by shielding of Task 1, whereas in the no-go BCE the preparation state for 
Response 2 seems to be adjusted. However, future studies are needed to investigate whether 
cognitive control is involved in the latter adjustments.  
To conclude, the answer to the primary research question is: Indeed, the no-go BCE can 
be distinguished from the compatibility-based BCE, as it differs in its underlying processing 
stages, in the mechanism it is caused by, and in the way processing is adjusted depending on 
characteristics of the previous trial.  
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7.1.2 Can the S1-R2 BCE be distinguished from the R1-R2 BCE?  
While Studies 1-3 showed that the no-go BCE can be clearly distinguished from the 
compatibility-based BCEs, Study 4 aimed to distinguish two types of compatibility-based 
BCEs, namely the S1-R2 BCE and the R1-R2 BCE. To this end, Experiment 1 of Study 4 
applied Sternberg’s (1969) additive factors logic to rule out a perceptual locus of both BCEs. 
As both BCEs were not modulated by the manipulation of Stimulus 1 brightness, results of 
Experiment 1 suggest that they do not have their locus in the perceptual stage, but most likely 
in the capacity-limited central stage as was suggested by Janczyk, Renas et al. (2018). 
The following Experiments 2 and 3 investigated whether the same capacity-limited 
process underlies either compatibility-based BCE or whether both compatibility-based BCEs 
are based on two different capacity-limited processes. To this end, both the S1-R2 BCE and the 
R1-R2 BCE were enabled in the same trial. Cognitive control in one of two possible capacity-
limited processes should only be adjusted in Trial n if the same process was subject to conflict 
in the previous Trial n-1. Following this logic, mutual sequential modulations of both 
compatibility-based BCEs would indicate that they are based on the same capacity-limited 
process. However, in Experiment 2 and 3 only sequential modulations within each 
compatibility-based BCE were observed, which is in line with the assumption that the S1-R2 
BCE and the R1-R2 BCE are based on different capacity-limited processes. 
For the R1-R2 BCE, several studies suggested that it is based on the central process of 
response selection, which receives the activation resulting from automatic stimulus-response 
translation in the Task 2 response activation stage (for behavioral evidence, see Janczyk, Renas 
et al., 2018; Thomson et al., 2015; for evidence from the LRP, see Lien et al., 2007; Miller, 
2017). In the case of the S1-R2 BCE, however, automatic stimulus-response translation cannot 
influence Response 1 processing, as there is no dimensional overlap with Response 2. Instead, 
the S1-R2 BCE relies on conceptual or spatial overlap between Stimulus 1 and Response 2.  
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For the following explanation of the S1-R2 BCE, consider an experiment in which the 
letters H and S are presented in the color red or green. The color requires a manual response 
with the left or right index finger (Task 1) and the identity of the letter requires a vocal utterance 
of the words “red” or “green” (Task 2; see also Hommel, 1998, Experiment 2). In this case, 
Stimulus 2 – the letter identity – leads to the activation of a color word response (e.g., the 
Stimulus “H” is translated into the vocal utterance “red”). The activation of the color word 
response could then add to a process running in the capacity-limited central stage of Task 1. It 
is unlikely that response selection proper receives the activation of the color word and adds it 
to the activation of the manual response. Instead, it appears plausible that the activation of the 
color word feeds into an earlier capacity-limited process that deals with Stimulus 1 processing 
(for a similar suggestion, see Hommel, 1998, p. 1374).  
One possible candidate for such a capacity-limited process is stimulus categorization, 
which categorizes the task relevant feature of Stimulus 1. This appears plausible for two 
reasons: (1) „higher level perceptual processing (such as stimulus classification)“ (Johnston & 
McCann, 2006, p. 699) has been shown to be capacity-limited and (2) semantic category-
response rules instead of stimulus-response rules appear to be held in working memory for the 
S1-R2 BCE (Ellenbogen & Meiran, 2008) and can also replace stimulus-response rules for the 
R1-R2 BCE under certain circumstances (Thomson et al., 2010). While (1) supports the 
assumption that stimulus categorization is indeed a capacity-limited process, (2) suggests that 
stimulus categorization is a process that occurs for both compatibility-based BCEs.  
For the example of the S1-R2 BCE mentioned before, this means that stimulus 
categorization categorizes the task relevant feature of Stimulus 1 as red or green (see Figure 
15). If stimulus categorization of Task 1 temporally overlaps with response activation of Task 
2, activation of the color word derived from Task 2 response activation feeds into stimulus 
categorization running in Task 1 central stage. If Stimulus 1 and Response 2 are compatible, 
the color word activation added to stimulus categorization activates the respective color-
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category of Stimulus 1, and thus the categorization process is completed faster compared to 
Stimulus 1 and Response 2 being incompatible. The task relevant feature of Stimulus 1 is then 
translated into the correct response by the process of response selection. For the R1-R2 BCE 
the stimulus categorization model assumes that the activation of a certain response feature in 
Task 2 response activation feeds into the process of response selection as already suggested by 
the model proposed by Janczyk, Renas et al. (2018) and Thomson et al. (2015). This is because 
the Response 2 feature only spatially overlaps with the response into which Stimulus 1 is 
translated by response selection, and not with Stimulus 1 categorized in stimulus categorization. 
At this point, it cannot be safely said whether the two capacity-limited processes of 
stimulus categorization and response selection proceed in serial or (at least partially) in parallel. 
On the one hand it is plausible that stimulus categorization begins first, or at least gets a head 
start, as response selection needs to know which stimulus code needs to be translated into a 
response. On the other hand, it is possible that response selection runs (at least partially) in 
parallel with stimulus categorization. Two predictions can be derived from these assumptions. 
Under the assumption of two serial processes, the duration of each capacity-limited processes 
should be unaffected by the duration of the respective other capacity-limited process, and thus 
both compatibility-based BCEs should combine additively. Alternatively, if both processes (at 
Figure 15. The stimulus categorization model. The capacity-limited central stage (orange) comprises two 
processes separated by a dashed line. Task 2 (the identity task) is illustrated separately for the S1-R2 BCE and 
the R1-R2 BCE. (P = perceptual stage, M = motor stage, the subscript indicates Task 1 and 2, respectively) 
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least partially) run in parallel, the duration of both capacity-limited processes should depend on 
each other (see additive factors logic, Sternberg, 1969). For instance, if both processes run in 
parallel and one process is finished earlier in a compatible trial, the remaining process gains all 
available resources and is thus also finished earlier. 5 In fact, in Experiment 2 and 3 of Study 4 
the interaction of both compatibility-based BCEs in Trial n was not significant. This indicates 
that the duration of both capacity-limited processes did not affect each other, and is thus in line 
with the assumption that both capacity-limited processes run in serial. 
In a nutshell, results of Study 4 indicate that the S1-R2 BCE and the R1-R2 BCE both 
arise in the capacity-limited central stage, but they differ qualitatively in the capacity-limited 
process they are based on. Against the background of previous evidence, the stimulus 
categorization model was suggested, which can account for both compatibility-based BCEs. 
The stimulus categorization model assumes that the capacity-limited process of stimulus 
categorization underlies the S1-R2 BCE and presumably precedes the capacity-limited process 
of response selection that underlies the R1-R2 BCE. Future research is needed to directly test 
the stimulus categorization model.   
 
7.2 Towards an integration of backward crosstalk effects and related 
phenomena  
The results of Study 1-4 emphasize that observations of backward crosstalk arising under 
different preconditions differ qualitatively in several aspects such as their locus and source, the 
mechanism they are caused by, and in the way processing is adjusted depending on 
                                                 
 
5 At this point, it cannot be ruled out that both processes run completely in parallel and gain 50% of the available 
resources each. However, even a completely balanced allocation of resources to both processes would lead to the 
predicted interaction, as one of both processes likely finishes first.  
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characteristics of the previous trial (for a more comprehensive list of aspects see the first column 
of Table 2). Based on these aspects, phenomena related to the BCEs can be compared to the 
BCEs under investigation here. If a related phenomenon is similar to a BCE in a sufficient 
amount of aspects, an integration of both phenomena may be considered. In the following, I 
will undertake a first approach towards such an integration of the related phenomena mentioned 
in the introduction with the BCEs under investigation here. I will begin with the category match 
effect followed by the response congruency effect, and motor-related phenomena.
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 Compatibility-based BCEs No-go BCE  Related phenomena 
 R1-R2 BCE S1-R2 BCE   Category match effect 
Response 
congruency effect 
Complexity-based 
BCE-like effect 
Force-based BCE-
like effect 
Manifestation RT1 RT1 RT1  RT1 RT1 RT1 Response 1 force 
Overlap Spatial Conceptual / Spatial - 
 Categorial Spatial (?) - - 
Locus T1 central stage T1 central stage T1 motor execution  T1 central stage (?) T1 central stage (?) T1 motor execution T1 motor execution 
Source T2 response activation 
T2 response 
activation T2 central stage 
 T2 response 
activation 
T2 response 
activation (?) T2 central stage T2 central stage 
Mechanism 
Automatic 
response-feature 
activation 
Automatic 
response-feature 
activation 
Inhibition of a 
prepared Response 
2 
 Automatic memory 
retrieval 
Automatic 
response-feature 
activation (?) 
Anticipation of 
response selection 
difficulty (?) 
Anticipation of 
Response 2 force 
(?) 
Processing 
adjustment Task 1 shielding Task 1 shielding 
Preparation state 
for Response 2 
 Task 1 shielding 
(?) 
Activation setting 
for both task sets ? ? 
Response-rules 
in working 
memory 
Category-response 
rules 
Category-response 
rules ? 
 Category-response 
rules 
Response-rules not 
held in working 
memory 
? ? 
Table 2. Overview of the different types of BCEs and related phenomena (columns). Each row represents an aspect in which the phenomena differ. Matching colors 
indicate that the respective phenomena appear to be related to the types of BCEs under investigation here, according to the similarity of their aspects. Aspects that have 
not yet been investigated in the literature are labeled with a “?”. 
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7.2.1 The category match effect compared with BCEs. 
Similar to the compatibility-based BCEs, the category match effect appears to be based on 
dimensional overlap, as RTs in Task 1 are shorter when stimuli of both tasks are of the same 
relative to different category. Indeed, Fischer et al. (2007) suggested that the category match 
effect has similar underlying cognitive preconditions as the compatibility-based BCEs (for 
additional evidence, see Oriet et al., 2005). These authors obtained evidence for semantic 
memory retrieval in Task 2 running in parallel with Task 1 central stage, applying the locus of 
slack logic to Task 2. While this suggests a source prior to the central stage, similar to the 
compatibility-based BCEs (Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018; Thomson et al., 2015), it, on the other 
hand, suggests that the mechanism causing the category match effect differs from the 
mechanism causing the compatibility-based BCEs. In line with what results of Study 3 suggest 
for the compatibility-based BCEs, it was suggested that cognitive control adjusts shielding of 
Task 1 in the category match effect (Fischer et al., 2014). However, it should be noted that these 
authors only interpreted the size of the category-match effect as an index for shielding of Task 
1 and they did not investigate sequential modulations for the category match effect. Similar to 
the compatibility-based BCEs, Thomson et al. (2010) obtained evidence that the category match 
effect relies on category-response rules held in working memory. 
In sum, the available evidence for the category match effect suggests that it has a similar 
source as the compatibility-based BCEs, and that for both phenomena similar response rules 
are held in working memory. However, at this point it is impossible to distinguish or integrate 
both phenomena, as evidence from studies directly comparing both phenomena lacks. A first 
step to bridge this gap would be to identify the model for the category match effect, applying 
the locus of slack and effect propagation logic (see Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018). If the model 
for the category match could not be distinguished from the model for the compatibility-based 
BCEs in such a study, this would support the assumption that both phenomena are qualitatively 
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similar. Besides behavioral approaches directly investigating sequential modulations, it would 
also be insightful to apply computational models like the diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978; see 
also Study 3 of the present dissertation) or the DMC (Ulrich et al., 2015), as well as 
psychophysiological approaches to verify that both phenomena have a common locus and 
source and that cognitive control adjusts processing similarly. If more evidence for qualitative 
similarities between both phenomena could be obtained, it might make sense to integrate the 
category match effect and compatibility-based BCEs under a common label (for a similar 
suggestion see, Fischer et al., 2007, p. 1696). 
7.2.2 The response congruency effect compared with BCEs. 
At first glance, the congruency effects in task switching appear to be based on spatial overlap 
of the responses required by both tasks and thus appear to be closer related to the compatibility-
based BCEs than to the no-go BCE. Importantly, the observation that the irrelevant task 
influences performance of the relevant task in task switching is in line with the result that 
compatibility-based BCEs can even be obtained when Task 2 does not have to be carried out 
(for evidence from the S1-R2 BCE, see Hommel 1998, Experiment 5; for evidence from the 
R1-R2 BCE, see Janczyk, Renas et al., 2018, Experiment 2). Even though it appears plausible 
to assume that the response congruency effect has its source in Task 2 response activation (for 
a tentative suggestion, see Kiesel et al., 2007), evidence from studies investigating the locus, 
the source, and the mechanism causing the response congruency effect still lacks at this point.  
Concerning processing adjustments, it was suggested that in the case of an incongruent 
stimulus the task-relevant set is strengthened, whereas the task-irrelevant task-set is inhibited 
(Goschke, 2000). Then, the just acquired activation setting for both task-sets is re-used in the 
following trial. Such a notion appears to share similarities with the processing adjustments made 
for the compatibility-based BCEs and with the prevalence of the preparation state for Response 
2 in the no-go BCE. On the one hand, the activation setting seems to be adjusted continuously 
(for a tentative suggestion see Brown, Reynolds, & Braver, 2007, p. 72) similar to what would 
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be assumed for the compatibility-based BCEs according to Botvinick et al. (2001, p. 630). On 
the other hand, the re-usage of activation settings is similar to the notion of re-used motor 
programs for the no-go BCE. However, at this point attempts to relate processing adjustments 
in the response congruency effect to compatibility-based BCEs and the no-go BCE remain 
highly speculative.  
One aspect in which the response congruency effect appears to differ from the 
compatibility-based BCEs is in its response-rules, which are not held in working memory 
(Kiesel et al., 2007). Rather, such rules seem to be “formed during the experiment as 
participants repeatedly perform a particular response according to a given stimulus” (Kiesel et 
al., 2007, p. 123).  
At this point, an integration of the response congruency effect with BCEs appears 
impossible, as these phenomena have never been directly compared in regard to the aspects 
listed in Table (2). Nevertheless, it should be noted that these phenomena are potentially related. 
Future studies directly comparing these phenomena are needed, to allow for an integration or a 
distinction of the response congruency effect and BCEs. 
7.2.3 Motor-related phenomena compared with BCEs. 
Miller (2006, Experiment 3) obtained longer RT1s when Task 2 required a triple index-finger 
keypress than a single index-finger keypress. Miller suggested that this complexity-based BCE-
like effect has its locus in Task 1 Motor execution and its source in Task 2 central stage, similar 
to the no-go BCE. Thus, this phenomenon was accounted for by a model similar to that of the 
no-go BCE. However, it is implausible that inhibition of an already prepared response is the 
mechanism that causes the complexity-based BCE-like effect. Instead, it is possible that this 
response-complexity-based BCE-like effect was caused by motor-interference occurring when 
the two responses are made in close temporal succession (e.g., Ketelaars, Khan, & Franks, 1999; 
for evidence that this especially happens with two hand responses, see e.g., Franz, 1997; 
Rinkenauer, Ulrich, & Wing, 2001; Spijkers & Heuer, 1995), or that programming of the triple-
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response in Task 2 could have taken longer, and thus RTs were prolonged (Fischman, 1984; 
Sternberg, Monsell, Knoll, & Wright, 1978).  
The complexity-based BCE-like effect matches the force-based BCE-like effect (Miller 
& Alderton, 2006) in most aspects. Miller and Alderton (2006) observed harder keypresses in 
Task 1 when the response required in Task 2 was a hard relative to soft keypress. Thus, for the 
force-based BCE-like effect it cannot be ruled out that it was at least partially enabled by the 
common effector system (Huestegge, Pieczykolan, & Janczyk, 2018). Nevertheless, Miller and 
Alderton (2006) suggested a locus in Task 1 motor execution and a source in Task 2 central 
stage, and thus a model in line with the one for the no-go BCE.  As the mechanism causing this 
phenomenon, Miller and Alderton suggested that processing of Stimulus 2 “activated some 
internal representation associated with a high-force response” (p. 157). This assumption is in 
line with studies that documented the important role of effect anticipation for BCEs (see 
Janczyk et al., 2014; Renas et al., 2018). It is thus conceivable that the anticipation of the 
Response 2 force could have influenced Response 1 force.  
Taken together, both motor-related BCE-like phenomena are likely to share their locus 
and source with the no-go BCE. The mechanisms causing both phenomena, however, appear to 
differ from each other and from the mechanism causing the no-go BCE. Nevertheless, up to 
this point it appears that the response-complexity-based BCE-like effect (Miller, 2006, 
Experiment 3) and the force-based BCE-like effect (Miller & Alderton, 2006) are closer related 
to the no-go BCE than to the compatibility-based BCEs. However, insights about aspects such 
as processing adjustments and working memory foundations lack, and it cannot be ruled out 
that dimensional overlap is a precondition in both motor-related BCE-like phenomena. Thus, 
future research is needed to distinguish these phenomena from the compatibility-based BCEs 
and to investigate how closely they are related to the no-go BCE.  
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7.3 Implications for theories of dual-tasking 
The compatibility-based BCE, the no-go BCE, and the phenomena related to both BCEs are 
evidence of parallel processing in dual-tasks. However, the results from Studies 1-4 of the 
present dissertation suggest that models for different types of BCEs – and presumably also for 
BCE-like phenomena – differ qualitatively. Thus, the way in which parallel processing occurs 
also differs qualitatively for different types of BCEs and BCE-like phenomena. This means that 
each of these observations contradict the notion of a completely encapsulated bottleneck in dual 
tasks in a different way.  
In the case of the compatibility-based BCEs, the stimulus-categorization model (Study 
4) assumes that the capacity-limited central stage in Task 1 receives activation from Task 2. 
From a serial processing perspective, this suggests that the central stage is not completely 
encapsulated, but to some extent permeable for activation from other tasks. Even though this 
means that parallel processing during the central stage of Task 1 is possible to some extent, the 
assumption that the central stage is capacity-limited remains untouched. In other words, the 
capacity-limited stage is still only available for one task at a time. According to this view, one 
would assume that the response activation accumulated for Task 2 cannot be used to build on 
in Task 2 central stage. Instead, the accumulation process that needs to be completed to select 
the correct Response 2 starts from scratch in Task 2. If, however, a parallel processing 
perspective is taken, it would be assumed that central stages of both tasks run in parallel. 
However, as Task 1 central processing is prioritized, it receives more resources and is finished 
earlier than Task 2 central processing. If this were the case, the response activation for Task 2 
accumulated in parallel to Task 1 central stage should at least to some degree be available the 
moment Task 1 has finished central processing and Task 2 gains the remaining resources.  
Up to this point, the question whether response activation in Task 2 is set to zero when 
Task 2 central stage starts (serial perspective; for evidence, see Schubert et al., 2008) or whether 
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it continues to accumulate under certain conditions (parallel perspective; for evidence see 
Thomson & Watter, 2013) remains to be answered.  In order to gain insights about the Task 2 
response activation level in the course of time, it could be fruitful to fit a computational model 
that allows for estimating parameters for two tasks at the same time to data of a compatibility-
based BCE task. Such a model could for instance be created by modifying the DMC (Ulrich et 
al., 2015; for a similar suggestion see also Study 3, General Discussion). 
The no-go BCE contradicts the notion of an encapsulated bottleneck in a different way 
than the compatibility-based BCE. The model for the no-go BCE (see Study 1-3) assumes that 
the motor stage in Task 1 receives the inhibition arising in Task 2 central stage in the case an 
already prepared response has to be withheld in a no-go trial. This model neither contradicts 
the notion of strictly serial central processing nor the idea of parallel central processing. 
However, it suggests that the bottleneck is permeable under certain circumstances and that 
certain byproducts of central processing can leak the bottleneck and interfere with other 
processes running in parallel. In the case of the no-go BCE, the inhibition needed to withhold 
an already prepared Response 2 leaks the capacity-limited central stage (i.e., the bottleneck) 
and affects Task 1 motor stage. 
In a nutshell, the results of the present dissertation contradict the notion that the 
capacity-limited central stage of processing – also known as the bottleneck – is an encapsulated 
processing stage. In fact, the capacity-limited central stage even appears to be the hub of 
between-task interference in dual-tasking. In the case of the compatibility-based BCEs, it 
receives activation from Task 2 response activation, whereas in the case of the no-go BCE it 
passes on inhibition to the motor stage in Task 1. Although both observations are in line with 
the notion of parallel processing in dual-tasking in general, they can also be explained from a 
serial processing view. To distinguish between both theories of dual-tasking, future studies 
should apply computational modelling approaches to investigate the Task 2 response activation 
level in the course of time and specify models for other BCE-like phenomena. 
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8 Conclusion 
The main question of the present dissertation was: Can we distinguish different types of 
backward crosstalk? The answer to this question is a clear yes. Studies 1-3 showed that the no-
go BCE indeed differs from the compatibility-based BCEs in (1) its locus and source, (2) the 
mechanism it is caused by, and (3) in the way processing is adjusted based on characteristics of 
the previous trial. Thus, the no-go BCE and the compatibility-based BCE should be seen as two 
different types of backward crosstalk. Furthermore, results of Study 4 indicate that both 
compatibility-based BCEs, namely the S1-R2 BCE and the R1-R2 BCE, can be distinguished 
by the capacity-limited process they are based on. Importantly, the types of BCEs under 
investigation here all appear to contradict the notion of a completely encapsulated stage of 
central processing in dual-tasking in a different way. Evidence for each type of BCE rather 
suggests that the capacity-limited central stage of processing is actually the hub for dual-tasking 
interference. 
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The Motor Locus of No-Go Backward Crosstalk
Moritz Durst and Markus Janczyk
University of Tübingen
A frequent observation in dual-task studies is the backward crosstalk effect (BCE), meaning that aspects
of a secondary Task 2 influence Task 1 performance. Up to this point, 2 major types of the BCE were
investigated: a BCE based on dimensional overlap between both stimuli and/or responses (the
compatibility-based BCE), and a BCE based on whether Task 2 is a go or no-go task (the no-go BCE).
Recent evidence suggests that the compatibility-based BCE has its locus inside the response selection
stage. The available evidence for the locus of the no-go BCE is still mixed, however. To this end, the 3
experiments reported in the present study used an extended psychological refractory period (PRP)
paradigm with 3 subsequent tasks. Applying the locus of slack logic in Experiment 1, the no-go BCE was
not absorbed into the cognitive slack and, thus, a locus before response selection could be ruled out.
Subsequently applying the effect propagation logic in Experiment 2 and 3, the no-go BCE arising in Task
1 was even inverted in Task 3. Because no propagation of the no-go BCE was observed, a locus before
or in response selection could be ruled out. Thus, we conclude that the no-go BCE has its locus during
motor execution. Because the no-go BCE and the compatibility-based BCE are located in different
stages, we suggest that both types of the BCE do not share a common underlying mechanism.
Keywords: PRP, locus of slack, dual-task, backward crosstalk, go/no-go
Human dual-task performance has been extensively studied in
the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm (Pashler,
1994; Welford, 1952). In the PRP paradigm usually two tasks are
performed in rapid succession, that is, participants on each trial
first carry out Response 1 (R1) to Stimulus 1 (S1) and then
Response 2 (R2) to Stimulus 2 (S2). The crucial manipulation is
the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), that is, the interval between
onset of S1 and S2 and consequently the temporal overlap between
Task 1 (T1) and Task 2 (T2). While response times for T1 (RT1)
are largely unaffected by the SOA, those for T2 (RT2) increase
severely the shorter the SOA—the PRP effect (Pashler, 1994;
Telford, 1931) evidencing performance costs for T2 (for possible
exceptions, see Janczyk, Pfister, Wallmeier, & Kunde, 2014).
A popular model explaining the PRP effect is the so called
response selection bottleneck model (RSB; Pashler, 1984), which
assumes that each task is processed in the three subsequent stages
of perception, response selection, and motor execution. The per-
ception and motor execution stages are supposed to be capacity-
unlimited. In contrast, the response selection (RS) stage is con-
ceived as capacity-limited, which means it can only process one
task at a time (see Figure 1a) and is described as a (structural)
bottleneck in human cognition. It follows that RS in T2 cannot
start until RS in T1 has finished and, thus, RT2s get prolonged at
a short SOA: When T2 cannot gain direct access to the RS stage,
it simply waits, and this idle time is called cognitive slack.
However, converging evidence for simultaneous processing of
more than one task at a time was accumulated in the last decades
(e.g., Hazeltine, Teague, & Ivry, 2002; Miller, Ulrich, & Rolke,
2009; Mittelstädt & Miller, 2017). One particular effect that con-
tradicts a strict bottleneck explanation in dual-tasking is that fea-
tures of T2 can already influence performance in T1. Such effects
have been termed backward crosstalk effects (BCEs). Studies
beginning with Hommel (1998) reported BCEs based on dimen-
sional overlap and, thus, compatibility of features (stimuli, re-
sponses; Ellenbogen & Meiran, 2008; Janczyk, Pfister, Hommel,
& Kunde, 2014; Lien & Proctor, 2000; Schubert, Fischer, &
Stelzel, 2008; Watter & Logan, 2006), but Miller (2006) reported
cases even without such dimensional overlap. Specifically, in
Experiment 1 and 2, he observed that the performance in T1 was
also influenced by whether T2 was a go or a no-go task. It is of
debate whether both variants are akin or represent (qualitatively)
different kinds of BCEs. If both kinds of BCEs were indeed akin
they should have the same locus (i.e., both BCEs arise in the same
processing stage of T1) and the same source (i.e., both BCEs are
caused by the same processing stage of T2).
The Locus of the Compatibility-Based BCE
In a typical experiment investigating the compatibility-based
BCE (Hommel, 1998), participants are presented with colored
letters and are instructed to respond to the color of the letter with
a left versus right manual keypress and to the identity of the letter
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with a vocal “left” versus “right” utterance or pedal key press.
When R1 and R2 are spatially compatible (e.g., a left keypress in
R1 and a vocal “left” utterance or a right keypress in R1 and a
vocal “right” utterance), RT1s are shorter compared with incom-
patible responses.
Such results imply that some RS-related aspects of T2 must
have run in parallel to T1 RS to some extent, which is in contrast
to the classic RSB model. To account for this, Hommel (1998)
suggested to subdivide the RS stage into two sequential substages,
(a) the response activation stage (RA) dealing with automatic and
capacity-unlimited stimulus-response (S-R) translation, and (b) the
capacity-limited RS that “deals with the outcome of all the trans-
lations, hence, the resulting response-activation pattern” (p. 1381;
see Figure 1b, see also Lien & Proctor, 2002).1 Because RA can
run in parallel with other stages, crosstalk occurs if T1 and T2 RA
overlap in time. If then T1 RA is the locus of this BCE (i.e., the
stage in T1 that is affected), T1 RA should be prolonged in
incompatible relative to compatible trials, yielding a BCE in RTs.
Accordingly, then T2 RA is the stage that causes this BCE in T1
RA and, thus, the source of this BCE.
In contrast, Thomson, Danis, and Watter (2015) assumed that an
(automatic) RA occurs after the perceptual stage of T2 because T2
does not gain direct access to the bottleneck stage of RS. This T2
RA could then interfere with T1 RS (see Figure 1c) and this was
tested in a training study. Because dual-task training mainly short-
ens the duration of RS (Strobach, Liepelt, Pashler, Frensch, &
Schubert, 2013) the authors assumed that a shortening of T1 RS
should reduce the opportunity for a BCE to arise between T2 RA
and T1 RS. In line with this, Thomson et al. observed that the BCE
indeed became smaller with training. The model suggested by
Thomson et al. received recent support from a study by Janczyk
et al. (2017) that introduced a triple-task logic (similar to what we
use in the present study) to localize the compatibility-based BCE.
In Experiments 1–3 of this study, a variant of the locus of slack
logic (Schweickert, 1978)2 was used and the results excluded a
locus before the bottleneck stage (i.e., the perceptual or the RA
stage). In two additional experiments (Experiments 4 and 5), two
different approaches were taken to exclude a motor contribution to
the compatibility-based BCE. For example, in Experiment 5 a
stimulus/go-signal interval was introduced, and the compatibility-
based BCE was eliminated when participants were provided suf-
ficient time to prepare their responses. In summary, Janczyk et al.
also concluded that the locus of the BCE is in the RS stage of T1,
and suggested that it is caused by interference from (automatic)
RA in T2 running in parallel to T1 RS (see Figure 1c).
In a nutshell, recently converging evidence for a RS locus of the
compatibility-based BCE was accumulated in behavioral (Janczyk
et al., 2017; Thomson et al., 2015) as well as LRP data (Miller,
2017).
The Locus of the No-Go BCE
Miller (2006) investigated whether BCEs exclusively occur with
dimensional overlap between both tasks (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, &
Osman, 1990). In Experiments 1 and 2, a manual choice-response
T1 was combined with a go/no-go T2 (see Donders, 1969). Thus,
in go-trials participants responded with a keypress of their right
index finger and withheld this response in no-go trials. Miller
observed that RT1 was prolonged when T2 was a no-go compared
with go trial. We will refer to this effect as the no-go BCE (see
1 The interpretation of the RA and RS stages as being sequential pro-
cessing stages may not be uncontroversial, yet it is widely received in this
way in the respective literature (see Janczyk et al., 2017, for details; see
also, e.g., Paelecke & Kunde, 2007; Schubert et al., 2008).
2 This approach is explained in more detail in the Introduction to
Experiment 1 that makes use of that logic as well.
Figure 1. (a) Illustration of the original response selection bottleneck
(RSB) model (e.g., Pashler, 1994). Task 2 response selection (RS) can only
start when Task 1 RS is finished. No (backward) crosstalk can occur in this
model. (b) Illustration of a modified RSB model (Hommel, 1998; Lien &
Proctor, 2002). A parallel stage of response activation (RA) starts after
stimulus identification. (Backward) crosstalk is enabled when both RA
stages overlap temporally (as is illustrated by the gray arrows). (c) Illus-
tration of a model according to which RA occurs automatically if RS
cannot start immediately in Task 2. (Backward) crosstalk arises if Task 2
RA feeds directly into Task 1 RS (Janczyk, Renas, & Durst, 2017, Figure
1; Thomson et al., 2015, Figure 1). (d) Illustration of a model where
(backward) crosstalk arises from temporally overlapping Task 2 RS and
Task 1 motor stage (Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017; Miller, 2006, see general
discussion for a tentative suggestion). (P ! perceptual stage; RS !
response selection; RA ! response activation; M ! motor stage, the
subscript indicates Task 1 and 2, respectively). See the online article for the
color version of this figure.
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1932 DURST AND JANCZYK
Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017). The no-go BCE was replicated with
a pedal go/no-go T2 in a study by Ko and Miller (2014) and it was
also observed in an alternative dual-task paradigm, the prioritized
processing (PP) paradigm (Miller & Durst, 2014, 2015).
The exact reason for the no-go BCE, however, is still debated.
One line of argument suggests that the no-go BCE is caused by
active inhibition (Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017; Miller, 2006) re-
sulting from the attempt to inhibit and prevent the execution of an
already prepared response in T2 (see Brunia, 1983; Heil, Osman,
Wiegelmann, Rolke, & Hennighausen, 2000; Sasaki, Gemba,
Nambu, & Matsuzaki, 1993). This inhibition spreads to T1 and
prolongs RT1 (Miller, 2006; Miller & Durst, 2014, 2015), by
inhibiting the according motor execution, as was suggested in the
discussion of Ko and Miller (2014). In particular, the no-go BCE
could result from a “rather general crosstalk between response
selection and/or execution processes of the two tasks” (Miller,
2006, p. 492). Following this reasoning, the extent of inhibition
required in a no-go trial should increase with the degree of prep-
aration for the according R2. In line with this, Janczyk and Hue-
stegge only observed a no-go BCE when T2 was very easy to
prepare (when T2 was a simple go/no-go task).3 In summary, it
seems reasonable to assume that the no-go BCE results from a
lengthened T1 motor stage in case of T2 no-go trials.
As an alternative, it was recently proposed to explain the no-go
BCE in a similar vein as the compatibility-based BCE, namely by
means of automatic response feature activation (Röttger & Haider,
2017). These authors compared the no-go BCE of blocks with a
classic go/no-go T2 (forced-choice) to blocks where participants
could freely choose whether to respond or to withhold their response
to T2 (free-choice). They obtained a no-go BCE only in the forced-
choice condition and, thus, reasoned that the no-go BCE is not based
on inhibition but rather on automatic response feature activation (that
cannot happen in free-choice tasks). Such automatically activated
response features could for instance be response effects, which play a
role for the selection of no-go responses (Kühn, Elsner, Prinz, &
Brass, 2009) and also for the compatibility-based BCE (Janczyk,
Pfister, Hommel, et al., 2014; Renas, Durst, & Janczyk, 2017).4 In
addition, compatibility may exist on a higher level in the sense that the
“go representation” of T1 conflicts with the “no-go representation” of
T2. In any case, the perception of a no-go S2 should automatically
impair T1 performance (i.e., via T2 RA running in parallel to T1 RA
or RS), because of the incompatibility with the response effect of a go
R1 (e.g., the tactile effect of pressing a key) or because of the
incompatibility between the abstract “go and no-go representations”.
In summary, according to these ideas, the no-go BCE results from the
T1 RA stage (or the RS stage, against the background of the Janczyk
et al., 2017; Thomson et al., 2015, studies).
The Present Study
In the present study, we investigated whether the no-go BCE is
based on (a) similar cognitive mechanisms as the compatibility-
based BCE or (b) rather has its locus in the later motor stage,
perhaps because of T2 inhibition spilling over to T1. To this end,
we conducted three PRP-like experiments with three subsequent
tasks (see also Janczyk et al., 2017). Experiment 1 was designed to
distinguish whether the no-go BCE is located (a) before or (b) at
or after the bottleneck. This experiment ruled out a locus before the
bottleneck and, thus, a locus in RA as suggested by Röttger and
Haider (2017) seems unlikely. Still, as in the case of the
compatibility-based BCE, the source may be in the RS stage (as
was already suggested by Ko & Miller, 2014) and, thus, nonethe-
less both BCEs would share commonalities.
Thus, Experiment 2 and 3 were run to distinguish between (a) a
locus before or during the bottleneck or (b) after the bottleneck.
Combined with the results from Experiment 1, this allows to
distinguish between a locus in RS or motor execution: A locus
inside RS would still be in line with the idea that the no-go BCE
has essentially the same cause as the compatibility based BCE (i.e.,
RA of T2; Röttger & Haider, 2017). A locus within the motor stage
would rather fit with the ideas of inhibition spilling over from T2
(Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017; Miller, 2006) and suggest that both
types of the BCE may be of distinct nature. To anticipate, results
from Experiments 1–3 suggest that the no-go BCE is indeed
located in motor execution.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 applied the locus of slack logic (Schweickert, 1978;
see Janczyk, 2013, 2017; Miller & Reynolds, 2003, for applications)
to distinguish whether the no-go BCE is located (a) before or (b) at or
after the bottleneck. To this end, three subsequent tasks were pre-
sented in a PRP-like manner. In each trial S1 arrived first and after a
variable SOA, S2 and S3 were presented simultaneously. While T1
(the tone task) and T2 (the identity task) were two choice-tasks, T3
(the color task) was a go/no-go task. Thus, a no-go BCE was expected
in T2. At a long SOA, without cognitive slack, T2 does not have to
wait to gain access to RS and the no-go BCE should be observable as
a prolongation of RT2. This is because the prolongation of any T2
stage caused by the no-go BCE would affect RT2 equally. At a short
SOA, however, there is cognitive slack. Thus, a prolongation of any
stage of T2 before the bottleneck (perception and RA) simply extends
into the cognitive slack—the no-go BCE is absorbed into slack. In
this case RT2s are not prolonged because the subsequent RS of T2 is
not further delayed (see Figure 2). This pattern would manifest in an
underadditive interaction of trial type (go vs. no-go) with SOA and
indicates a locus of the no-go BCE before the bottleneck. However, an
additive combination of trial type and SOA would indicate that the
no-go BCE is still observed at a short SOA, and was not absorbed into
slack. Then, a locus of the no-go BCE at or after the bottleneck is
indicated.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four students (19 women) from the
University of Tübingen, aged 18 to 27 years (M ! 20.1 years,
3 The inhibition that is assumed to arise in no-go tasks has often been
equated with the inhibition that is thought to arise in stop trials of the
stop-signal paradigm (Friedman & Miyake, 2004), and the inhibition in
both paradigms actually seems to arise in the same processing stage
(Bissett, Nee, & Jonides, 2009). However, there is also evidence suggesting
that inhibition arises automatically in the go/no-go paradigm, whereas it
arises in a controlled manner in the stop-signal paradigm (Verbruggen &
Logan, 2008). Taken together, evidence for the equity of no-go and
stop-signal tasks is mixed and we do not wish to intermingle both para-
digms at this point.
4 According to Verbruggen and Logan (2008) such response features
may also be task rules, inhibitory tags, inhibitory states, action plans, or
task goals.
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1933LOCUS OF NO-GO BACKWARD CROSSTALK
SD ! 2.0), participated for monetary compensation (8€) or course
credit. All participants provided written informed consent before
the experiment and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus and stimuli. A standard PC was used for stimulus
presentation and response collection. Stimuli and instructions were
presented on a 17-in. CRT monitor. For an illustration of the follow-
ing, see Figure 3a and 3b. S1 was a 300 or 900 Hz tone played via
headphones (50 ms). The letters ‘H’ or ‘X’ colored in blue or yellow
were presented in the center of an otherwise black screen. The identity
of the letter served as S2 and the color of the letter served as S3.
Responses to S1 (R1) were collected with a voice key, and the
experimenter coded the response identity immediately to allow for
error feedback. The experimenter was in the same room, but not
visible for the participant. Responses to the identity of the letter (R2)
were given via manual keypresses of two response keys located to the
left of the participant. Responses to the color of the letter were given
via a keypress of a single response key located to the right of the
participant (R3).
Task and procedure. T1 was to respond to S1 by giving a vocal
R1 (“tipp” vs. “topp”). T2 was to respond to S2 with the left middle
or index finger. T3 was a go/no-go response to S3 with the right index
finger.
Every trial started with a white fixation cross (250 ms), followed
by a blank screen (250 ms), and the onset of S1. After a variable
SOA of 50 versus 1,000 ms (similar to the study by Janczyk et al.,
2017), the colored letter (S2/S3) was presented, until R2 and R3
were registered. The next trial started after an intertrial interval
(ITI) of 1,000 ms. In case of wrong responses or general errors (no
response within 4,000 ms following S2/S3 onset, responses in the
wrong order, and so on), specific error feedback was provided for
1,000 ms before the ITI.
Participants first performed a short practice block of 10 ran-
domly drawn trials, which was followed by 10 experimental blocks
of 64 trials each, resulting from four repetitions of all combinations
of 2 S1 " 2 S2 " 2 S3 " 2 SOAs. All trials were presented in a
random order. Participants received written instructions that em-
phasized speed and accuracy, and were asked to give R1, R2, and
R3 successively in fixed order. The S-R mapping of all tasks was
counterbalanced across participants.
Design and analysis. A trial was considered a go trial when R3
was to be given. Otherwise, it was considered a no-go trial. Data from
the first two blocks were considered practice and were excluded from
analyses, as were trials with general errors. For the analysis of re-
sponse times (RTs), only entirely correct trials were included. Further,
no-go trials were excluded from RT3 analysis and trials with RTs
deviating more than 2.5 SDs from the individual cell mean were
considered outliers and were excluded from all RT analyses. Con-
cerning T1 and T2, mean correct RTs and error rates (ERs) were
Figure 2. Illustration of the extended PRP paradigm applying the locus of slack logic (see Janczyk et al., 2017).
Panel (a) illustrates the case when the no-go backward crosstalk effect (BCE) arises because of a lengthened RA
stage (in Task 2), and Panel (b) illustrates the case when the BCE arises because of a lengthened RS stage (in
Task 2; the predictions for a lengthened motor stage are the same). (P ! perceptual stage; RS ! response
selection; RA ! response activation; M ! motor stage, the subscript indicates Task 1 and 2, respectively; Task
3 has been omitted in this illustration; the effect size of the BCE is indicated by the gray curly brackets). See
the online article for the color version of this figure.
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1934 DURST AND JANCZYK
Figure 3. Illustration of the trial structure for each experiment of the present study. (a) Every trial (in
Experiments 1–3) started with a 1,000 ms intertrial interval (ITI), which was followed by a fixation cross lasting
for 250 ms and a blank screen lasting for 250 ms. Note, that each trial lasted for a maximum of 4,000 ms plus
the SOA duration of the according trial or until all responses were given. The tone always lasted for 50 ms, while
the letter and color stimuli remained on screen until the trial had ended. The tone task always was a two-choice
task requiring a vocal utterance (“tipp” vs. “topp”), the identity task was a two-choice task (left index vs. left
middle finger), and the color task was a go/no-go task (give vs. withhold a response with the right index finger).
(b) Trial structure for Experiment 1. (c) Trial structure for Experiment 2. (d) Trial structure for Experiment 3.
See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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1935LOCUS OF NO-GO BACKWARD CROSSTALK
submitted to 2 " 2 analyses of variance (ANOVA) with SOA (50 vs.
1,000 ms) and trial type (go vs. no-go) as repeated-measures. Mean
correct RTs and ERs of T3 were submitted to an ANOVA with SOA
(50 vs. 1,000 ms) as a repeated measure. Additionally, throughout the
article, we provide results from Bayesian analyses (Masson, 2011;
Wagenmakers, 2007) when critical conclusions are based on nonsig-
nificant results. ERs for T3 were calculated separately for erroneously
withheld responses in case of a go trial (go trial errors) and for
erroneously given responses in case of a no-go trial (no-go trial
errors).
Results
All mean RTs are visualized in Figure 4 (see also Table 1) and
ERs are summarized in Table 1.
Task 1. The ANOVA for mean RT1s (2.85% outliers) yielded
no significant results, all Fs ! 1.63, all ps " .214. The ANOVA
for ER1 yielded a significant main effect of SOA, with 1.59%
more errors for the 50 ms SOA compared with the 1,000 ms SOA,
F(1, 23) ! 18.02, p # .001, $p2 ! .44. All other Fs ! 0.41, all ps "
.527.
Task 2. The ANOVA for mean RT2s (2.88% outliers) revealed
a significant main effect of SOA, with 640 ms shorter RT2s for the
1,000 ms SOA relative to the 50 ms SOA, that is, the typical PRP
effect for T2, F(1, 23) ! 323.63, p # .001, $p2 ! .93. Further, the
ANOVA revealed a main effect of trial type, with 41 ms shorter RT2s
for go compared with no-go trials, reflecting the no-go BCE in T2,
F(1, 23) ! 13.71, p ! .001, $p2 ! .37. The interaction, however, was
not significant, which indicates that the no-go BCE was of compara-
ble size at both SOAs, F(1, 23) ! 2.45, p ! .131, $p2 ! .10 (BF01 !
1.45, pBIC(H0 |D) ! .592). Descriptively, the no-go BCE was slightly
larger at the short (51 ms) compared with the long SOA (31 ms),
instead of being underadditive. No significant effects were observed
for ER2, all Fs ! 0.31, all ps " .769.
Task 3. The ANOVA for mean RT3s (2.98% outliers) re-
vealed a main effect of SOA, with 638 ms shorter RT3s at the SOA
of 1,000 ms compared with an SOA of 50 ms, F(1, 23) ! 298.89,
p # .001, $p2 ! .93. The ANOVA for go-trial errors revealed a
significant effect of SOA, F(1, 23) ! 4.80, p ! .039, $p2 ! .17,
with 0.43% less errors for the 1,000 ms SOA compared with the 50
ms SOA. The main effect of SOA was not significant for no-go
trial errors, F(1, 23) ! 0.58, p ! .453, $p2 ! .02.
Discussion
Experiment 1 aimed to determine whether the no-go BCE arises (a)
before or (b) at or after the bottleneck by means of applying the locus
of slack logic. A no-go BCE was observed in T2, but its size did not
differ across SOAs. Thus, the no-go BCE was not absorbed into slack
meaning that a locus of the no-go BCE before the bottleneck could be
excluded. Even though the additional Bayes analysis revealed only
positive evidence favoring the H0, it is important to note that the
(descriptive) data pattern does not point to an underadditive interac-
tion of SOA and trial type (that would in fact have been problematic
for the conclusion from this experiment). Thus, the results observed in
Experiment 1 contradict the assumption that the no-go BCE is located
inside RA as implied by Röttger and Haider (2017). If one assumes
the compatibility-based and the no-go BCE were caused by the same
mechanisms, this experiment could be conceived as a replication of
Experiments 1–3 of Janczyk et al. (2017). To further distinguish
between (a) a locus before or during the bottleneck or (b) after the
bottleneck in the motor stage, Experiments 2 and 3 applied variants of
the effect propagation logic.
Experiment 2
To apply the effect propagation logic (see, e.g., Kunde, Pfister,
& Janczyk, 2012; Miller & Reynolds, 2003) in Experiment 2, the
order of tasks in Experiment 1 was switched. The two tasks in
between which backward crosstalk was enabled were now pre-
sented first: T1 (the identity task) was the task for which the no-go
BCE was observed, and T2 (the color task) was the go/no-go task
causing the no-go BCE in T1. The former T1 was now T3 (the tone
task), and was separated from T1 and T2 by the SOA.
For the following argument, we assume that the SOA is short (i.e.,
50 ms). Consider first the case that a stage before the motor stage is
the locus of the no-go BCE in T1 (against the background of Exper-
iment 1, this would be the RS stage). Any prolongation of these stages
in T2 no-go trials delays the start of T2 RS and thereby also of T3 RS
in a no-go trial.5 The situation, however, is slightly more complicated
because the RS stage of no-go tasks is known to be shorter than of go
tasks (de Jong, 1993; Van Selst & Johnston, 1997). This counteracts
5 Note that our reasoning hinges on the assumption that the processing
of no-go tasks also need a RS stage, and there is ample evidence for this
assumption (Bertelson & Tisseyre, 1969; de Jong, 1993; Gottsdanker,
1979; Kerr, 1983; Smith, 1967; Van Selst & Johnston, 1997).
Figure 4. Mean RTs of Tasks 1, 2 and 3 as a function of trial type (go vs.
no-go) and SOA (50 ms vs. 1,000 ms) for Experiment 1. For Task 1 and
2, errors bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the difference
between go and no-go trials, collapsed across SOA (see Pfister & Janczyk,
2013). Note that this does not apply for mean RTs of Task 3 because no
RTs for no-go responses can be measured. Thus, error bars for Task 3 were
omitted.
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1936 DURST AND JANCZYK
the propagation from T1 and two situations are possible: (a) If the RS
stage is the locus and if T2 RS is strongly shortened, the propagation
may be outweighed and RT3s are even shorter in no-go compared
with go trials (“inverted no-go BCE”; see Figure 5a, left panel). (b)
With a moderately shortened T2 RS stage, the T3 effect is in the same
direction as for T1, but smaller (see Figure 5b, left panel).
The second possible case is that the motor stage after the
bottleneck is the locus of the no-go BCE. The prolongation of this
stage would only affect RT1 and, thus, T2 RS and T3 RS should
not be delayed (see Figure 5, right panels). Regardless of how
much T2 RS is shortened, the onset of T3 RS is earlier in no-go
trials than in go trials and an inverted no-go BCE in T3 would be
observed.
With the long SOA of 1,000 ms, no effect of the T2 go/no-go
manipulation is expected instead. Taken together, a propagation of
the T1 no-go BCE into T3 (although of a smaller size in T3) would
suggest a locus of the BCE in RS. An inverted no-go BCE would,
however, be compatible with a RS and a motor locus, and further
conclusions are difficult in this case. Nonetheless, we ran this
rather standard effect propagation experiment for two reasons:
First, it is an empirical question whether we would observe a
propagated standard BCE in T3, which is only predicted assuming
a RS locus (Figure 5b, left panel). Second, regardless of the
outcome, the results pattern will indicate whether the models
illustrated in Figure 5 can in principle make correct predictions in
this novel experimental situation.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four students (14 women) from the
University of Tübingen, aged 19 to 36 years (M ! 23.1 years,
SD ! 3.7), participated for monetary compensation (8€) or course
credit. All participants provided written informed consent before
the experiment and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus, stimuli, task, procedure, and analysis. Experiment 2
was almost the same as Experiment 1. The only change concerned
the order of the tasks, and for an illustration of the following, see
Figure 3a and 3c. T1 was now to respond to the letter identity (S1)
via a manual keypress of one of two response keys located to the
left of the participant, using the left index and middle finger (R1).
T2 was the go/no-go response to the color of the letter (S2) via a
keypress of a single response key located to the right of the
participant with the right index finger (R2). Task 3 was to respond
to the tone via the vocal utterance (R3).
The procedure was very similar to Experiment 1. The order of
stimulus presentation was now changed, with S1 and S2 arriving
first. After the SOA, the tone was presented as S3. A trial was
considered a go trial when R2 was to be given; otherwise it was
considered a no-go trial. Instructions, practicing blocks, and error
messages were adapted to the new tasks.
T1 and T3 mean correct RTs and ERs were submitted to 2 " 2
ANOVA with SOA (50 vs. 1,000 ms) and trial type (go vs. no-go)
as repeated-measures. Mean correct RTs and ERs of T2 were
submitted to an ANOVA with the factor SOA (50 vs. 1,000 ms) as
a repeated measure.
Results
All mean RTs are visualized in Figure 6 (see also Table 2) and
ERs are summarized in Table 2.
Task 1. The ANOVA for mean RT1s (2.86% outliers) yielded
a significant main effect of SOA, with 40 ms shorter RTs at the
1,000 ms SOA compared with the 50 ms SOA, F(1, 23) ! 13.25,
p ! .001, $p2 ! .37. Further, a significant main effect of trial type
was observed with 26 ms shorter RTs for go relative to no-go
trials, that is, a no-go BCE, F(1, 23) ! 9.69, p ! .005, $p2 ! .30.
A significant interaction was observed, with a 18 ms larger no-go
BCE at the 50 ms SOA compared with the 1,000 ms SOA, F(1,
23) ! 4.55, p ! .044, $p2 ! .17. The analysis for ER1 yielded no
significant effect, all Fs ! 2.34, all ps " .140.
Task 2. The ANOVA for mean RT2s (3.0% outliers) yielded
no significant main effect of SOA, F(1, 23) ! 2.97, p ! .098, $p2 !
.11. The main effect of SOA was significant for go errors, with
0.49% less errors at the 1,000 ms SOA relative to the 50 ms SOA,
F(1, 23) ! 4.98, p ! .036, $p2 ! .18. The main effect of SOA only
approached significance for no-go trial errors, F(1, 23) ! 3.94,
p ! .059, $p2 ! .15.
Task 3. The ANOVA for mean RT3s (2.9% outliers) revealed a
main effect of SOA, with 361 ms shorter RT3s at the 1,000 ms SOA
compared with the 50 ms SOA, F(1, 23) ! 192.42, p # .001, $p2 !
.89. Most crucially, a significant main effect of trial type was ob-
tained, with 58 ms shorter RT3s for no-go trials compared with go
trials, indicating an inverted no-go BCE, F(1, 23) ! 41.80, p # .001,
$p2 ! .65. Further, the inverted no-go BCE at the 50 ms SOA
was % 115 ms large, while it was not present at the 1,000 ms SOA (0
ms), F(1, 23) ! 54.27, p # .001, $p2 ! .70. The ANOVA for ER3
revealed a significant main effect of SOA, F(1, 23) ! 10.80, p !
.003, $p2 ! .32, with 1.37% more errors at the 50 ms compared with
the 1,000 ms SOA. All other Fs ! 1.39, all ps " .250.
Discussion
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to distinguish between a locus
of the no-go BCE (a) before the motor stage or (b) in the motor
Table 1
Mean RTs (in Milliseconds) and Error Rates (ER, in %) for
Experiment 1 as a Function of Trial Type and SOA (in
Milliseconds)
Trial type
DV Task SOA Go No-go BCE
RT
Task 1 50 1,019 1,017 % 2
1,000 1,040 1,049 10
Task 2 50 1,353 1,404 51
1,000 723 755 31
Task 3 50 1,567 — —
1,000 930 — —
ER
Task 1 50 3.86 4.13 .27
1,000 2.50 2.32 .18
Task 2 50 2.47 2.69 .22
1,000 2.75 2.71 % .05
Task 3 50 .57 1.21 —
1,000 .13 .97 —
Note. DV ! dependent variable; SOA ! stimulus onset asynchrony;
BCE ! backward crosstalk effect. Crosstalk effects were computed by
subtracting values from go trials from those of no-go trials line-by-line.
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1937LOCUS OF NO-GO BACKWARD CROSSTALK
Figure 5. Illustration of the extended PRP paradigm applying the effect propagation logic with a short SOA
(see Janczyk et al., 2017). Panel (a) illustrates the case when the response selection (RS) stage of Task 2 is
shortened by a large amount, in the case of a RS and motor (M) locus of the no-go BCE. Because of the
shortened RS in Task 2 the no-go backward crosstalk effect (BCE) is inverted. The inverted no-go BCE is
smaller in the case of a RS locus compared with a M locus. Panel (b) illustrates the case when RS of Task 2 is
shortened by a small amount, in the case of a RS or a M locus of the no-go BCE. Despite the minimally shortened
RS in no-go trials the no-go BCE should be present in the case of a RS locus. In the case of a M locus, however,
the no-go BCE should still be inverted. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
T
hi
s
do
cu
m
en
t
is
co
py
ri
gh
te
d
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
or
on
e
of
its
al
lie
d
pu
bl
is
he
rs
.
T
hi
s
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
r
th
e
pe
rs
on
al
us
e
of
th
e
in
di
vi
du
al
us
er
an
d
is
no
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
1938 DURST AND JANCZYK
stage by applying the effect propagation logic. Now the no-go
BCE was observed in T1 and was caused by T2 which was a
go/no-go task. After a variable SOA, a two-choice T3 was pre-
sented. Complicating the situation, T2 RS is known to be shorter
for no-go trials relative to go trials and, thus, a reversal of the
no-go BCE was possible for T3 (see Figure 5), and both possible
loci are able to predict this. If, on the other hand, a decreased (but
not inverted) no-go BCE in T3 relative to T1 would be observed,
a locus before the motor stage would be indicated.
Results indeed revealed a reversal of the no-go BCE at the 50 ms
SOA, while at the 1,000 ms SOA any differences were eliminated, as
predicted. This pattern of results first suggests that in general the
models assuming a shortened RS stage make correct predictions if
they also assume a motor locus as depicted in Figure 5 (right half of
the panel). On the other hand, models assuming a RS locus only make
correct predictions if the RS stage in no-go tasks is shortened by a
large amount (Figure 5, upper left panel), which can be tentatively
interpreted as first evidence against a locus before motor execution
because it makes a locus in motor execution more likely. However,
because the no-go BCE was inverted in T3, the data do not allow for
distinguishing both loci with certainty because it is unknown by how
much the T2 RS is shortened in no-go trials, which determines the size
of the inverted no-go BCE. Looking at the mean RTs in Figure 6, the
rather large inverted BCE seems most compatible with the predictions
made in Figure 5a (right panel), that is, a motor locus. Note also that
there is a slight modulation of the no-go BCE in Task 1 by SOA, but
frankly we have no convincing explanation for this unexpected ob-
servation. With the preliminary conclusion in favor of a motor locus
in mind, we ran Experiment 3 where the inverted no-go BCE was
compared with a proper baseline condition.
Experiment 3
The inverted no-go BCE observed in T3 of Experiment 2 is in line
with both possible loci. Its exact size, however, depends on the locus
of the no-go BCE, but without a proper baseline, this is difficult to
evaluate. As can be seen in Figure 7 (middle panel), in the case of a
motor locus, RS2 and RS3 are not delayed and the inverted no-go
BCE reflects only the difference in T2 RS duration between go- and
no-go trials. In the case of a locus before the motor stage, however,
RS2 and RS3 are delayed as well (see Figure 7, left panel). In
summary, the inverted BCE in T3 is the result of the differences in T2
RS but also of the propagated effect from T1 and, thus, a smaller
inverted no-go BCE is predicted by a locus before the motor stage.
To establish a baseline against which we can compare the size
of the inverted BCE in T3, in Experiment 3 the number of tasks in
each trial was manipulated block-wise. Half of all blocks comprised
three tasks similar to Experiment 2 (see Figure 7, left and middle
panel). In the other half of blocks, T1 (the identity task) was omitted
and a trial comprised only two tasks (i.e., T2 [the color task] and T3
[the tone task]; see Figure 7, right panel). Again, the same task order
as in Experiment 2 was applied; however, the integral stimulus for T1
(identity of the letter) and T2 (color of the letter) had to be changed to
two separate stimuli, to allow for an omission of S1 without also
omitting S2. Thus, instead of using a colored letter, a colored square
(S2) surrounding the letter (S1) was now introduced.6 Data from
6 To make sure the new stimulus material would also elicit the no-go
BCE in T1, a pilot study (n ! 8) was conducted before running Experiment
3. Applying only T1 and T2 the no-go BCE was still observed in RT1,
F(1,7) ! 9.47, p ! .018, $p2 ! .57, and the new S1/S2 combination
appeared reasonable to be used in Experiment 3.
Table 2
Mean RTs (in Milliseconds) and Error Rates (ER, in %) for
Experiment 2 as a Function of Trial Type and SOA (in
Milliseconds)
Trial type
DV Task SOA Go No-go BCE
RT
Task 1 50 607 642 35
1,000 576 593 18
Task 2 50 814 — —
1,000 792 — —
Task 3 50 1,266 1,151 % .115
1,000 848 847 0
ER
Task 1 50 2.39 2.42 .03
1,000 2.97 2.63 % .34
Task 2 50 .88 1.17 —
1,000 .39 .66 —
Task 3 50 3.17 3.37 .19
1,000 1.66 2.14 .48
Note. DV ! dependent variable; SOA ! stimulus onset asynchrony;
BCE ! backward crosstalk effect. Crosstalk effects were computed by
subtracting values from go trials from those of no-go trials line-by-line.
Negative results indicate a (numerically) inverted BCE.
Figure 6. Mean RTs of Tasks 1, 2, and 3 as a function of trial type (go
vs. no-go) and SOA (50 ms vs. 1,000 ms) for Experiment 2. Errors bars are
95% within-subject confidence intervals for the difference between go and
no-go trials, collapsed across SOA (see Pfister & Janczyk, 2013). Note that
this does not apply for mean RTs of Task 2 because no RTs for no-go
responses can be measured. Thus, error bars for Task 2 were omitted.
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1939LOCUS OF NO-GO BACKWARD CROSSTALK
dual-task blocks were used as baseline for the inverted no-go BCE in
T3, because the inverted BCE would only reflect the differences in T2
RS depending on the go or no-go status of a trial. A comparison of the
inverted no-go BCE in the triple- and dual-task blocks would then
allow to distinguish both possible loci of the no-go BCE. If the size of
the inverted no-go BCE in T3 is the same in the triple-task and the
dual-task condition, a locus of the no-go BCE in the motor stage is
indicated. If, however, the inverted no-go BCE in the triple-task is
smaller relative to the dual-task condition, a locus before the motor
stage is indicated.
Because of the additional manipulation of dual versus triple-task
and because the data from the long SOA of 1,000 ms is not
indicative in the present experiment, we applied only a short SOA
of 50 ms. Note that in Experiment 2, the long SOA was used and
yielded the expected results patterns.
Method
Participants. Thirty-two students (29 women) from the Uni-
versity of Tübingen, aged 19 to 36 years (M ! 22.9 years, SD !
3.2), participated for monetary compensation (8€) or course credit.
All participants provided written informed consent before the
experiment and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus, stimuli, task, procedure, and analysis. Experiment 3
was very similar to Experiment 2. The major changes concerned
the stimulus material, and for an illustration of the following, see
Figure 3a and 3d. T1 was now to respond to a white letter’s
identity (S1) via a manual keypress of one of two response keys
located to the left of the participant, using the left index and middle
finger (R1). T2 was now a go/no-go response to the color of a
square surrounding the letter (S2) via a keypress of a single
response key located to the right of the participant with the right
index finger (R2). T3 was to respond to the tone via the vocal
utterance (R3).
The procedure was nearly the same as in Experiment 2. In each
trial S1 and S2 arrived first. However, S1 only appeared in half of
all blocks (triple-task blocks) and was omitted in the other half of
all blocks (dual-task blocks). After a constant SOA of 50 ms, the
tone was presented. As in Experiment 2, a trial was considered a
Figure 7. Illustration of the extended PRP paradigm applying the effect propagation logic (see Janczyk et al., 2017).
The left side of the panel illustrates the predictions for the inverted no-go BCE in Task 3 for the triple-task condition.
The predictions are based on the response selection bottleneck model under assumption of either a response selection
or motor locus. In the case of a response selection locus a small inverted no-go BCE is predicted, because of the
prolonged response selection stage in Task 1 of no-go trials. Note, that a response activation stage is needed in Task
2 to enable backward crosstalk (see Janczyk et al., 2017; Thomson et al., 2015). In the case of a motor locus, however,
the prolongation of the motor stage of Task 1 does not delay the onset of Task 3 response selection in no-go trials and,
thus, a large inverted no-go BCE is predicted. The right side of the panel illustrates the prediction for the inverted
no-go BCE in Task 3 for the dual-task baseline. In the baseline condition no BCE arises in Task 1 and, thus, the
inverted no-go BCE in Task 3 only depends on the shortening of Task 2 response selection in no-go relative to go
trials. Note that assuming a motor locus the response selection bottleneck model predicts the same effect size of the
inverted no-go BCE as the dual-task baseline (the small inverted no-go BCE predicted by a response selection locus
is visualized by the blue curly bracket and the large inverted no-go BCE predicted by a motor locus and the dual-task
baseline are visualized by the orange curly bracket). See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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1940 DURST AND JANCZYK
go trial when R2 was to be given, and otherwise it was considered
a no-go trial. Instructions, practicing blocks, and error messages
were adapted to the new tasks. Triple-task and dual-task blocks
alternated and the type of the first block was counterbalanced
across participants. Before each block, participants were informed
about whether they would have to respond to three or two tasks in
the upcoming block, and the according S-R mappings were again
mentioned. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and
accurately as possible.
T1 data were submitted to two ANOVAs with trial type as a
repeated measure and T2 data were submitted to two ANOVAS
with task as repeated measure. T3 data were submitted to two
ANOVAs with task and trial type as repeated measures.
Results
All mean RTs are visualized in Figure 8 (see also Table 3), and
ERs are summarized in Table 3.
Task 1. The ANOVA for mean RT1s (1.02% outliers) yielded
a significant main effect of trial type, with 19 ms shorter RTs for
go trials compared with no-go trials, F(1, 31) ! 6.89, p ! .013,
$p2 ! .18. The main effect of trial type was not significant for ER1,
F(1, 31) ! 0.12, p ! .728, $p2 # .01.
Task 2. Mean RT2s (2.74% outliers) were on average 492 ms
shorter in dual-task relative to triple-task blocks, F(1, 31) !
250.12, p # .001, $p2 ! .89. Go-trial errors occurred 1.45% more
frequently in dual-task relative to triple-task blocks, F(1, 31) !
31.34, p # .001, $p2 ! .50. The main effect of task was not
significant for no-go errors, F(1, 31) ! 3.55, p ! .069, $p2 ! .10.
Task 3. The ANOVA for mean RT3 (2.64% outliers) revealed
a significant main effect of trial type, with 159 ms shorter RT3s for
no-go relative to go trials, F(1, 31) ! 117.53, p # .001, $p2 ! .79,
indicating an inverted no-go BCE. Trivially, RT3s were on aver-
age 465 ms shorter in dual-task relative to triple-task blocks, F(1,
31) ! 149.93, p # .001, $p2 ! .83, but the interaction of trial type
and task was not significant, F(1, 31) ! 0.06, p ! .816, $p2 # .01,
indicating that the size of the inverted no-go BCE did not differ
between the triple-task and dual-task blocks (BF01 ! 5.50,
pBIC(H0 |D) ! .846). The ANOVA for ER3 revealed a significant
main effect of trial type, with on average 1.31% less errors in go
trials compared with no-go trials, F(1, 31) ! 16.99, p # .001, $p2 !
.35, indicating a speed–accuracy trade-off. In dual-task blocks on
average 1.53% less errors relative to triple-task blocks were ob-
served, F(1, 31) ! 16.52, p # .001, $p2 ! .35. The interaction of
trial type and task was not significant, F(1, 31) ! 0.01, p ! .909,
$p2 # .01.
Speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT). The no-go BCE for ER3
opposed that for RT3s, indicating a SAT was present what com-
plicates the interpretation of the RT3 results. To investigate
whether the SAT modulated the pattern of results obtained for
RT3, the method of Janczyk (2016) was adopted. To this end,
no-go BCEs for RT3 and ER3 were calculated for each participant.
If the signs of both BCEs did not match, an SAT for the
respective participant was indicated. RT3 data were then sub-
mitted to a mixed ANOVA with trial type and task as repeated
measures and the additional between-subjects factor SAT. Nei-
ther the main effect of SAT, F(1, 30) ! 1.13, p ! .296, $p2 !
.04, nor the interaction of SAT and trial type, F(1, 30) ! 0.65,
p ! .426, $p2 ! .02, were significant (BF01 ! 4.01,
pBIC(H0 | D) ! .801). Most importantly, the interaction of SAT,
trial type and task was not significant, F(1, 30) ! 0.10, p !
.757, $p2 # .01 (BF01 ! 5.37, pBIC(H0 | D) ! .843). Even
Table 3
Mean RTs (in Milliseconds) and Error Rates (ER, in %) for
Experiment 3 as a Function of Trial Type and Block Type
Trial type
DV Task Block type Go No-go BCE
RT
Task 1 Dual-task — — —
Triple-task 388 406 19
Task 2 Dual-task 616 — —
Triple-task 1,109 — —
Task 3 Dual-task 1,055 899 % .156
Triple-task 1,523 1,362 % .161
ER
Task 1 Dual-task — — —
Triple-task 2.60 2.72 .12
Task 2 Dual-task 1.75 1.57 —
Triple-task .30 .99 —
Task 3 Dual-task 2.82 4.09 1.27
Triple-task 4.32 5.66 1.34
Note. DV ! dependent variable; SOA ! stimulus onset asynchrony;
BCE ! backward crosstalk effect. Crosstalk effects were computed by
subtracting values from go trials from those of no-go trials line-by-line.
Negative results indicate an (numerically) inverted BCE.
Figure 8. Mean RTs of Tasks 1, 2, and 3 as a function of trial type (go
vs. no-go) and block type (dual-task vs. triple-task) for Experiment 3.
Errors bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the difference
between go and no-go trials, collapsed across SOA (see Pfister & Janczyk,
2013). Note that this does not apply for mean RTs of Task 2 because no
RTs for no-go responses can be measured. Thus, error bars for Task 2 were
omitted.
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1941LOCUS OF NO-GO BACKWARD CROSSTALK
additional separate analyses for data with and without an SAT
yielded qualitatively similar results.
Discussion
The goal of Experiment 3 was to distinguish between a locus of
the no-go BCE (a) before or (b) in the motor stage. However, a
locus in RS and in motor execution both predict an inverted no-go
BCE in T3, because of a significantly shortened T2 RS stage in
no-go tasks (de Jong, 1993; Van Selst & Johnston, 1997; see also
Experiment 2). As the observation of an inverted no-go BCE alone
would not allow for distinguishing between a RS or motor execu-
tion locus, a dual-task baseline condition was implemented where
the pure propagation from T2 to T3 without any additional prop-
agation from T1 could be observed. As can be seen in Figure 7, the
inverted no-go BCE predicted by a motor locus and by the baseline
condition are of the same size. Thus, an inverted no-go BCE of the
same size in the triple-task and dual-task baseline indicates a motor
locus of the no-go BCE, whereas an inverted no-go BCE of a
smaller size in the triple-task relative to the dual-task baseline
indicates a RS locus of the no-go BCE.
Half of all blocks comprised a triple-task while the other half
comprised dual-tasks (baseline condition). In the triple-task blocks
a no-go BCE was expected to arise in T1. In T3 of triple-task and
dual task blocks an inverted no-go BCE was expected. Results
showed that the size of the inverted no-go BCE did not differ
between the triple-task condition and the dual-task baseline. This
result is in line with the predictions under the assumption of a
motor locus of the no-go BCE. One incidental observation is the
higher rate of go errors in the dual-task compared with the triple-
task condition in T2. Frankly, we have no convincing explanation
for this and prefer not to interpret this result.
General Discussion
The goal of the present study was to locate the no-go BCE
inside the stages of the RSB model. Experiment 1 used the locus
of slack logic to distinguish between a locus (a) before or (b) at
or after the bottleneck. The no-go BCE arising in T2 was still
present even at the 50 ms SOA and SOA and trial type com-
bined additively. This suggests that the no-go BCE must be
located at or after the bottleneck because it was not absorbed
into the cognitive slack. Thus, a locus inside T1 RA could be
ruled out. Subsequently, Experiment 2 was carried out to dis-
tinguish between a locus (a) before or (b) in the motor stage, by
applying the effect propagation logic. The inverted no-go BCE
in T3 was predicted by both loci though and, thus, no differ-
entiation was possible merely on the basis of these data. In
Experiment 3 the size of the inverted no-go BCE in T3 was
compared with a dual-task baseline. Most importantly, the size
of the inverted no-go BCE did not differ between both condi-
tions, and data from Experiment 3 suggest a motor locus of the
no-go BCE. This latter result again rules out a prebottleneck
locus, because the used logic distinguishes a motor locus from
an earlier one. Only if we had to conclude in favor of an earlier
locus, a prebottleneck locus would be viable at all and the results from
Experiment 1 provide the evidence for distinguishing the bottleneck
from such prebottleneck stages. Taken together, these results suggest
that the no-go BCE is located after the response selection stage and,
thus, in the motor execution stage.
Theoretical Implications
To further investigate the underlying mechanisms of both types
of the BCE a closer look at the overlapping processing stages
enabling the no-go BCE is required. Recent studies investigating
the compatibility-based BCE (Janczyk et al., 2017; Thomson et al.,
2015) suggest that this BCE is caused by automatically accumu-
lated T2 RA adding to evidence of T1 accumulated in RS (see
Figure 1c). If an automatic accumulation of evidence for T2 were
possible for the no-go BCE as well, this could only be the case
inside T2 RA. However, an overlap between T1 motor execution
and T2 RA hardly seems to have enabled the no-go BCE in the
present study, because no temporal overlap of both stages was
given in any of the three experiments.
Alternatively, a model in which T1 and T2 motor execution
overlap could be debated. However, an overlap between two motor
execution stages also seems implausible because in a strict inter-
pretation of the RSB model there is no motor execution stage
needed in no-go tasks, allowing no possibility for crosstalk (for a
visualization see, Miller, 2017, Figure 1).
The most plausible model taking into account a motor execution
locus of the no-go BCE is one with temporal overlap of T1 motor
execution and T2 response selection (see Figure 1d for an illustration).
In all three experiments of the present study, the task in which the
no-go BCE was observed and the task causing the no-go BCE were
presented simultaneously. Thus, it can be assumed that the onset of T1
motor execution coincided with the onset of T2 RS. This model is
partially supported by results of other studies applying the PRP
paradigm (Miller, 2006, Experiment 1) and the PP paradigm (Miller
& Durst, 2015, Experiment 1). Miller (2006) observed a no-go BCE
even at the shortest SOA of 100 ms and there was no modulation of
the no-go BCE with increasing SOA (100, 200, or 400 ms). This
result was replicated by Miller and Durst (2015) who even intermixed
negative SOAs (that means that T2 arrived first) with positive SOAs
(% 400, % 150, 0, 150, and 400 ms). If the overlap of T1 motor
execution with any T2 stage before RS would enable the no-go BCE,
then the no-go BCE should have become larger with increasing SOA
and the no-go BCE should not be observed at short or even negative
SOAs (because T2 RA would have taken place during the cognitive
slack).
Two Types of Backward Crosstalk
A motor execution locus of the no-go BCE contrasts with the
results of recent studies which located the locus of the compatibility-
based BCE inside RS (Janczyk et al., 2017; Miller, 2017; Thomson et
al., 2015). Taken together, different loci for both types of the BCE
suggest that the compatibility-based BCE and the no-go BCE are
based on different cognitive processes and, therefore, represent qual-
itatively different types of BCEs.
The compatibility-based BCE is enabled when T1 RS and T2
RA overlap (Janczyk et al., 2017; Thomson et al., 2015). Janczyk
et al. (2017) recently suggested that RA could occur in T2, if it
does not gain direct access to RS (see Figure 1c). This evidence
then adds to the evidence for T1, which is accumulated in a
controlled manner in RS and, thus, prolongs the RS stage of T1 in
incompatible trials (see Ulrich, Schröter, Leuthold, & Birngruber,
2015, for this idea in the case of conflict tasks). In a sense then, the
compatibility-based BCE may work similar as other conflict tasks
(e.g., the Eriksen flanker task; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974).
T
hi
s
do
cu
m
en
t
is
co
py
ri
gh
te
d
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
or
on
e
of
its
al
lie
d
pu
bl
is
he
rs
.
T
hi
s
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
r
th
e
pe
rs
on
al
us
e
of
th
e
in
di
vi
du
al
us
er
an
d
is
no
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
1942 DURST AND JANCZYK
The no-go BCE, in contrast, seems to be based on a different
mechanism. A model where temporal overlap between T1 motor
execution and T2 response selection enables the no-go BCE im-
plies that processing of a no-go T2 involves a controlled RS
process (for general evidence for the presence of a controlled RS
stage in no-go tasks, see Bertelson & Tisseyre, 1969; Gottsdanker,
1979; Kerr, 1983; Smith, 1967). This is in contrast to the assump-
tion that a no-go task can become automatized with practice
(Röttger & Haider, 2017; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008), because RS
is by definition a controlled process. Verbruggen and Logan
(2008) argued that in the go/no-go paradigm each stimulus is
consistently associated with either a go or no-go goal that should
enable automatic inhibition of an already prepared response with
practice. Such no-go goals could for instance be the perception of
a sensory consequence of not responding (see Kühn et al., 2009).
Verbruggen and Logan observed that RTs were prolonged when
S-R mappings were switched and when stimuli previously had
been consistently associated to go/no-go responses in the training
phase. They concluded that, with practice, stimulus no-go associ-
ations get strong enough to automatically inhibit an already pre-
pared response by activating the no-go goal upon retrieval of the
stimulus no-go association.
Analogous to Verbruggen and Logan (2008), post hoc analyses
were carried out to test whether the inhibition of an already
prepared response became automatic with practice in the present
study.7 The results indicated that inhibition did not become auto-
matic in the present study, which provides further support for the
assumption that a controlled response selection process is needed
to process no-go tasks.
In a nutshell, we suggest that both types of the BCE have
different prerequisites and are based on different cognitive pro-
cesses—that means they have different sources. The compatibility-
based BCE is based on automatic response feature activation and
is enabled when T1 RS and T2 RA overlap, whereas the no-go
BCE is based on a controlled process and is enabled when T1
motor execution and T2 RS overlap. Even though on a phenom-
enological level both types of the BCE appear to be similar, they
fundamentally differ in the underlying cognitive processes, as the
compatibility-based BCE has its source in T2 RA whereas the
no-go BCE has its source in T2 RS. Thus, it can be concluded that
backward crosstalk is not a general phenomenon itself. The term
“backward crosstalk” should rather be used as an umbrella term for
different types of crosstalk, which can be further specified as
compatibility-based BCEs or no-go BCEs. As a possible objection,
however, we had the go/no-go task always in the setting of a
dual-task (or even triple-task) experiment. We cannot exclude that
this particular context has induced some controlled processing that
overrode automaticity, for example, because of the required con-
trol of task order. Future research may investigate whether the
task’s characteristics depend on whether it is performed in isola-
tion or in a multitasking context.
Caveats, Limitations, and Future Directions
The results of the present study appear straightforward. How-
ever, it should be noted that the assumptions made and the impli-
cations drawn from the present study hinge on a strictly serial
interpretation of the RSB model, where the stage affected by the
no-go BCE is prolonged. This strictly serial interpretation of the
RSB model was chosen in line with the available literature (see,
e.g., Eder, Pfister, Dignath, & Hommel, 2016; Hommel & Eglau,
2002; Lien & Proctor, 2002; Paelecke & Kunde, 2007). As alter-
native interpretations cannot be excluded yet, further research
applying alternative methods is needed. For instance data from
diffusion models (e.g., Ulrich et al., 2015) could help to review the
conclusions drawn from the present study, and such work is
currently ongoing in our lab. Additionally, we assumed the bot-
tleneck in the RS stage, but we concur that there are other models
suggesting, for example, a motor bottleneck instead or in addition
to the RS bottleneck (see Bratzke et al., 2008; de Jong, 1993).
Following the strictly serial interpretation of the RSB model, the
question upon which controlled process the no-go BCE is actually
based still remains to be answered. Even though this question is
clearly out of the scope of the present study, the present results can
help to narrow down possible explanations. In this respect two
processes could be discussed: (a) selection of the no-go response
as one of two response alternatives (give the response vs. withhold
the response) analogous to two-choice tasks, and (b) inhibition of
an already prepared response. If the selection of a go versus no-go
response takes place during the T2 RS stage of a no-go task
analogous to the selection of a response in a two-choice task (for
evidence that go/no-go and two-choice tasks are based on similar
cognitive processes, see Gomez, Ratcliff, & Perea, 2007), the
length of T2 RS should be the same irrespective of whether T2 is
a go or no-go task. However, previous studies provided evidence
that T2 RS is shortened by a significant amount in no-go relative
to go trials (see also de Jong, 1993; Van Selst & Johnston, 1997),
and the inverted no-go BCE in our Experiments 2 and 3 most
likely arises exactly for this reason.
Alternatively, the shorter RS for no-go relative to go trials could
indicate that the controlled process occurring in RS is actually the
inhibition of the already prepared go response: The inhibition
needed to withhold this response could in turn also prolong RT1 by
inhibiting T1 motor execution (for similar suggestions see Ko &
Miller, 2014; Miller & Durst, 2014). Furthermore, Janczyk and
Huestegge (2017) observed that a no-go BCE in T1 could be
inverted when preparation of T2 was impeded (i.e., by an increase
of task relevant dimensions). The no-go BCE only emerged in their
Experiment 3b where T2 always was a simple go/no-go task where
the (correct) response in case of go trials could be entirely prepared
and, thus, required inhibition in case of a no-go trial. Even though
the available evidence and the present data indicate that inhibition
of a prepared response could be the controlled process occurring
during T2 RS, further research is needed to test this assumption.
7 To test whether inhibition of an already prepared task became auto-
matic with practice in the present study, two post hoc ANOVAs for RT3s
of Experiment 2 and 3 were carried out, including the additional within-
subjects factor of block number. If the inhibition of an already prepared
response became automatic with practice, there would no longer be a need
for a RS stage in no-go tasks that would allow for an even earlier onset of
T3 RS. Thus, an increase of the effect size of the inverted no-go BCE
should be observed, if the inhibition of an already prepared response in T2
became automatic. However, neither the analyses for Experiment 2,
F(7,133) ! 0.88, p ! .524, $p2 ! .04, nor for Experiment 3, F(7,217) !
0.31, p ! .767, $p2 ! .01, ε ! .34, yielded a significant interaction of trial
type and block number. Thus, it can be concluded that inhibition of an
already prepared response did not become automatic with practice in the
present study.
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It should be mentioned that a shortened T2 RS may not have
been the only factor that contributed to the inverted no-go BCE,
but interference from the motor execution of R2 may also have
played a role. However, because T2 and T3 are the same in both
conditions, such interference would be present in the triple-task but
also in the dual-task baseline condition of Experiment 3. Thus,
even if it contributed to the inverted no-go BCE, its contribution
was the same in the triple-task and dual-task condition. Further, the
comparison of the dual-task baseline and the triple-task condition
in Experiment 3 was within-subjects to avoid further differences
between both conditions.
Another potentially critical factor for the comparison of dual-
task and triple-task blocks in Experiment 3 is that preparation may
have differed in the two conditions. We have purposefully opted
for a block-wise manipulation instead of omitting T1 trial-wise and
randomly. Gottsdanker (1979) used the latter way and observed
even longer RT2s without T1 that “suggests that the infrequent
omission of S1 may have caused a strong surprise reaction that
interfered with S2 processing” (de Jong, 1993, p. 4). Still, we
cannot exclude that differential preparation took place. Even
though it is unclear which processing stage would be modulated by
preparation, it is reasonable to assume that better prepared stages
were shorter in the dual-task compared with the triple-task condi-
tion. Assuming that such preparation affects the same stages of all
tasks then, the inverted no-go BCE in the dual-task condition should
still be of the same size no matter which processing stage is shortened.
This can be illustrated by looking at Figure 7 (dual-task panel):
Regardless of which stage is shortened in all tasks, the inverted no-go
BCE does not change its size. Thus, such cases of preparation would
be unproblematic for our interpretations. Note further that even en-
hanced preparation for T1 in the PP paradigm (Miller & Durst, 2014)
led to in general very similar results as observed with the PRP
paradigm, even when T1 was a no-go task (Miller & Durst, 2015).
Nevertheless, future studies may further investigate a potential influ-
ence of motor execution-based interference of a go/no-go task and
preparation on the inverted no-go BCE.
In summary, results of the present study clearly indicate that the
compatibility-based and the no-go BCE are not only different types of
backward crosstalk but also affect different stages of Tl processing.
However, it cannot be said whether these models generalize to even
other types of BCEs. For instance, performance in T1 can also be
affected by T2 response complexity (Miller, 2006).
Conclusion
The present study suggests that the no-go BCE arises in the
motor execution stage and a model with overlapping T1 motor
execution and T2 RS appears to be best suited to explain this. In
a broader picture, the loci and sources of the compatibility-based
BCE and the no-go BCE differ fundamentally, and we suggest to
use the term backward crosstalk only as an umbrella term, but to
further specify distinct types of such effects.
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Abstract 
In dual-tasking, the no-go backward crosstalk effect (BCE) means that processing of Task 1 
takes longer when Task 2 does not require a response (no-go-trial) than when it requires a 
response (go-trial). Thus, contrary to the usual observation, giving two successive responses 
counterintuitively reduces instead of increases performance costs for Task 1. Results from 
recent studies are in line with the notion that the no-go BCE reflects response inhibition, which 
is required to overcome an already prepared go response in Task 2 but which also spills over to 
motor execution in Task 1. No direct test of this hypothesis, however, has been carried out so 
far and hence the present study was designed to fill this gap. The result of this study with n = 
48 participants revealed that a no-go Task 2 impeded Task 1 performance when preparation of 
the Task 2 response was encouraged, but facilitated Task 1 performance when preparation of 
the Task 2 response was not encouraged.  
 
Keywords: dual-task, backward crosstalk, go/no-go task, response preparation  
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Response preparation determines the direction of no-go Backward Crosstalk 
 
Performing movements in two motor tasks simultaneously, that is dual-tasking, can be 
very difficult, and often comes at the cost of performing one or both movements slower and/or 
producing more errors. Just imagine learning to play drums where you have to simultaneously 
coordinate contrary movements of both arms and feet. As most dual-tasking research and 
popular opinions nowadays focus on the difficulties of dual-tasking, situations in which 
negative consequences are reduced when two instead of only one movement are carried out are 
often overlooked. However, this happens in no-go backward crosstalk experiments. 
Miller (2006) was the first to combine a manual two-choice Task 1 with a go/no-go Task 
2 (see Donders, 1969). For example, in his Experiment 1, participants were instructed to 
respond to the identity of a letter by pressing a key with their left index or middle finger in Task 
1, and to respond to the pitch of a tone by pressing a key with their right index finger (go-trials) 
or by withholding the response (no-go-trials) in Task 2. Task 1 RTs were shorter when Task 2 
required a response relative to when it did not. This no-go backward crosstalk effect (no-go 
BCE) is an example of how dual-task costs are actually reduced when two motor tasks have to 
be carried out (see also Ko & Miller, 2014; Miller & Durst, 2014, 2015), even though the 
addition of a second task certainly impedes performance of the first task overall (i.e., general 
dual-task costs are present). 
The most often invoked explanation for the no-go BCE is that inhibition is required to 
withhold an already prepared Task 2 response in no-go-trials, whereby some inhibition spills 
over to Task 1 and thus prolongs RT1s in no-go-trials (Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017; Miller, 
2006). In addition, recent results from a mental chronometry study (Durst & Janczyk, 2018) 
also suggest that indeed motor execution in Task 1 is prolonged in Task 2 no-go-trials, thus 
lending additional support for the preparation hypothesis. As an alternative explanation, Röttger 
and Haider (2017) suggested that the no-go BCE is based on automatic response feature 
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activation. For instance, such response features could be response effects which seem to play 
an important role in the selection of no-go responses as well (Kühn, Elsner, Prinz, & Brass, 
2009). In this sense, the sensory consequence of a go and no-go response would be 
incompatible, which could impair Task 1 performance in no-go-trials. Alternatively, the 
incompatibility of abstract “go-representations” versus “no-go representations” could impair 
Task 1 performance. Importantly, according to this hypothesis, mere perception of a no-go 
stimulus in Task 2 should automatically activate the (incompatible) no-go representation and 
thereby impair performance of Task 1 (which always involves a go representation). In sum, and 
in contrast to the above mentioned preparation hypothesis, the no-go BCE would then emerge 
entirely independent from the preparatory status of the Task 2 response.  
Even though the larger part of evidence indirectly supports the preparation hypothesis, 
a direct test of the competing explanations still lacks. The present study fills this gap. To this 
end, a two-choice Task 1 was combined with a choice/no-go Task 2, which either required one 
of two go-responses or to withhold the response (no-go-response). The critical manipulation 
was that preparation of a Task 2 go-response was either encouraged or not by varying the 
frequency of the Task 2 go-stimuli, keeping everything else equivalent. More specifically, in 
one half of the blocks, both go-stimuli occurred equally often (neutral blocks). Thus, 
participants would be less encouraged to prepare one or the other response in advance and 
consequently no or even a reversed no-go BCE was expected, because there was nothing to 
inhibit in case of a no-go-stimulus (see also Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017, for this observation). 
In the other half of blocks, one go-stimulus occurred in 90% of the go-trials (biased blocks), 
thereby encouraging preparation of the more often required Task 2 response. In this case, the 
preparation hypothesis predicts that the no-go BCE should re-emerge in these biased blocks. 
Although previous research has supported the view that the no-go BCE has its locus in the 
motor stage of Task 1 (Durst & Janczyk, 2018), the role of preparation in Task 2 (and the 
required inhibition) has not been addressed directly so far. Yet, evidence for the preparation 
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hypothesis would not only help to better understand the no-go BCE as such, but also to further 
delineate it from compatibility-based BCEs (Hommel, 1998). These latter BCEs occur when 
both tasks overlap, for example, in their spatial response features, are caused by automatic 
response feature activation in Task 2, and have their locus during Task 1 response selection 
instead of motor execution (see Janczyk, Renas, & Durst, 2018; and Durst & Janczyk, 2019, 
for a direct comparison of both kinds of BCEs).  
 
Method 
Participants. Forty-eight people (28 female) from the Tübingen (Germany) area, aged 
19 to 64 years (M = 23.21 years, SD = 6.56), participated for monetary compensation (8€) or 
course credit. All participants provided written informed consent before the experiment and 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
According to Röttger and Haider (2017, p. 602) their Experiment 1 and Miller’s (2006) 
Experiment 1 exhibited large effect sizes (𝜼𝐩𝟐  > .5). The effect of interest in our experiments is 
a 2×2 interaction of two repeated-measures which can be broken down to a (paired) t-test, and 
we (conservatively) assume a medium effect size of dz = 0.5 (Cohen, 1988). Power analysis 
using the function power.t.test() of the R-software yielded a required sample size of n 
≈ 44 participants to achieve 1-β = .90, with α =.05. 
Apparatus and Stimuli. A standard PC was used for stimulus presentation and response 
collection. Stimuli and instructions were presented on a 17-inch CRT monitor. Stimuli were the 
letters ‘X’ and ‘O’ colored in red, green, and blue and presented in the center of an otherwise 
black screen. The identity of the letter served as Stimulus 1 (S1), the color of the letter served 
as Stimulus 2 (S2). Responses to S1 were given via a manual key-press of the left index or 
middle finger (R1). Responses to S2 were given via a manual key-press of the right index or 
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middle finger, or by withholding the response (R2). Custom made keys were used to collect all 
responses and two keys each were placed to the left and to the right of the participant.  
Task and Procedure. The trial structure is illustrated in Figure 1. Task 1 was to respond 
to S1 with a manual key-press of the left index or middle finger, and Task 2 was either to 
respond to S2 (go-trial) with an index or middle finger key-press of the right hand or to withhold 
the response (no-go-trial).  
Each trial started with a white fixation cross (250 ms), followed by a blank screen (250 
ms). Subsequently, the colored letter was presented at the center of the screen for a maximum 
of 4,000 ms or until R1 and R2 were registered. The next trial started after an inter-trial interval 
(ITI) of 1,000 ms. In case of wrong responses or general errors (no response within 4,000 ms 
following stimulus onset, responses in the wrong order, response with a wrong key, and so on), 
specific error feedback was provided for 1,000 ms before the ITI. 
Figure 1. Graphical illustration of the trial structure for go- and no-go-trials. Participants first responded to the 
identity of the letter in a manual two-choice task with the left hand and subsequently to the color of the letter in a 
manual choice/no-go task with the right hand. In this particular example, an X calls for a response with the left 
index-finger in Task 1. Depending on the stimulus-response mapping the color blue either calls for a response with 
the right middle-finger (go-trial), or for withholding any response in Task 2.  
 
Participants first performed a short familiarization block of 20 randomly drawn trials, 
which was followed by eight experimental blocks of 60 trials each. All trials were presented in 
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a random order. Throughout the experiment, the S2 associated with the no-go-response 
occurred in one third of the trials (no-go trials), while an S2 associated with a go-response of 
the right hand occurred in the remaining two thirds of all trials (go-trials). In neutral blocks, 
both S2 associated with go responses occurred equally often (i.e., 20 times), whereas in the 
biased blocks, one S2 associated with either the right index or middle finger response occurred 
in 90% of all go-trials (i.e., 36 times).  
Participants received written instructions that informed them about the frequency of the 
two possible go-S2s in the upcoming blocks. After the first four blocks, participants were told 
that the instructions would change in the remaining blocks and therefore to contact the 
experimenter. Before the remaining blocks were started, the experimenter made sure that 
participants understood the altered instructions concerning the new frequency of the two go-
S2s. In general, the instructions emphasized speed and accuracy, and participants were asked 
to give R1 and R2 successively in fixed order, and to wait until the trial ended in case of a no-
go-trial. The stimulus-response mapping of all tasks, as well as the order of blocks (neutral vs. 
biased blocks first), and the S2 that occurred in 90% of go-trials in biased blocks were 
counterbalanced across participants.  
Design and Analysis. Trials in which a response in Task 2 was required (i.e., a right 
index or middle finger response) were considered go-trials, whereas trials in which a response 
in Task 2 was to be withheld were considered no-go-trials. Data from the practice block were 
excluded from analyses. For the analysis of RTs, trials deviating more than 2.5 standard 
deviations from the individual cell means were considered outliers and excluded from analyses. 
Error rates in both tasks (ER1 and ER2) were arcsine transformed for statistical analyses, but 
raw ERs are reported as descriptive statistics. For Task 1, mean correct RT1s and ER1 were 
submitted to 2 × 2 Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) with trial type (go vs. no-go) and block 
type (neutral vs. biased) as repeated measures. For Task 2, mean correct RT2s were submitted 
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to an ANOVA with Response 2 frequency1 (neutral vs. frequent vs. less frequent) as a repeated 
measure. For ER2 an ANOVA with Response 2 frequency as a repeated measure for errors in 
go-trials (a response was withheld when it was actually required) and an ANOVA with block 
type for errors in no-go-trials (a response was given when it should be withheld) were calculated 
separately. 
 
 
Results 
Mean RT1s are visualized in Figure 2 (see also Table 1 for mean RT1s and ER1s), and 
all mean RT2s and ER2s are summarized in Table 2. For RT1, 2.73% of all trials were 
considered outliers and for RT2, 1.75% of all trials were considered outliers. 
Task 1. The ANOVA yielded no significant main effect of trial type, F(1,47) = 0.48, p 
= .492, 𝜂p2  = .01. The main effect of block type was significant, with RT1s being on average 70 
ms longer in neutral (712 ms) relative to biased blocks (642 ms), F(1,47) = 28.37, p < .001, 𝜂p2  
= .38. Most importantly, the interaction was significant, F(1,47) = 69.57, p < .001, 𝜂p2  = .60. 
The no-go BCE was present in biased blocks (63 ms), t(47) = 5.62, p < .001, d = 0.81, and in 
neutral blocks, it was inverted (-50 ms), t(47) = -4.18, p < .001, d = -0.60. Error rates were very 
low, but the analysis for ER1 revealed a significant main effect of trial type, with on average 
1.30% more errors for go- (2.54%) relative to no-go-trials (1.24%), F(1,47) = 53.25, p < .001, 
𝜂p2  = .53. Neither the main effect of block type, F(1,47) = 0.01, p = .915, 𝜂p2  < .01, nor the 
interaction were significant, F(1,47) = 0.07, p = .798, 𝜂p2  < .01.2  
                                                          
1 This factor refers to the actual experimental manipulation. Note though that the critical assumption is that a 
frequent Task 2 response is prepared. 
2 Note that the higher ER1 for go- relative to no-go-trials in biased blocks opposes the results pattern for RT1s, 
which suggests that a speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT, see, Liesefeld & Janczyk, 2018) was present. This could 
potentially complicate the interpretation of the present results. An analysis of the potential influence of the SAT 
can be found in the appendix. The critical interaction observed in RT1 was not compromised by an SAT. 
9 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean RTs of Task 1 (RT1) as a function of trial type (no-go vs. go) and block type (neutral vs. biased). 
Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the difference between block type (see Pfister & 
Janczyk, 2013). 
 
Table 1. Mean RT1s (in ms) and Error Rates (ER1, in %) for Task 1 as a function of trial type and block type.  
  Trial type 
 Block type No-go Go3 
RT1 Neutral 687 737 
 Biased 673 610 
    
ER1 Neutral 1.30 2.49 
 Biased 1.18 2.60 
 
Task 2. The analysis for RT2 revealed a significant main effect of Response 2 frequency, 
F(2,94) = 64.75, p < .001, 𝜂p2  = .58. On average the longest RT2s were observed for less 
frequent responses (1,105 ms), with intermediate RT2s for neutral blocks (982 ms), and shortest 
RT2s for frequent responses (783 ms). All pairwise comparisons were significant, all ts ≥ 12.47, 
all ps ≤ .001. This suggests that participants prepared the more likely R2 alternative in advance. 
                                                          
3 Mean RT1 and ER1 for biased blocks were also calculated separately for frequent and less frequent go-responses 
in Task 2. RT1s for frequent responses were 587 ms and mean RT1s for less frequent responses were 856 ms. ER1 
for frequent responses was 2.39% and ER1 for less frequent responses was 4.51%. 
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The ANOVA for ER2 in go-trials yielded a significant main effect of Response 2 frequency, 
F(2,94) = 21.25, p < .001, 𝜂p2  = .31. On average ER2 for go-trials in neutral blocks (4.64%) 
was larger relative to frequent responses (1.68%), t(47) = -7.83, p < .001, d = -1.13, and relative 
to less frequent responses (3.05%), t(47) = -5.29, p < .001, d = -0.76. However, ER2 neither 
differed between frequent and less frequent responses in go-trials, t(47) = 0.24, p = .810, d = 
0.03, nor between no-go-trials of neutral and biased blocks, F(1,47) =  1.35, p = .251, 𝜂p2  = .03. 
 
Table 2. Mean RT2s (in ms) and Error Rates (ER2, in %) for Task 2 as a function of trial type and block type 
(Response 2 frequency).  
  Trial type 
 Block type (Response 2 frequency) No-go Go 
RT2 Neutral  982 
 Biased (frequent)  783 
 Biased (less frequent)  1105 
    
ER2 Neutral 0.26 4.64 
 Biased (frequent) 
1.15 
1.68 
 Biased (less frequent) 3.05 
Note, that in no-go-trials of biased blocks no distinction between frequent and less frequent responses in Task 2 
can be made. Thus, only one mean ER2 for no-go-trials in biased blocks can be reported. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Usually, giving two temporally overlapping responses in two different tasks results in 
worse performance in one or both of the tasks – that is, most often prolonged RTs – in 
comparison with their isolated application. Such dual-task costs are a common observation and 
only few exceptions were reported (see Janczyk, Pfister, Wallmeier, & Kunde, 2014), and thus 
a possible beneficial aspect of dual-tasking is only rarely considered (but see, e.g., Reissland & 
Manzey, 2016). Yet, there are situations in which giving two temporally overlapping responses 
can actually be at least less detrimental compared to giving only one response. Such a 
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counterintuitive effect has been observed when Task 2 requires a response (go-trial) compared 
to when Task 2 demands no response (no-go-trial) (e.g., Durst & Janczyk, 2018; Miller, 2006). 
Presumably, this so-called no-go BCE arises from the inhibition of an already prepared Task 2 
response, spilling over to Task 1, and impeding motor execution in this task (but see Röttger & 
Haider, 2017, for an alternative explanation). To directly test this preparation hypothesis, we 
compared performance in two different blocks, where Task 2 was always a choice/no-go task: 
In neutral blocks, preparation of a particular go-response was not encouraged, but in biased 
blocks, one response was required more frequently than the other, thus encouraging advance 
preparation of this particular response. 
Task 1 performance in no-go-trials suffers only when Task 2 response preparation is 
encouraged. The present results are straightforward. First, RT2s for frequent responses were 
shorter than those for less frequent responses, supporting the idea that participants indeed 
prepared for the more likely response alternative. Second, in neutral blocks, RT1 was shorter 
when Task 2 was a no-go-trial, replicating results reported by Janczyk and Huestegge (2017). 
Most important, this pattern was reversed in biased blocks, thus the no-go BCE re-emerged 
when preparation of a Task 2 response was encouraged. This result supports the preparation 
hypothesis and is also in line with the assumption that the inhibition of an already prepared 
response is the mechanism that underlies the no-go BCE. In a recent mental-chronometry study, 
Durst and Janczyk (2018) obtained further evidence that the no-go BCE arises during motor 
execution (i.e., the locus of the no-go BCE) of Task 1 when it temporally overlaps with the 
central stage (i.e., the source of the no-go BCE) of Task 2 (for an illustration see, Durst & 
Janczyk, 2018, Figure 1d). They suggested (motor) inhibition as the controlled process 
occurring in the central stage of Task 2 processing, causing the no-go BCE at the level of motor 
execution of Task 1. Note that the present results are not in line with an alternative explanation 
for the no-go BCE that was advanced by Röttger and Haider (2017). According to this account, 
a no-go-trial automatically implies the activation of, for example, a no-go tag or the absence of 
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sensory feedback when not responding – features that are on a more abstract level incompatible 
with Task 1 features. Thus, if this explanation were true, the same no-go BCE would have been 
expected regardless of block type.  
Possible objections and limitations. Although the main results are straightforward, 
some aspects are worth discussing. One observation that appears not to be in line with the 
assumed inhibition in biased blocks is that RT1s for no-go-trials are similar in neutral and 
biased blocks. At first glance, one would have expected longer no-go RT1s in biased compared 
with neutral blocks instead. We concur, but we believe that several explanations for this are 
conceivable. Due to the block-wise application, we cannot exclude further differences that 
either decreased RT1s in biased blocks or increased RT1s in neutral blocks (or both), thereby 
obscuring the expected difference for no-go-trials. For example, the possibility of preparation 
in biased blocks may have led to a better preparation in general, which decreased RT1s in biased 
blocks. Further, as RT2s were also longer for neutral than for biased blocks, even a small portion 
of grouped responses in neutral blocks may have increased RT1s accordingly. 
A second objection concerns the nature of the neutral blocks in our experiment. One 
important advantage of our design is that – except for the distribution of the go-response 
frequencies – both blocks are comparable. However, one might suggest that in neutral blocks 
no inhibition occurred in no-go-trials, because the two-choice/no-go task was more similar to a 
three-choice task. In this case, left versus right response code overlap may have induced a 
compatibility-based BCE in go-trials that may have prolonged RT1 in neutral blocks. It is, 
however, unclear whether such code overlap necessarily leads to interference. Rather, in case 
of two compatible responses, facilitation is likely as well. Further, an exploratory post-hoc 
analysis revealed that such a compatibility-based BCE was not evident in the data, t(47) = -
1.40, p = .168, and numerically even inversed. 
Relations to other phenomena. The present results can also be related to other 
phenomena. For example, a reduction in dual-task costs in Task 1 was also reported when 
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saccadic eye movements were required in Task 2 as compared to keeping the eye fixated at the 
screen center (Huestegge & Koch, 2014; see also Raettig & Huestegge, 2018). These studies 
assumed that a saccadic eye movement toward a peripheral target occurs rather automatically, 
and thus inhibition is needed to keep the eye fixated at the screen center. Again then, performing 
only one motor response is harder than performing two responses in this setup as well and 
inhibition appears to be the underlying mechanism for this. 
Our manipulation of stimulus and response frequency conceivably renders the less 
frequent stimuli unexpected. Unexpected events, in turn, are also known for slowing ongoing 
responses (Wessel & Aaron, 2013; Wessel, 2018), and this might have affected RT1s as well. 
In fact, in a post-hoc exploration, RT1s were slower for less frequent Task 2 responses than for 
the frequent Task 2 responses. However, given that RT2s were slower as well, it is difficult to 
separate effects of unexpectedness from other possible sources with the present design. For 
example, RT1s may as well have been prolonged via response grouping (see Ulrich & Miller, 
2008) or because less frequent responses impose larger dual-task costs in general. Future 
research should try to separate unexpectedness from other sources to identify a possible unique 
contribution. 
The present results further support the assumption that the no-go BCE is caused by 
inhibition of a prepared Task 2 response. As such it seems important to clearly distinguish the 
no-go BCE from other types of BCEs, which have different causes. The most-well known other 
type are compatibility-based BCEs, which are likely caused by automatic response feature 
activation occurring in Task 2 (Hommel, 1998; Lien & Proctor, 2000; Janczyk, Pfister, 
Hommel, & Kunde, 2014; Janczyk et al., 2018;Oriet, Tombu, & Jolicoeur, 2005; Logan & 
Schulkind, 2000; Logan & Delheimer, 2001; Renas, Durst, & Janczyk, 2018; Schubert, Fischer, 
& Stelzel, 2008; Watter & Logan, 2006; see Durst & Janczyk, 2019, for a direct comparison). 
To allow for a more precise distinction of backward crosstalk phenomena, future studies should 
investigate to what extent the no-go BCE differs from still other types of BCEs, which seem to 
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be based on motor processes in Task 1, Task 2, or even both tasks (Miller & Alderton, 2006; 
Ruiz Fernández & Ulrich, 2010). 
Conclusion. Motivated by the different suggestions advanced in the previous literature 
(Durst & Janczyk, 2018; Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017; Miller, 2006; Röttger & Haider, 2017), 
the present study provides a direct test that preparation of a Task 2 response and its inhibition 
in no-go-trials is the reason for performance decrements in Task 1, when Task 2 is a no-go task 
– a phenomenon known as the no-go BCE. More generally, the present results support the view 
that reduced preparation for Task 2 can reduce performance decrements in Task 1. Therefore, 
performing two motor responses at the same time can not only produce the usual observation 
of dual-task costs, but can under certain circumstances reduce these costs. 
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Appendix 
Speed accuracy tradeoff (SAT). The higher ER1 for go- relative to no-go-trials in biased 
blocks opposes the results pattern for RT1s, where RT1s were shorter in go- relative to no-go-
trials. This suggests that a speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) was present, which could complicate 
the interpretation of the present results; although the descriptive difference for ER1 was small 
in general.  
To investigate whether the SAT modulated the pattern of results obtained for RT1, the 
method of Janczyk (2016) was adopted. To this end, no-go BCEs for RT1 and ER1 were 
calculated for each participant. If the signs of both no-go BCEs did not match, an SAT for the 
respective participant was indicated. RT1 data were then submitted to a mixed ANOVA with 
trial type and block type as repeated measures plus the additional between-subjects factor SAT.  
The main effect of SAT was not significant, F(1,46) = 1.25, p = .270, 𝜂p2  = .03. However, 
the interaction of trial type and SAT was significant, F(1,46) = 6.38, p = .015, 𝜂p2  = .12. The 
interaction of block type and SAT was not significant, F(1,46) = 0.47, p = .498, 𝜂p2  = .01. Most 
crucially, the interaction of trial type and block type was significant, F(1,46) = 64.20, p < .001, 
𝜂p2  = .58, but the interaction of SAT, trial type, and block type was not significant, F(1,46) = 
0.01, p = .931, 𝜂p2  < .01. Additional separate analyses for participants with and without an SAT 
yielded qualitatively similar results. 
Taken together, the results of the SAT analysis indicate that the SAT did not modulate 
the crucial interaction of trial type and block type, as the three-way interaction was not 
significant. This renders the interpretation of the present results unproblematic. 
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A B S T R A C T
In multitasking, the backward crosstalk effect (BCE) means that Task 1 performance is influenced by char-
acteristics of Task 2. For example, (1) RT1 is shorter when the two responses are given on the same (compatible
trial) compared with opposite sides (incompatible conflict-trial; compatibility-based BCE), and (2) RT1 is longer
when Task 2 is a no-go relative to a go task (no-go BCE). We investigated the impact of recently experienced trial
and conflict history on the size of such BCEs. Similar to the Gratton effect in standard conflict tasks, clear
sequential modulations were observed for the two kinds of BCEs, which were present following (1) compatible
trials and (2) go-trials and inverted following (1) incompatible and (2) no-go trials. Furthermore, recent evidence
from mental chronometry studies suggests that the compatibility-based BCE is located inside the response se-
lection stage, while the no-go-based BCE arises in motor execution. Against this background, a diffusion model
analysis was carried out to reveal the reason(s) for the sequential modulations. As expected, for the compat-
ibility-based BCE, changes in drift rate explain the sequential modulations, but for the no-go BCE changes in non-
decision time are important. The present results indicate that both BCEs not only differ fundamentally in their
underlying processes, but also in the way cognitive control is adjusted.
1. Introduction
At first glance, it seems as if humans are able to carry out multiple
tasks at a time without any problems. However, extensive research in
cognitive psychology teaches us the opposite: Performance declines
under a wide range of seemingly very easy laboratory tasks (e.g.,
Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001) and also in more applied settings
(Levy & Pashler, 2008; Strayer & Drews, 2004, 2007). Today, it is still
hotly debated whether humans are even able to process two or more
tasks in parallel or whether human cognition is limited to processing
only one task at a time in a strictly serial manner.
The widespread and well-accepted response selection (RS) bottle-
neck model (Pashler, 1984, 1994; Welford, 1952) assumes that only one
task at a time can get access to the RS stage. Thus, while RS in Task 1 is
ongoing, that of Task 2 must wait until RS is available again. Accord-
ingly, response times (RTs) for Task 2 are prolonged by this idle time of
waiting (e.g., Pashler, 1994; for possible exceptions, see Janczyk,
Pfister, Wallmeier, & Kunde, 2014). Others have suggested that pro-
cessing of different tasks requires the same limited resource, which can
be shared between tasks to allow for parallel—but less efficient—pro-
cessing (Navon & Miller, 2002; Tombu & Jolicœur, 2003). Converging
evidence for this view was put forward in the recent past (Mittelstädt &
Miller, 2017; for a review, see Fischer & Plessow, 2015). One frequently
reported observation that was taken to indicate parallel processing in
dual-tasking is that characteristics of Task 2 can already influence
performance in Task 1—so-called backward crosstalk effects (BCEs).
The structure of the present paper is as follows. We will first in-
troduce two types of BCEs that we suggest are qualitatively different,
although it is important to note that this is yet controversial in the
literature. We then turn to sequential modulations of these BCEs, that
is, the influence of a previous Trial n− 1 on performance in the current
Trial n. To substantiate our assumption about the clear distinction of
both BCEs, we then argue that the reasons for the sequential mod-
ulations—and thus the mechanisms adjusting cognitive control—in
both BCEs should differ. To demonstrate that, we will reason that the
mechanisms adjusting cognitive control in both BCEs can be mapped to
different parameters of the diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978). This is
followed by a brief sketch of the diffusion model, before we then pre-
sent the particular predictions for our experiment.
1.1. Two types of the BCE
The recent literature has documented several examples of BCEs, and
our own research strongly suggests that several types of BCEs must be
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2018.11.013
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distinguished based on (1) the particular stage of Task 2 that causes the
BCE (henceforth the source) and (2) the stage of Task 1 that is affected
from this influence (henceforth the locus of the BCE). We here focus on
the two types that have attracted most of the respective research so far,
namely the compatibility-based BCE (Hommel, 1998) and the no-go
BCE (Miller, 2006).
The first experiment on the compatibility-based BCE was reported by
Hommel (1998). In Experiment 1, he presented participants with co-
lored letters and instructed them to respond to the color of the letter
with a left vs. right manual keypress, and to the identity of the letter
with a vocal “left” vs. “right” utterance. Task 1 RTs (RT1s) were shorter
for trials in which both responses were spatially compatible (e.g., a left
keypress and a “left” utterance) compared to trials in which both re-
sponses were spatially incompatible (e.g., a left keypress and a “right”
utterance). Thus, dimensional overlap between both tasks and the
compatibility of task features (i.e., stimuli and/or responses) influenced
Task 1 performance. Similar results have been reported in many other
studies (Ellenbogen & Meiran, 2008; Hommel & Eglau, 2002; Janczyk,
Pfister, Hommel, & Kunde, 2014; Lien & Proctor, 2000; Naefgen,
Caissie, & Janczyk, 2017; Schubert, Fischer, & Stelzel, 2008; Watter &
Logan, 2006). Such observations imply that at least some Task 2 RS-
related processing must have proceeded in parallel to Task 1 RS. To
align such results with the RS bottleneck model, it was suggested that a
parallel-processing stage of response activation (RA) runs prior to RS
and is where crosstalk between tasks can occur (Hommel, 1998; Lien &
Proctor, 2002).
To clarify the underlying mechanisms of the compatibility-based
BCE we (Janczyk, Renas, & Durst, 2018) recently investigated the locus
of the compatibility-based BCE by applying the well-established locus
of slack and effect propagation logic (for introductions, please see
Janczyk, 2013, 2017; Kunde, Pfister, & Janczyk, 2012; Miller &
Reynolds, 2003; Schweickert, 1978; and others) in a series of experi-
ments using an extended Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) para-
digm with three subsequent tasks. The results provided strong evidence
for a locus inside Task 1 RS. As the source, we suggested automatic RA,
which occurs if Task 2 does not gain direct access to the response se-
lection stage (for a similar conclusion from a training study see,
Thomson, Danis, & Watter, 2015; for evidence from the LRP, see Lien,
Ruthruff, Hsieh, & Yu, 2007; Miller, 2017). In more detail, we suggested
that automatic response feature activation from Task 2 adds to the
evidence accumulated in Task 1 response selection (see Ulrich,
Schröter, Leuthold, & Birngruber, 2015). Thereby, RT1s become shor-
tened in compatible and prolonged in incompatible trials, in a similar
way as flankers affect performance in an Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen &
Eriksen, 1974). This is illustrated in Fig. 1a.
The no-go BCE was first reported by Miller (2006), who observed a
BCE when a manual-choice Task 1 was combined with a go/no-go Task
2 (see Donders, 1969). In the latter task, participants responded with a
keypress of their right index finger in go trials, and withheld this re-
sponse in no-go trials. Miller observed shorter RT1s for go relative to
no-go trials (see also Ko & Miller, 2014; Miller & Durst, 2014, 2015;
Röttger & Haider, 2017).
One explanation for the no-go BCE is that the necessity to inhibit the
already prepared Task 2 response spills over to Task 1 motor execution
and thus prolongs RT1 in no-go trials (Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017;
Miller, 2006). As an alternative explanation, it was suggested that the
“go representation” of Task 1 conflicts with the “no-go representation”
of Task 2, which causes the no-go BCE via automatic response feature
activation, similar to what was suggested for the compatibility-based
BCE (Röttger & Haider, 2017). However, a recent study applying the
locus of slack and a modified effect propagation logic to the no-go BCE
supported the inhibition hypothesis (Durst & Janczyk, 2018). The re-
sults indicated that Task 1 motor stage is the locus and that the source is
the inhibition resulting from Task 2 RS. This is illustrated in Fig. 1b.
In sum, it appears as if both BCEs are based on fundamentally dif-
ferent cognitive processes and should, thus, be classified as two different
types of BCEs. Notably, both types are usually assessed for the current
trial only. However, the previous trial's characteristics also affect the
size of at least the compatibility-based BCE, as will be explained in the
next section. To allow for a more fine-grained assessment of the as-
sumed distinction of both types of BCEs, the present study also con-
siders the influence of the previous trial for both types of BCEs and
directly addresses the underlying reasons for such sequential modula-
tions.
1.2. Sequential modulation of backward crosstalk effects
A common observation in conflict tasks like, for instance, the
Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) is that the congruency
effect in the present Trial n is larger if the preceding Trial n− 1 was
congruent relative to incongruent (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992).
Similar observations have been reported for other conflict tasks as well
(Simon: Praamstra, Kleine, & Schnitzler, 1999; see also Janczyk &
Leuthold, 2018; Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002;
Wühr, 2004; Stroop: Kerns et al., 2004; Notebaert, Gevers, Verbruggen,
& Liefooghe, 2006). Such sequential modulations (sometimes referred to
as the Gratton effect) have been taken as evidence for rapidly ongoing
adaptation to just experienced (response) conflict (for a review, see
Egner, 2007). More precisely, the conflict monitoring hypothesis
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) suggests that re-
gistering conflict in a trial leads to optimized task processing in the
subsequent trial, for example, by increasing processing of the task re-
levant stimulus.
In a very similar way, the size of the compatibility-based BCE is
affected by the previous trial's compatibility, that is, this BCE is present
only following compatible trials but absent (and sometimes even re-
versed) following incompatible trials (Janczyk, 2016; Scherbaum,
Gottschalk, Dshemuchadse, & Fischer, 2015; Renas, Durst, & Janczyk,
2018; see also Schuch, Dignath, Steinhauser, & Janczyk, 2018). This is
also the case for older adults (Janczyk, Mittelstädt, & Wienrich, 2018)
and for 5–6-year-old children (Janczyk, Büschelberger, & Herbort,
2017), although for children the reasons might be different compared to
(older) adults. The reduced compatibility-based BCE following in-
compatible trials has mostly been explained by more efficient shielding
of Task 1 against influences of Task 2 (Fischer, Gottschalk, & Dreisbach,
2014; Janczyk, 2016). Alternatively, Task 2 RA might become more
suppressed in this case and thus there is nothing that can influence Task
1 processing any longer.
Fig. 1. Illustration of the locus (blue brackets) and
the source (orange brackets) of the two BCEs under
investigation here (see, e.g., Janczyk, Renas, et al.,
2018, Durst & Janczyk, 2018; and others). (a) Com-
patibility-based BCE and (b) no-go BCE. (P= per-
ceptual stage, RS= response selection, RA= re-
sponse activation, M=motor stage, the subscript
indicates Task 1 and 2, respectively). (For inter-
pretation of the references to color in this figure le-
gend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
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For the no-go BCE, no sequential modulation has been reported so
far and it remains an open question whether the no-go BCE is also
subject to trial-by-trial adjustments in a similar way. As will be outlined
below in the section on predictions, there are reasons to assume this,
however.
While most previous studies on backward crosstalk and its sequen-
tial modulations focused on RTs and error data as the main dependent
measures, we here go a step beyond and apply the diffusion model
(Ratcliff, 1978) to our data. This allows (1) to further test the models
depicted in Fig. 1 and (2) also to uncover the reasons for the sequential
modulations, which will both help to specify the distinction between
both BCEs. A brief introduction to the diffusion model is provided in the
next section before we outline the present study and the predictions in
more detail.
1.3. A brief introduction into the diffusion model
The diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978) is a mathematical model of
human decision making in binary tasks (see Fig. 2). It assumes that an
individual accumulates evidence for a decision until one of two
thresholds is reached. As soon as the threshold is hit, the decision is
made and the according response is given. The standard diffusion
model contains three main parameters: The drift rate v reflects the
(average) speed and direction of information accumulation. In ac-
cordance with this, v is higher for easier tasks than for difficult ones
(e.g., Germar, Schlemmer, Krug, Voss, & Mojzisch, 2014; Voss,
Rothermund, & Brandtstädter, 2008; Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004).
Another important parameter is non-decision time (t0), which reflects
the duration of processes occurring before and after the decision pro-
cess proper. Such processes are, for instance, perceptual or motor
processes. Of particular importance for the present purposes, several
manipulations affecting motor processes (e.g., blockwise altering re-
sponse modalities, Gomez, Ratcliff, & Childers, 2015; movement dis-
tance to the response key, Voss et al., 2004; motor complexity, Lerche &
Voss, 2017) were indeed reflected in t0. Finally, the threshold separa-
tion a defines the amount of information that is needed to reach a de-
cision, and can thus reflect speed-accuracy settings (for other manip-
ulations affecting a, see Naefgen, Dambacher, & Janczyk, 2018).
Evidence accumulation usually starts in the middle of both thresholds,
although a bias towards one threshold can be implemented as well. In
addition, while the drift rate drives the evidence into one direction in
each time-step, random noise is added as well. This noise makes the
diffusion process hit the correct threshold at various points in time and
can also lead to its ending at the opposite threshold. In the latter case,
an error is committed.
There are many publications on the diffusion model and its ex-
perimental validation, and we refer the reader to those instead of re-
peating the information here (for introductory articles, see Ratcliff,
Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016; Voss, Nagler, & Lerche, 2013; for
empirical studies with the diffusion model see, e.g., Schmitz & Voss,
2012; Janczyk & Lerche, 2018; Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2011;
Schubert, Hagemann, Voss, Schankin, & Bergmann, 2015). In relation
to the compatibility-based BCE, only two previous studies have applied
the diffusion model so far, but both focused only on Trial n. The pre-
valent impression from these studies is that drift rate was higher in
compatible compared with incompatible trials (which is in line with a
locus in RS; Janczyk, Renas, et al., 2018), at least for young and older
adults (Janczyk, Mittelstädt, et al., 2018). For children, the effect was
represented more in non-decision time (Janczyk et al., 2017).
1.4. The present study and predictions
The aims of the present study were twofold. First, we aimed at de-
termining whether a sequential modulation can also be observed for the
no-go BCE. Second, given this, we wanted to investigate the reasons for
these sequential modulations in more detail, and our theoretical con-
siderations (Durst & Janczyk, 2018; Janczyk, Renas, et al., 2018) sug-
gest different loci that would be reflected in different parameters of the
diffusion model. This assumption, so far based on behavioral measures
and chronometric approaches carried out independently for both BCEs,
would receive further and novel support if we could identify different
reasons for the sequential modulations in both BCEs as reflected in
different parameters of the diffusion model. Furthermore, this would
help to specify the mechanisms which adjust cognitive control in both
types of BCEs. To allow for a first direct comparison of both types of
BCEs, the same participants provided data for both types of BCEs in two
separate sessions. In the following, we will formulate specific predic-
tions focusing on Task 1. Subsidiary hypotheses and the respective re-
sults concerning Task 2 can be found in the Appendix.
We will present the main hypotheses separately for both types of
BCEs and for behavioral measures (RTs, error rates) and diffusion
model parameters. Let us first consider the compatibility-based BCE:
• Behavioral measures. As reported in previous studies, we expected to
observe a sequential modulation with a larger BCE following com-
patible relative to following incompatible trials (e.g., Janczyk,
2016).• Diffusion model parameters. Considering that the compatibility-based
BCE has its locus in Task 1 RS (Janczyk, Renas, et al., 2018;
Thomson et al., 2015) and that drift rate v has been reported to be
larger in compatible than in incompatible trials (Janczyk,
Mittelstädt, et al., 2018), we expected the sequential modulation to
be reflected in a sequential modulation of Task 1 drift rate v.
While this is the primary prediction, we also predict an interaction
of compatibility in Trial n− 1 and Trial n for t0. This prediction is
due to the particular experimental setup in which the two transi-
tions ‘incompatible→ incompatible’ and ‘compatible→ compatible’
entail 50% trials with exact repetitions of the two responses (see also
Fig. 1 in Janczyk, 2016). Previous research has shown that such
repetitions lead to shorter RTs due to re-usage of motor programs
(e.g., Rosenbaum, Weber, Hazelett, & Hindorff, 1986).1
Fig. 2. Exemplary illustration of decision processes in the diffusion model. The
two thresholds (here associated with correct [a] and erroneous responses [0])
are separated by the threshold separation a. The accumulation process moves
with drift rate ν from the starting point (here centered between thresholds) until
it reaches the upper or lower threshold. To the decision process depicted in the
figure add non-decisional processes (e.g., encoding of information, motoric
response execution). The green line illustrates a decision process leading to a
correct response and the red line illustrates a decision process leading to a
wrong response. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
1 To foreshadow, this is what we observed. Thus, we also re-analyzed data
from Experiment 3 in Janczyk (2016), where such transitions were avoided,
and we expected to replicate the sequential modulation in drift rate v, but this
time not in non-decision time t0.
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Regarding the no-go BCE, a sequential modulation has not been
reported to date. Yet, it can be expected, but for different reasons than
for the compatibility-based BCE. Consider that the no-go BCE is caused
by inhibition required to overcome a prepared Task 2 response in a no-
go trial (Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017; Miller, 2006) which spills over to
Task 1 motor execution (Durst & Janczyk, 2018). We further assume
that participants would adjust their response preparation of Task 2 in
Trial n according to the preparation state induced by Trial n− 1, si-
milar to what was observed in stop-signal studies where an already
prepared response has to be inhibited (Bissett & Logan, 2011). In other
words, following go trials, participants (again) prepare the Task 2 re-
sponse, which should lead to a no-go BCE in the case of a no-go trial. In
contrast, following no-go trials, participants may not prepare the Task 2
response, and, thus no no-go BCE should be observed because the Task
2 response would not have to be inhibited. More precisely:
• Behavioral measures. Following go trials, we predict shorter RT1s in
go compared to no-go trials.• Diffusion model parameters. According to our assumption and the
model presented in Fig. 1b, the sequential modulation is predicted
to be reflected in non-decision time t0, accordingly. Alternatively, a
response selection locus of the no-go BCE was suggested by Ko and
Miller (2014) and also, the no-go BCE might involve an abstract
incompatibility of go versus no-go representations (Röttger &
Haider, 2017). These accounts suggest a reflection in drift rate v as
more likely.
In a nutshell, we expected to observe sequential modulations of the
compatibility-based and the no-go BCE in the behavioral data and in the
diffusion model parameters. The compatibility-based BCE was expected
to be reflected mainly in drift rate v, whereas the no-go BCE was ex-
pected to be reflected in non-decision time t0.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Forty-eight students (37 female) from the University of Tübingen,
aged 20 to 37 years (M=24.4 years, SD=4.0), participated for
monetary compensation (16€) or course credit. All participants pro-
vided written informed consent prior to data collection and had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision.
The effect of interest in our experiments is a 2× 2 interaction of
two repeated-measures which can be broken down to a (paired) t-test. A
corresponding analysis of Janczyk's (2016) Experiment 3 data revealed
dz= 0.66 (without correction by multiplication with 2 ), that is, a
medium-to-large effect according to Cohen (1988). To calculate our
sample size, we thus assumed a medium effect of dz= 0.5, α=0.05,
and 1−β=0.90. Power analysis using the function power.t.test() of
the R-software yielded a required sample size of n≈ 44 participants.
2.2. Apparatus and stimuli
A standard PC was used for stimulus presentation and response
collection. Stimuli and instructions were presented on a 17-in. CRT
monitor. Stimuli were the letters ‘H’ or ‘X’ colored in yellow or blue.
The identity of the letter served as Stimulus 1 (S1) and the color of the
letter served as Stimulus 2 (S2). Stimuli were presented in the center of
an otherwise black screen. In the compatibility-based BCE session, re-
sponses to S1 were given via a manual key press of one of two response
keys (R1), one to the left and one to the right of the participant on the
table. Responses to S2 were given via a pedal press of one of two pedals
(R2), one to the left and one to the right of the participant on the floor.
In the no-go BCE session, responses to S1 were given via a manual key
press of one of two response keys (R1), both placed to the left of the
participant. Responses to S2 were given via a key press of a single re-
sponse key to the right of the participant, or by withholding the re-
sponse (R2).
2.3. Task and procedure
The trial structure is illustrated in Fig. 3. In the compatibility-based
task, Task 1 was to respond to S1 with a key press of the left or right
index finger, and Task 2 was to respond to S2 with a left or right pedal
press. In the no-go task, Task 1 was to respond to S1 via a key press of
the left index or middle finger, and Task 2 was to respond to S2 with a
key press of the right index finger (go trial) or by withholding the re-
sponse (no-go trial).
Every trial started with a white fixation cross (250ms), followed by
a blank screen (250ms). Subsequently, the colored letter was presented
for a maximum of 2500ms or until R1 and R2 were registered. The next
trial started after an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 1000ms. In case of
wrong responses or general errors (no response within 2500ms fol-
lowing stimulus onset, responses in the wrong order, response to S2 in a
no-go trial, and so on), specific error feedback was provided for
1000ms before the ITI. (Such trials were excluded for analyses.)
Fig. 3. Graphical illustration of the trial
structure and the tasks performed for the
compatibility-based BCE and the no-go BCE.
In the compatibility-based BCE task, parti-
cipants first responded to the identity of the
letter in a manual two-choice task and
subsequently to the color of the letter in a
pedal two-choice task. In this particular
example, an X calls for a manual response
with the left key, while the color blue calls
for a left pedal response, and thus both re-
sponses in Trial n are spatially compatible.
In the no-go BCE task, participants first re-
spond to the identity of the letter in a
manual two-choice task with their left hand
and subsequently to the color of the letter
with a go/no-go task using their right index
finger. In this particular example, an X calls
for a response with the left middle finger,
while the color blue indicates a no-go trial.
(For interpretation of the references to color
in this figure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
M. Durst, M. Janczyk $FWD3V\FKRORJLFD²

Participants first performed a short familiarization block of 20
randomly drawn trials, which was followed by eighteen experimental
blocks of 48 trials each, resulting from twelve repetitions of all com-
binations of 2 S1× 2 S2. All trials were presented in a random order.
Participants received written instructions that emphasized speed and
accuracy, and were asked to give R1 and R2 successively in fixed order.
The stimulus-response mapping of all tasks was counterbalanced across
participants. One half of participants started with the compatibility-
based BCE session, and completed the no-go BCE session one day to a
week later (and vice versa for the other half of participants). One single
session lasted for approximately 45min.
2.4. Design and analysis
For the compatibility-based BCE, trials in which both responses
were emitted on the same side (i.e., left index finger and left foot, or
right index finger and right foot) were considered compatible, whereas
trials in which both responses were emitted on different sides (i.e., left
index finger and right foot, or right index finger and left foot) were
considered incompatible. For the no-go BCE, a trial was considered a
go-trial when R2 was to be given. Otherwise, when R2 was to be
withheld, the trial was considered a no-go trial. Data from the first two
blocks were excluded from analyses. For the sequential analysis of RTs,
only entirely correct trials were considered if Trial n− 1 was also en-
tirely correct. Additionally, the first trial of each block was excluded
from data analyses, because for these trials no Trial n− 1 was avail-
able. In addition, for the analysis of RTs, only trials with RT1s between
200ms and 1500ms were included, while for RT2 only trials with RT2s
between 200ms and 1900ms were included, all other trials were
considered outliers. Mean correct RTs and error rate (ER) were first
submitted to a 2× 2× 2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with the fac-
tors (1) Task (compatibility-based vs. no-go BCE), (2) type in Trial n and
(3) type in Trial n− 1 (for factors 2 and 3: compatible vs. incompatible
[compatibility-based BCE], or go vs. no-go [no-go BCE]) as repeated-
measures. The critical interaction indicating a sequential modulation is
that between the latter two factors 2 and 3. Thus, if the three-way in-
teraction was significant, we followed-up this initial analysis with two
2× 2 ANOVAs separately for each task to further test whether the
critical interaction is present or not in each task.
2.5. Modelling
The same outlier criteria as for RT analyses were applied. The dif-
fusion model parameters were estimated for each individual and se-
parately for each task, applying the Maximum Likelihood criterion
implemented in fast-dm-30 (Voss & Voss, 2007; Voss, Voss, & Lerche,
2015). The upper threshold was associated with a correct response,
while the lower one was associated with an error response. The starting
point was fixed at the center of the two thresholds.2 The parameter a
was allowed to vary across Trial n− 1, while v and t0 were allowed to
vary across Trial n and Trial n− 1. Inter-trial variability of starting
point and v were fixed to zero, while the inter-trial variability of t0 (st0)
was estimated, because under these conditions the Maximum Like-
lihood criterion leads to very reliable parameter estimates (Lerche &
Voss, 2016). Thus, in total, eleven parameters were estimated: an−1
compatible, an−1 incompatible, vn compatible, n−1 compatible, vn compatible, n−1
incompatible, vn incompatible, n−1 compatible, vn incompatible, n−1 incompatible, t0 n
compatible, n−1 compatible, t0 n compatible, n−1 incompatible, t0 n incompatible, n−1
compatible, t0 n incompatible, n−1 incompatible, and st0. The diffusion model
parameters v and t0 were first submitted to a 2× 2× 2 ANOVA with
the factors (1) Task (compatibility-based vs. no-go BCE), (2) type in
Trial n and (3) type in Trial n− 1 (for factors 2 and 3: compatible vs.
incompatible [compatibility-based BCE], or go vs. no-go [no-go BCE]),
and the parameter a was first submitted to a 2× 2 ANOVA with the
factors (1) task (compatibility-based vs. no-go BCE) and (2) type in Trial
n− 1 (compatible vs. incompatible [compatibility-based BCE], or go
vs. no-go [no-go BCE]) as repeated-measures. As for RTs and ERs, se-
parate analyses per task were run if the three-way interaction (for v and
t0) or the two-way interaction (for a) turned out to be significant.
3. Results
3.1. Behavioral results
All mean RT1s are visualized in Fig. 4 (see also Table 1 for the
compatibility-based BCE and Table 2 for the no-go BCE) and ERs in
Task 1 are summarized in Table 1 (compatibility-based BCE) and in
Table 2 (no-go BCE). The corresponding analyses for Task 2 can be
found in the Appendix.
The most important results of the initial three-way ANOVA relate to
the three-way interaction of Task and type in Trial n and in Trial n− 1
for RT1s and ER1. This interaction was significant for both RT1s, F
(1,47)= 86.07, p < .001, ηp2= 0.65, and ER1, F(1,47)= 58.83,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.56 (details of the full results are provided in
Table 3). Accordingly, the sequential modulations differed significantly
for the compatibility-based BCE and the no-go BCE, and we continue
with the follow-up ANOVAs omitting the factor Task.
For the compatibility-based BCE task, the ANOVA for mean RT1s
(0.76% outliers) revealed 30ms longer RT1s for incompatible (548ms)
compared to compatible trials (518ms), and thus a compatibility-based
BCE, F(1,47)= 38.52, p < .001, ηp2= 0.45. RT1s were 8ms longer
following compatible (537ms) relative to incompatible (529ms) Trials
n− 1, F(1,47)= 6.68, p= .013, ηp2= 0.12. Most importantly, the in-
teraction of type in Trial n and in Trial n− 1 was significant, F
(1,47)= 231.90, p < .001, ηp2= 0.83, and thus a sequential modula-
tion of the compatibility-based BCE occurred. The compatibility-based
BCE was present following compatible trials (121ms), t(47)= 6.08,
p < .001, d=0.88 (here and in the following, d was calculated as=d tn ), and inverted following incompatible trials (−63ms), t
(47)=−7.88, p < .001, d=−1.14.
The ANOVA for ER1 revealed a significant main effect of type in
Trial n, with 1.84% more errors in incompatible (4.41%) relative to
compatible trials (2.57%), F(1,47)= 26.50, p < .001, ηp2= 0.36. ER1
were on average 1.34% higher following compatible (4.16%) relative to
incompatible trials (2.82%), F(1,47)= 26.07, p < .001, ηp2= 0.36.
The interaction was also significant, F(1,47)= 63.18, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.57, indicating a sequential modulation of the compatibility-
based BCE. The compatibility-based BCE was present following com-
patible trials (6.60%), t(47)= 5.34, p < .001, d=0.77, and inverted
following incompatible trials (−2.91%), t(47)=−4.36, p < .001,
d=−0.63.
For the no-go BCE task, the ANOVA for mean RT1s (0.60% outliers)
revealed a significant main effect of type in Trial n, with 26ms shorter
RT1s for go (484ms) relative to no-go trials (510ms), and thus a no-go
BCE, F(1,47)= 56.12, p < .001, ηp2= 0.54. RT1s were 22ms shorter
following go trials (487ms) than following no-go trials (509ms), F
(1,47)= 27.29, p < .001, ηp2= 0.37. Most importantly, the interac-
tion of type in Trial n and Trial n− 1 was also significant, F
(1,47)= 123.50, p < .001, ηp2= 0.72, indicating a sequential mod-
ulation. The no-go BCE was present following go trials (70ms), t
(47)= 13.25, p < .001, d=1.91, and inverted following no-go trials
(−18ms), t(47)=−3.30, p= .002, d=−0.48. The ANOVA for ER1
revealed no significant effects, all Fs≤ 1.47, all ps≥ .231.
2 Note, that we decided to keep the starting point fixed, because in the lit-
erature there is no indication about how the starting point would vary de-
pending on Trial n−1 and on Trial n, and because we had no hypothesis in this
regard.
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3.2. Summary of behavioral results
Significant interactions between type in Trial n and Trial n− 1 were
present in Task 1 data for both the compatibility-based and the no-go
BCE in RTs and ERs. The compatibility-based BCE was larger following
compatible relative to incompatible trials (where it was even inverted)
and the no-go BCE was larger following go relative to no-go trials
(where it was even inverted). Thus, the present results indicate that
indeed both types of the BCE were sequentially modulated. The se-
quential modulation for the no-go BCE is reported for the first time
here. We will now present the results from the diffusion model analyses.
3.3. Diffusion model results
In the initial three-way ANOVAs the interactions of Task, type in
Trial n and in Trial n− 1 were significant for v, F(1,47)= 24.11,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.34, and t0, F(1,47)= 28.04, p < .001, ηp2= 0.37.
This indicates that the sequential modulations of both parameters dif-
fered significantly for the compatibility-based BCE and the no-go BCE.
Also, the two-way interaction for the parameter a, F(1,47)= 6.64,
p= .013, ηp2= 0.12, was significant. The full results of these ANOVAs
are provided in Table 4. We continued with the follow-up ANOVAs
separately for each task.
An illustration of the model fit for Task 1 of the compatibility-
based BCE can be found in Fig. 5. Descriptive parameter data are vi-
sualized in Fig. 6 (see also Table 5). The corresponding analyses for
Task 2 can be found in the Appendix.
The ANOVA revealed that v was on average 0.34 larger when Trial n
was compatible (3.30) relative to incompatible (2.96), F(1,47)= 21.44,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.31, but it was not influenced by Trial n− 1, F
(1,47)= 0.60, p= .444, ηp2= 0.01. Most importantly, the interaction
of type in Trial n and Trial n− 1 was significant, F(1,47)= 79.27,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.63. After incompatible Trials n− 1, v was on
average 0.51 larger if the current Trial n was incompatible (3.41) re-
lative to compatible (2.90), t(47)= 3.39, p= .001, d=0.49, while
Fig. 4. Mean RTs of Task 1 as a function of type in Trial n (incompatible vs. compatible, or no-go vs. go) and Trial n− 1 (incompatible vs. compatible, or no-go vs. go)
and task (compatibility-based BCE, left panel vs. no-go BCE, right panel). Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the difference between type in
Trial n (see Pfister & Janczyk, 2013).
Table 1
Mean RTs (in ms) and Error Rates (ER, in %) for Task 1 of the compatibility-
based BCE task as a function of type in Trial n and Trial n− 1 (in ms). Crosstalk
effects were computed by subtracting values from compatible trials from those
of incompatible trials of Trial n line-by-line. (Note: DV=dependent variable).
DV Trial n− 1 Trial n
Incompatible Compatible BCE
RT Incompatible 497 560 −63
Compatible 598 477 121
ER Incompatible 1.37 4.28 −2.91
Compatible 7.46 0.86 6.60
Table 2
Mean RTs (in ms) and Error Rates (ER, in %) for Task 1 of the no-go BCE task as
a function of type in Trial n and Trial n− 1 (in ms). Crosstalk effects were
computed by subtracting values from go trials from those of no-go trials of Trial
n line-by-line. (Note: DV=dependent variable).
DV Trial n− 1 Trial n
No-go Go BCE
RT No-go 500 518 −18
Go 522 452 70
ER No-go 3.06 2.68 0.38
Go 3.08 3.03 0.05
Table 3
Inferential statistics for the three-way ANOVA on RT1 and ER1. (Note:
DV=dependent variable).
DV Effect F(1,47) p ηp2
RT1 Type in Trial n 84.71 < .001 0.64
Type in Trial n− 1 6.02 =.018 0.11
Task 13.79 =.001 0.23
Type in Trial n× type in Trial n− 1 239.36 < .001 0.84
Type in Trial n× task 0.30 =.585 0.01
Type in Trial n− 1× task 34.71 < .001 0.42
Type in Trial n× type in Trial n− 1× task 86.07 < .001 0.65
ER1 Type in Trial n 32.05 < .001 0.41
Type in Trial n− 1 23.98 < .001 0.34
Task 2.69 =.108 0.05
Type in Trial n× type in Trial n− 1 52.58 < .001 0.53
Type in Trial n× task 14.21 < .001 0.23
Type in Trial n− 1× task 13.90 =.001 0.23
Type in Trial N× type in Trial N− 1× task 58.83 < .001 0.56
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after compatible Trials n− 1, v was on average 1.19 larger if Trial nwas
compatible (3.71) relative to incompatible (2.51), t(47)=−4.15,
p < .001, d=−0.60.
t0 was neither affected by Trial n, F(1,47)= 0.56, p= .460,
ηp2= 0.01, nor by Trial n− 1, F(1,47)= 0.32, p= .572, ηp2= 0.01.
However, the ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction of type in
Trial n and Trial n− 1, F(1,47)= 144.81, p < .001, ηp2= 0.75. After
incompatible Trials n− 1, t0 was on average 0.04 larger for compatible
(0.32) relative to incompatible (0.28) Trials n, t(47)=−11.02,
p < .001, d=−1.59, while after compatible Trials n− 1, t0 was on
average 0.05 larger for incompatible (0.32) relative to compatible
(0.27) Trials n, t(47)=−0.09, p= .928, d=−0.01. In other words,
the trial transitions that entailed 50% repetitions of responses had
shorter non-decision times than the other transitions had.
Finally, the ANOVA revealed, that a was not influenced by type in
Trial n− 1, F(1,47)= 0.66, p= .422, ηp2= 0.01.3
An illustration of the model fit for Task 1 of the no-go BCE can be
found in Fig. 7. Descriptive parameter data are visualized in Fig. 8 (see
also Table 6). The corresponding analyses for Task 2 can be found in the
Appendix.
For v, the main effect of type in Trial n was significant, with an on
average 0.18 larger v in go (3.72) relative to no-go (3.54) trials, F
(1,47)= 6.66, p= .013, ηp2= 0.12. Type in Trial n− 1 also affected v,
with an on average 0.14 larger v following go (3.70) than no-go (3.56)
trials, F(1,47)= 5.24, p= .027, ηp2= 0.10. The interaction was not
significant, F(1,47)= 2.33, p= .134, ηp2= 0.05. The ANOVA for t0
revealed an on average 0.02 larger t0 for no-go (0.34) relative to go
(0.32) trials, F(1,47)= 43.45, p < .001, ηp2= 0.48. Type in Trial
n− 1 did not affect t0, F(1,47)= 1.50, p= .227, ηp2= 0.03. Most im-
portantly, the interaction of type in Trial n and Trial n− 1 was sig-
nificant, F(1,47)= 111.20, p < .001, ηp2= 0.70. After no-go trials, t0
was on average 0.02 larger for go (0.34) relative to no-go trials (0.32), t
(47)=−3.85, p < .001, d=−0.56, while after go trials, t0 was on
Table 4
Inferential statistics for the three-way ANOVA on the diffusion model para-
meters v, t0, and a. (Note: DV=dependent variable).
DV Effect F(1,47) p ηp2
v Type in Trial n 6.03 =.018 0.11
Type in Trial n− 1 24.03 < .001 0.34
Task 57.80 < .001 0.55
Type in Trial n× type in Trial n− 1 0.98 =.327 0.02
Type in Trial n× task 2.71 =.106 0.05
Type in Trial n− 1× task 48.85 < .001 0.51
Type in Trial n× type in Trial n− 1× task 24.11 < .001 0.34
t0 Type in Trial n 0.10 =.754 <0.01
Type in Trial n− 1 21.15 < .001 =0.31
Task 187.38 < .001 =0.80
Type in Trial n× type in Trial n− 1 1.84 =.182 =0.04
Type in Trial n× task 25.61 < .001 =0.35
Type in Trial n− 1× task 2.63 =.112 =0.05
Type in Trial n× type in Trial n− 1× task 28.04 < .001 0.37
a Type in Trial n− 1 57.70 < .001 0.55
Task 2.75 =.104 0.06
Type in Trial n− 1× task 6.64 =.013 0.12
Fig. 5. Illustration of the model fit for the compat-
ibility-based BCE Task 1: relationship between em-
pirical and predicted statistics (accuracy, 1st, 2nd,
and 3rd RT quartile). Red circles represent type in
Trial n and Trial n− 1 compatible, green circles re-
present type in Trial n incompatible and type in Trial
n− 1 compatible, blue circles represent type in Trial
n compatible and type in Trial n− 1 incompatible,
and yellow circles represent type in Trial n and Trial
n− 1 incompatible means. (For interpretation of the
references to color in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
3 Correlations between the three parameters were calculated for each of the
four design cells. Because a was only estimated as a function of Trial n−1
compatibility, the respective values were used in the relevant two design cells.
In the following, we report the range of the four calculated correlations for each
parameter combination: r(v,a)= [−0.45; 0.23], r(v,t0)= [−0.24; −0.01], r
(a,t0)= [−0.13; 0.15].
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average 0.06 larger for no-go (0.36) relative to go (0.30) trials, t
(47)= 13.65, p < .001, d=1.97.
Finally, the ANOVA revealed an on average 0.08 larger a following
no-go (1.19) than go trials (1.11), F(1,47)= 15.38, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.25.4
3.4. Reanalysis of Experiment 3 in Janczyk (2016)
This particular experiment employed a standard compatibility-
based BCE task, but full repetitions and full alternations of stimuli were
not allowed and repetitions of response combinations did not occur in
all four possible compatibility transitions. Nonetheless, a sequential
modulation of the BCE was observed, which was only present following
compatible trials, but entirely absent following incompatible trials. For
the reanalysis, the same diffusion model and outlier criteria as in the
present study were applied.
An illustration of the model fit for Task 1 can be found in Fig. 9.
Descriptive parameter data are visualized in Fig. 10 (see also Table 7).
The corresponding analyses for Task 2 can be found in the Appendix.
Neither type in Trial n, F(1,31)= 0.14, p= .708, ηp2 < 0.01, nor
type in Trial n− 1, F(1,31)= 0.28, p= .599, ηp2= 0.01, affected v.
Importantly, the sequential modulation was significant for v, F
(1,31)= 4.51, p= .042, ηp2= 0.13. Following incompatible trials, v
was on average 0.68 larger for incompatible (2.94) relative to compa-
tible trials (2.26), t(31)= 2.49, p= .019, d=0.44, and following
compatible trials, v was on average 0.59 larger in compatible (3.09)
relative to incompatible trials (2.50), t(31)= 0.72, p= .474, d=0.13.
For t0, the analysis neither revealed a significant main effect of type
in Trial n, F(1,31)= 0.15, p= .702, ηp2 < 0.01, nor of type in Trial
n− 1, F(1,31)= 0.68, p= .414, ηp2= 0.02. Most importantly, the in-
teraction was also not significant, F(1,31)= 1.41, p= .243, ηp2= 0.04.
Thus, these results replicate the sequential modulation in drift rate v,
but when repetitions of response combination did not occur, t0 was not
sequentially modulated.
Finally, a was not affected by type in Trial n− 1, F(1,31)= 0.52,
p= .476, ηp2= 0.02.5
4. General discussion
The main goals of the present study were to (1) investigate whether
sequential modulations could be obtained for the compatibility-based
BCE and in particular for the no-go BCE, and (2) to investigate the
reason for the sequential modulation of both BCEs applying the diffu-
sion model to the behavioral data of each BCE task. Our basic as-
sumption underlying this research was that both types of BCEs are
qualitatively different, that is, they occur for different reasons (see
Fig. 1 for an illustration). By and large, the results strongly support this
assumption.
In the following, we will summarize and discuss the main results
separately for both types of BCEs. In a subsequent section, we will then
conclude with comparing both BCEs regarding their underlying pro-
cesses and the adjustment of cognitive control.
4.1. The compatibility-based BCE
As already earlier studies demonstrated (Janczyk, 2016; Renas
et al., 2018; Scherbaum et al., 2015), a clear sequential modulation was
observed in the behavioral data: The compatibility-based BCE was large
Fig. 6. Mean diffusion model parameters for Task 1 of the compatibility-based BCE task: v and t0 as a function of type in Trial n and Trial n− 1 (for both factors:
incompatible vs. compatible), and a as a function of type in Trial n− 1 (incompatible vs. compatible). Errors bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the
difference between type in Trial n incompatible and compatible (see Pfister & Janczyk, 2013).
Table 5
Mean parameter values of, drift rate (v), non-decision time (t0), and threshold
separation (a) for Task 1 of the compatibility-based BCE task as a function of
type in Trial n (only v and t0) and Trial n− 1. (Note: DV=dependent variable).
DV Trial n− 1 Trial n
Incompatible Compatible
v Incompatible 3.41 2.90
Compatible 2.51 3.71
t0 Incompatible 0.28 0.32
Compatible 0.32 0.27
a Incompatible 1.41
Compatible 1.44
4 Correlations between parameters were calculated as described in Footnote
3: r(v,a)= [−0.53; 0.45], r(v,t0)= [−0.15; 0.18], r(a,t0)= [0.07; 0.40].
5 Correlations between parameters were calculated as described in Footnote
3: r(v,a)= [−0.35; 0.96], r(v,t0)= [0.51; 0.75], r(a,t0)= [−0.49; 0.63].
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following compatible trials, and absent, or more precisely: even in-
verted, following incompatible trials. In addition, the sequential mod-
ulation was effectively reflected in the drift rate parameter v of the
diffusion model. This was expected against the background of previous
studies that identified the RS stage of Task 1 as the locus of this type of
BCE (Janczyk, Renas, et al., 2018; Thomson et al., 2015; for evidence
from the LRP see Lien et al., 2007; Miller, 2017). In particular, fol-
lowing compatible trials, it appeared as if RA resulting from Task 2 was
added to that of Task 1, eventually resulting in an increased drift rate in
compatible trials and a decreased drift rate in incompatible trials. A
Fig. 7. Illustration of the model fit for the no-go BCE
Task 1: relationship between empirical and predicted
statistics (accuracy, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd RT quartile).
Red circles represent type in Trial n and Trial n− 1
go, green circles represent type in Trial n no-go and
type in Trial n− 1 go, blue circles represent type in
Trial n go and type in Trial n− 1 no-go, and yellow
circles represent type in Trial n and Trial n− 1 no-go
means. (For interpretation of the references to color
in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
Fig. 8. Mean diffusion model parameters for Task 1 of the no-go BCE task: v and t0 as a function of type in Trial n and Trial n− 1 (for both factors: no-go vs. go), and a
as a function of type in Trial n− 1 (no-go vs. go). Errors bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the difference between type in Trial n no-go and go (see
Pfister & Janczyk, 2013).
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similar idea was already envisaged in the ECTVA model (Logan &
Gordon, 2001), where response information from Task 2 is (erro-
neously) added to Task 1 response counters. Alternatively, it may be
possible that Task 1 RS, as reflected by Task 1 drift rate, is super-
imposed by a second diffusion process reflecting parallel-running Task
2 RA, as was envisaged in the Diffusion Model for Conflict tasks (DMC;
see Ulrich et al., 2015). Possible extensions of the DMC to the dual-task
situation are illustrated in Fig. 11, for two different scenarios of the
Task 2 RA time-course. In the left panel (Model A), the time-course
resembles that assumed for conflict tasks in the DMC: The Task 2 RA
activation quickly rises and declines again to zero. Alternatively,
against the background that the RA-inducing stimulus (feature) is not
irrelevant to the whole task (as, e.g., are the flankers in a flanker ex-
periment), Task 2 RA might steadily increase while Task 1 RS is still
ongoing. This is visualized in the right panel (Model B). A modelling
approach may also help to reveal whether information accumulated in
Task 2 RA can be passed on to Task 2 RS or not. Some authors suggested
that observing the same RT pattern for Task 2 as for Task 1 is com-
pletely due to propagation of Task 1 effects into Task 2 performance
(Schubert et al., 2008), while others suggested that Task 2 RS in fact
benefits from still available RA, at least in compatible trials (Thomson &
Watter, 2013). Note that, in Fig. 11, we assumed that Task 2 RS starts at
the still available level of existing RA. Interestingly, Model A in this
figure allows for larger RT differences between compatible and in-
compatible trials in Task 2 than in Task 1, what has in fact been ob-
served in several studies (e.g., Hommel, 1998; Logan & Gordon, 2001;
Janczyk, 2016, Exp. 1/2; but see also Ellenbogen & Meiran, 2011). This
work is currently ongoing in our lab.
Additionally, a sequential modulation of t0 was obtained with the
data from the present study, but not with the data from Experiment 3 in
Janczyk (2016). The crucial difference between the two experiments is
that in the present experimental setup two trial transitions comprise
50% of exact response repetitions; this did not occur in the data from
the reanalyzed experiment. The sped-up responses with response re-
petitions (Rosenbaum et al., 1986) were apparently reflected in non-
decision time t0. Thus, while it seems clear that a part of processing
responsible for the sequential modulation is attributable to RS-related
processing, some part also is due to repetitions of responses, if those are
present. Taken together, these results support the assumption that the
sequential modulation of the compatibility-based BCE is based on a
trial-to trial adjustment of v.
These results are, however, compatible with two different—yet not
mutually exclusive—scenarios. First, the critical adjustment following
incompatible trials may take place in Task 1, what has been termed
“increased shielding of Task 1” in several papers (e.g., Fischer et al.,
2014; Janczyk, 2016). Second, it might as well be the case that fol-
lowing incompatible trials, Task 2 RA is suppressed and can thus not
affect Task 1 processing at all (similar to what has been suggested to
Table 6
Mean parameter values of drift rate (v), non-decision time (t0), and threshold
separation (a), for Task 1 of the no-go BCE task as a function of type in Trial n
(only v and t0) and Trial n− 1. (Note: DV=dependent variable).
DV Trial n− 1 Trial n
No-go Go
v No-go 3.52 3.60
Go 3.56 3.84
t0 No-go 0.32 0.34
Go 0.36 0.30
a No-go 1.19
Go 1.11
Fig. 9. Illustration of the model fit for the compat-
ibility-based BCE Task 1 of the reanalysis of Janczyk
(2016, Experiment 3): relationship between em-
pirical and predicted statistics (accuracy, 1st, 2nd,
and 3rd RT quartile). Red circles represent type in
Trial n and Trial n− 1 go, green circles represent
type in Trial n no-go and type in Trial n− 1 go, blue
circles represent type in Trial n go and type in Trial
n− 1 no-go, and yellow circles represent type in
Trial n and Trial n− 1 no-go means. (For inter-
pretation of the references to color in this figure le-
gend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
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occur in standard conflict tasks; e.g., Janczyk & Leuthold, 2018;
Stürmer et al., 2002; Stürmer & Leuthold, 2003). Inhibition of tasks has
indeed been suggested as one mechanism supporting task switching
(Mayr & Keele, 2000; see Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 2010, for a
review). Although the present study was not meant to address this issue
directly, the Task 2 analyses presented in the Appendix can be taken to
inform this question. Acknowledging a few significant effects of type in
Trial n− 1 on Task 2 diffusion model parameters, the general im-
pression is that such effects are absent, small, and/or unreliable. Thus,
we suggest to tentatively take these results to conclude that Task 2
processing is essentially unaltered, but rather Task 1 processing is af-
fected by experiencing incompatibility in Trial n− 1 by increased task
shielding.
Admittedly, the term “increased task shielding” is little more than a
description of observing a reduced BCE. How, then, can such task
shielding be specified? Task sets have been suggested to function as a
general mechanism to prevent interference from irrelevant information,
by directing attention to the relevant features (Dreisbach & Haider,
2008, 2009). While our results do not speak in favor of Task 2 being
suppressed (Koch et al., 2010; Mayr & Keele, 2000), the alternative
would be that the task set of Task 1 is increased in activity, because
Fig. 10. Reanalysis of Janczyk (2016, Experiment 3). Mean diffusion model parameters for Task 1: v and t0 as a function of type in Trial n and Trial n− 1 (for both
factors: incompatible vs. compatible), and a as a function of type in Trial n− 1 (incompatible vs. compatible). Errors bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals
for the difference between type in Trial n incompatible and compatible (see Pfister & Janczyk, 2013).
Table 7
Mean parameter values of drift rate (v), non-decision time (t0), and threshold
separation (a) for Task 1 of the reanalysis of Janczyk (2016, Experiment 3) as a
function of type in Trial n (only v and t0) and Trial n− 1. (Note: DV=de-
pendent variable).
DV Trial n− 1 Trial n
Incompatible Compatible
v Incompatible 2.94 2.26
Compatible 2.50 3.09
t0 Incompatible 0.38 0.39
Compatible 0.38 0.37
a Incompatible 1.67
Compatible 1.82
Fig. 11. Illustration of a conceivable DMC
extension to dual-tasking for two models
differing regarding the time-course of Task
2 RA. E[X(t)] denotes the expected activa-
tion as a function of time t. In both variants,
an upper (a= 100) and a lower threshold
(b=−a) are associated with one of two
response directions (e.g., left vs. right). The
solid black line represents the evidence that
would result from the controlled Task 1
diffusion process only. However, because
the automatic Task 2 RA is superimposed,
the actual Task 1 activation is given by the
solid green and red lines (for compatible
and incompatible trials, respectively). The
time-course of Task 2 RA is illustrated via
the green and red dotted line, but im-
portantly, it differs between both models.
Model A assumes a time-course that corre-
sponds to DMC which assumes a pulse function with a fast rise followed by declining activation, whereas Model B assumes a steadily increasing function. RS in Task 2
begins, when Task 1 RS exceeds a threshold and—in this depiction—begins at the level of the (still) existing Task 2 RA (but see Schubert et al., 2008; Thomson &
Watter, 2013). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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participants may have the intention to shield it from interference
(Goschke, 2003). This might go along with directing attention more to
Task 1 demands (similar to how Botvinick et al., 2001, conceptualized
cognitive control to operate in the Stroop task) or a facilitated per-
ceptual processing in Task 1 (Stelzel, Brandt, & Schubert, 2009). By
these means, interfering influences of ongoing Task 2 processing might
be less effective, and consequently, the BCE becomes smaller. These
accounts all assume that the purpose of any adaptation is to reduce the
between task interference eventually resulting in a BCE.
A different perspective might perhaps be taken when considering
that a strong task shielding mode is also experienced as more de-
manding (Lehle, Steinhauser, & Hübner, 2009). Perhaps, following a
compatible trial, participants simply adopt a less demanding or more
“natural” processing style, which has been shown to result in between-
task crosstalk (Lehle & Hübner, 2009). Following this reasoning, the
sequential modulation of the BCE would just be a by-product of the
adjusted processing style. Future studies should investigate this issue
more directly. One way would be to have participants experience a
compatible or incompatible BCE trial and subsequently test to what
extent Task 1 or Task 2 interfere more or less with an independent third
task.
4.2. The no-go BCE
A novel observation of the present study is the sequential modula-
tion of the no-go BCE. A standard no-go BCE with shorter RT1s in go
compared with no-go trials was only present, if Trial n− 1 comprised a
go trial as well. In contrast, if the previous trial comprised a no-go task,
RT1s were even shorter in no-go compared with go trials. As predicted
from our underlying model (see Fig. 1), this interaction was reflected in
motor execution, that is, in the parameter t0 (see also Durst & Janczyk,
2018, for behavioral evidence). In sum, we suggest that an active in-
hibition required in Task 2 no-go trials induces a generalized inhibition
of the motor system (see already Miller, 2006), also prolonging RT1 as a
consequence. In addition, although only a speculation at present, the
induced inhibition might even be more general and account for the
smaller drift rate v following no-go trials compared with following go
trials. That no-go trials induce inhibition receives evidence also from
other perspectives. For instance, it was shown that pairing appetitive
stimuli with no-go responses led to devaluation of these stimuli, which
was assumed to be caused by the repeated inhibition of a response to
the according stimulus category (e.g., see Serfas, Florack, Büttner, &
Voegeding, 2017). Additional behavioral and psychophysiological evi-
dence for the existence of a generalized inhibition of the motor system
was observed in the stop-signal paradigm (for a review see Wessel &
Aron, 2017) and following the occurrence of unexpected events (Wessel
& Aron, 2013).
What are the reasons for the sequential modulation, that is, why did
the no-go BCE not occur in the usual way following no-go trials? We
interpret this in a way that participants remain in a “prepare R2”-state
following go trials, but that following no-go trials, preparation for R2 is
decreased or absent. In the latter case, less or no inhibition is needed to
suppress R2 and little or no inhibition spreads to Task 1 processing. The
assumption that preparation for Task 2 is the crucial mechanism that
adjusts cognitive control in the no-go BCE is further supported by the
results for Task 2 (see Appendix), where RT2s were shorter following go
than no-go trials and v was larger following go than no-go trials. These
results are well in line with the idea that R2 preparation was increased
following go trials.
As an alternative, already Botvinick et al. (2001) suggested that no-
go tasks involve overriding a prepotent response which is registered in
the same cortical area (the anterior cingulate cortex, ACC) as is the
conflict arising from an incompatible flanker trial, for example (see,
e.g., Donkers & van Boxtel, 2004; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, van den
Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003). In an extension, Botvinick (2007)
suggested that various conflict types have in common to induce
negative affect, which is subsequently used as the signal to initiate
adjustments (see also, e.g., Dreisbach & Fischer, 2015; Saunders, Lin,
Milyavskaya, & Inzlicht, 2017). Such interpretation is in fact in line
with the above mentioned observation that no-go tasks yield devalua-
tion of stimuli (see Serfas et al., 2017).
Taken together, the present state of research allows two inter-
pretations. First, performance adjustments in the no-go BCE task are
based on the preparation state for Task 2 which requires to overcome a
prepotent response via inhibition. Second, this requirement may be
experienced as conflict and/or negative affect, which then triggers
further adjustments (of which inhibition may be one). Future research
is certainly needed, however, to address this point directly.
In a further sense, the present results may also be related and in line
with the goal priority hypothesis known from the stop-signal paradigm
(Leotti & Wager, 2010; Liddle et al., 2009), which assumes that parti-
cipants prioritize the stop task over the go task following stop-signals
and that the occurrence of stop-signals makes participants more cau-
tious (Bissett & Logan, 2011). In the sense of the goal priority hy-
pothesis, the inverted no-go BCE following no-go trials combined with
the larger v following go relative to no-go trials indicates a prioritiza-
tion of the no-go over the go Task 2, while the larger a following no-go
relative to go trials indicates that participants became more cautious
following no-go trials. While it may be tempting to interpret the present
results in favor of the goal priority hypothesis it should be noted, that
the no-go BCE task and the stop-signal paradigm differ in several as-
pects, and it is not yet completely resolved whether inhibition plays the
exactly same role in both paradigms (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008).
4.3. Interim summary: two different types of BCEs
Taken together, the data from the present study—and in particular
the results from the diffusion model analyses—confirm and extend the
model depicted in Fig. 1. More precisely, the compatibility-based BCE
seems to be located inside Task 1 RS and has its source in Task 2 RA
(Janczyk, Renas, et al., 2018), while the no-go BCE is located inside
Task 1 motor execution and has its source in T2 RS (Durst & Janczyk,
2018). In addition, both types of BCEs exhibit sequential modulations,
but most likely for different reasons. In case of the compatibility-based
BCE, experiencing an incompatible trial leads to conflict-induced ad-
justments resulting in increased Task 1 shielding, perhaps similar to
what happens in standard conflict tasks. In contrast, a sequential
modulation of the no-go BCE, we suggest, results if participants adopt
their preparation of R2 depending on whether this response was re-
quired or not in the previous trial. These considerations are summarized
in Fig. 12, and we believe they provide clear support for a theoretical
distinction of both types of BCEs.
4.4. Caveats, limitations, and future directions
We consider the main results of the present study straightforward.
In contrast to the main results, however, the results speaking to the
subsidiary research questions (see Appendix), which mainly refer to
Task 2 of the compatibility-based BCE, are not that clear cut. Even
though the diffusion model parameter results seem not to support an
account in terms of Task 2 suppression following incompatible trials,
we wish to highlight the preliminary character of these results. Further,
we suggest tentatively that Task 1 processing is altered, but the present
data cannot indicate this account by themselves. Rather, an argument
in favor of Task 1 shielding is solely based on a preliminary exclusion of
Task 2 suppression. Future research is certainly required to explicitly
address these accounts empirically.
It should also be noted that the two types of backward crosstalk
under investigation here can also be produced with other combinations
of effector systems (e.g., manual and vocal responses for the compat-
ibility-based BCE: Renas et al., 2018; Hommel, 1998; and, e.g., manual
and pedal responses for the no-go BCE: Janczyk & Huestegge, 2017,
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Experiment 3b). We chose the effector system combinations of the
present study for two reasons: (1) to ensure comparability with our
previous studies and (2) because these effector system combina-
tions—according to our experience—produce the largest effects. Yet,
we do at present not see a reason why other effector system combina-
tions should invoke entirely different processes and yield qualitatively
different results.
The two types of BCEs under investigation here are not the only
types that have been reported in the literature. For instance, studies
that enabled a conceptual overlap between Task 1 and Task 2 (Logan &
Delheimer, 2001; Logan & Schulkind, 2000; Oriet, Tombu, & Jolicoeur,
2005) reported that the stimulus category S2 belonged to influenced
Task 1 performance in a way that RT1s were shorter when S2 was of the
same vs. different category as S1. Other studies have reported BCEs
based on aspects of Task 2 motor processes. For instance, Miller and
Alderton (2006) reported that the amount of response force required in
Task 2 influenced the force applied in Task 1, in a way that harder
keypresses in Task 2 led to harder keypresses also in Task 1. In a similar
vein, a study by Ruiz Fernández and Ulrich (2010) observed that the
distance over which a lever was moved in Task 2 affected RT1s and
response duration in Task 1. Further research should certainly compare
the compatibility-based BCE and the no-go BCE to other types of
overlap-based and motor execution based BCEs to help develop a more
general framework of between-task crosstalk and to pinpoint which
types of backward crosstalk can be distinguished based on their un-
derlying processes and adjustment of cognitive control.
Furthermore, it should be noted that an issue inherent to any
modelling approach is that other models may fit the present data
equally well, and yet indicate different loci and sources for both BCEs
than the ones we suggested here. We here applied the diffusion model,
and thus its particular assumptions. For one we believe this is a war-
ranted choice given the many applications of this model and the nu-
merous validations available. At the same time, however, we ac-
knowledge that other models exist that may account for the present
data in other ways.
4.5. Conclusion
The present study aimed at providing converging evidence for a
qualitative distinction of two types of backward crosstalk in dual-tasks.
This idea (see Fig. 1 for an illustration) was largely built on previous
behavioral studies (Durst & Janczyk, 2018; Janczyk, Renas, et al.,
2018). Here we (1) tested for sequential modulations of both types of
BCEs and (2) based our predictions not only on behavioral data but also
on parameters derived from diffusion model analyses. By and large, the
results support the qualitative distinction of compatibility-based BCEs
and no-go BCEs and suggest that their sequential modulations also re-
sult for different reasons (see Fig. 12 for an integrative depiction).
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Appendix A. Predictions and results for Task 2
Our main hypotheses related to Task 1 and thus the respective predictions and results were reported in the main text. In this Appendix, we
formulate several subsidiary hypotheses regarding the behavioral measures and the diffusion model parameters of Task 2. Admittedly, the (standard)
diffusion model was not designed to estimate parameters for two tasks at the same time, and thus the predictions made in the following are more
exploratory than those related to Task 1 performance. Nonetheless, we consider them and the respective results informative and required for
completeness.
A.1. Predictions
Regarding the compatibility-based BCE, RT2s often show a similar sequential modulation as RT1s. Thus far, it is an unresolved question
whether this is due only to propagation of Task 1 effects (Schubert et al., 2008) or to Task 2 RS benefitting from still available RA in Task 2, which
has not vanished completely (Thomson & Watter, 2013, suggested this at least for compatible trials). While the present experiment was not meant to
resolve this question, we believe that a diffusion model analysis of Task 2 data depending on type in Trial n− 1 may help illuminating the underlying
mechanisms of the sequential modulation in RT1s further. We can conceive of two scenarios. (1) (In-)Compatibility in Trial n− 1 does not affect
Task 2 RA in the following trial, but instead Task 1 processing is altered. A popular notion refers to increased “task shielding” in this case (Fischer
et al., 2014; Janczyk, 2016). In a sense, this would be akin to the mechanisms suggested by Botvinick et al. (2001), for example, when for a Stroop
task the relevant task set is activated more after experiencing conflict. In this case, we expect Task 2 diffusion model parameters being unaffected by
Fig. 12. Illustration of the mechanism, and locus of adjustment in Task 1 for (a) the compatibility-based BCE and (b) the no-go BCE. (P=perceptual stage,
RS= response selection, M=motor stage).
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type in Trial n− 1. (2) It might as well be possible that after experiencing an incompatible trial, the subsequent Task 2 RA is suppressed. Put plainly,
if no Task 2 RA exists, nothing can crosstalk to Task 1 RS. Such reasoning has been endorsed for standard conflict tasks by several authors (Janczyk &
Leuthold, 2018; Stürmer et al., 2002; Stürmer & Leuthold, 2003), suggesting that the automatic RA resulting from the irrelevant stimulus feature is
suppressed after conflict (see Mayr & Keele, 2000, for the role of task inhibition in task switching, and Koch et al., 2010, for a review). In this case, we
expect Task 2 diffusion model parameters being affected by type in Trial n− 1, for example, revealing a smaller drift rate v following incompatible
trials. (Of course, both scenarios are not mutually exclusive, and in the end, both might contribute to the observed effect.)
Analyses of the Task 2 no-go BCE data were run for Trial n go trials.6 These data can help support our assumption that following go trials,
participants remain in a preparatory state for the perhaps required Task 2 response. In particular, we expect shorter RT2s which may come together
with a larger drift rate, a shorter non-decision time, and/or a smaller threshold separation. Modelling of the go/no-go Task 2 was the same as for the
two-choice Task 2 of the compatibility-based BCE. Note, however, that the diffusion model was not developed for this type of task in the first place,
and accordingly the results should be taken with additional caution (see Gomez, Ratcliff, & Perea, 2007, for more details and discussion).
A.2. Results
A.2.1. Behavioral results
All mean RT2s are visualized in Fig. A1 (see also Table A1 for the compatibility-based BCE and Table A2 for the no-go BCE) and ERs in Task 2 are
summarized in Table A1 (compatibility-based BCE) and in Table A2 (no-go BCE).
For the compatibility-based BCE, the behavioral measures were analyzed as a function of type in Trial n and in Trial n− 1 (similar to Task 1
analyses). The ANOVA for mean RT2s (1.31% outliers) of the compatibility-based BCE task yielded a significant main effect of type in Trial n, with on
average 39ms longer RT2s for incompatible (889ms) as compared to compatible trials (850ms), F(1,47)= 31.67, p < .001, ηp2= 0.40. RT2s were
on average 10ms shorter following incompatible (864ms) than compatible (874ms) trials, F(1,47)= 6.25, p= .016, ηp2= 0.12. Paralleling results
for Task 1, a sequential modulation occurred, F(1,47)= 269.40, p < .001, ηp2= 0.85. Following compatible trials the BCE was present (143ms), t
(47)= 5.71, p < .001, d=0.82, and following incompatible trials the BCE was inverted (−66ms), t(47)=−6.69, p < .001, d=−0.97.
The ANOVA for ER2 revealed a significant main effect of type in Trial n, with on average 1.20% more errors for incompatible (4.71%) relative to
compatible trials (3.51%), F(1,47)= 8.20, p= .006, ηp2= 0.15, indicating a BCE. ER2 was on average 0.83% higher following compatible (4.52%)
relative to incompatible trials (3.69%), F(1,47)= 8.41, p= .006, ηp2= 0.15. The interaction was significant, F(1,47)= 104.67, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.69, indicating a sequential modulation of the BCE. The BCE was present following compatible trials (4.45%), t(47)= 3.31, p= .002,
d=0.48, and it was inverted following incompatible trials (−2.05%), t(47)=−3.77, p < .001, d=−0.54.
Fig. A1. Mean RTs of Task 2 as a function of type in Trial n (incompatible vs. compatible, compatibility-based BCE, left panel) and Trial n− 1 (incompatible vs.
compatible, or no-go vs. go) and task (compatibility-based BCE, left panel vs. no-go BCE, right panel). Errors bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the
difference between type in Trial n (see Pfister & Janczyk, 2013). Note, that for the no-go BCE only go trials were available in Trial n and, thus no error bars were
calculated in this way.
Table A1
Mean RTs (in ms) and Error Rates (ER, in %) for Task 2 of the compatibility-based BCE task as a function of type in Trial n and Trial n− 1 (in ms). Crosstalk effects
were computed by subtracting values from compatible trials from those of incompatible trials of Trial n line-by-line. (Note: DV=dependent variable).
DV Trial n− 1 Trial n
Incompatible Compatible Crosstalk effect
RT Incompatible 832 897 −65
Compatible 946 803 143
ER Incompatible 2.67 4.72 −2.05
Compatible 6.75 2.30 4.45
For the no-go BCE, the ANOVA for mean RT2s (0.25% outliers) yielded a significant main effect of type in Trial n− 1, with 74ms longer RT2s
6 Additional analyses including Trial n go and no-go trials were run and the
results did not differ qualitatively from the analyses reported here.
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following no-go (670ms) compared to go trials (596ms), F(1,47)= 120.19, p < .001, ηp2= 0.72. ER2 was on average 1.36% larger for no-go
(1.36%) relative to go trials (0.00%), F(1,47)= 35.68, p < .001, ηp2= 0.43. All other Fs≤ 0.75, all other ps≥ .391.
Table A2
Mean RTs (in ms) and Error Rates (ER, in %) for Task 2 of the no-go BCE task as a function of Trial n and Trial n− 1 (in ms). Crosstalk effects were
computed by subtracting values from go trials from those of no-go trials of Trial n line-by-line. (Note: DV=dependent variable).
DV Trial n− 1 Trial n
No-go Go Crosstalk effect
RT No-go – 670 –
Go – 596 –
ER No-go 1.25 0.00 1.25
Go 1.46 0.00 1.46
A.2.2. Diffusion model results
An illustration of the model fit for Task 2 of the compatibility-based BCE can be found in Fig. A2. Descriptive parameter data are visualized in
Fig. A3 (see also Table A3).
For v, the main effect of type in Trial n− 1 was not significant, F(1,47)= 0.34, p= .561, ηp2= 0.01. The ANOVA for t0 yielded a significant main
effect of type in Trial n− 1, F(1,47)= 26.02, p < .001, ηp2= 0.36, with t0 being on average 0.03 larger following incompatible (0.54) relative to
compatible (0.51) trials. The ANOVA revealed that a was affected by type in Trial n− 1, F(1,47)= 19.42, p < .001, ηp2= 0.29, with a being on
average 0.13 larger after compatible trials (1.71) relative to incompatible trials (1.58).
Fig. A2. Illustration of the model fit for the compatibility-based BCE Task 2: relationship between empirical and predicted statistics (accuracy, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd RT
quartile). Red circles represent compatible Trials n− 1, and yellow circles represent incompatible Trials nmeans. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. A3. Mean diffusion model parameter values of Task 2 of the compatibility-based BCE task as a function of type in Trial n− 1 (incompatible vs. compatible).
Table A3
Mean parameter values of drift rate (v), non-decision time (t0), and threshold se-
paration (a) for Task 2 of the compatibility-based BCE task as a function of type in
Trial n− 1. (Note: DV=dependent variable).
DV Trial n− 1
Incompatible Compatible
v 2.34 2.32
t0 0.54 0.51
a 1.58 1.71
An illustration of the model fit for Task 2 of the no-go BCE can be found in Fig. A4. Descriptive parameter data are visualized in Fig. A5 (see also
Table A4).
The ANOVA for v yielded an on average 0.60 larger v following go (5.04) relative to no-go (4.44) trials, F(1,47)= 5.78, p= .020, ηp2= 0.11.
Furthermore, the analysis for t0 revealed a significant main effect of type in Trial n− 1, with an on average 0.07 larger t0 following no-go (0.40)
relative to go (0.33) trials n− 1, F(1,47)= 40.08, p < .001, ηp2= 0.46. Finally, the analysis revealed that a was unaffected by type in Trial n− 1, F
(1,47)= 2.50, p= .120, ηp2= 0.05.
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Fig. A4. Illustration of the model fit for the no-go BCE Task 2: relationship between empirical and predicted statistics (accuracy, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd RT quartile). Red
circles represent go Trials n− 1, yellow circles represent no-go Trials n− 1 means. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. A5. Mean diffusion model parameter values of Task 2 of the no-go BCE task as a function of type in Trial n− 1 (no-go vs. go).
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Table A4
Mean parameter values of drift rate (v), non-decision time (t0), and threshold separation (a) for Task 2 of the no-go BCE task as a function of type in Trial n− 1.
(Note: DV=dependent variable).
DV Trial n− 1
No-go Go
v 4.44 5.04
t0 0.40 0.33
a 2.21 2.65
Reanalysis of Experiment 3 in Janczyk (2016). Task 2. An illustration of the model fit for Task 2 can be found in Fig. A6. Descriptive parameter
data are visualized in Fig. A7 (see also Table A5). The ANOVA revealed that neither a, F(1,31)= 1.89, p= .179, ηp2= 0.06, nor v, F(1,31)= 2.16,
p= .152, ηp2= 0.07, nor t0, F(1,31)= 0.60, p= .444, ηp2= 0.02, were affected by Trial n− 1.7
Fig. A6. Illustration of the model fit for the compatibility-based BCE Task 2 of the reanalysis of Janczyk (2016, Experiment 3): relationship between empirical and
predicted statistics (accuracy, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd RT quartile). Red circles represent compatible Trials n− 1, and yellow circles represent incompatible Trials n means.
(For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
7 Note, that v estimates for one participant were extraordinarily large.
However, an exclusion of these data led to the qualitatively same results.
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Fig. A7. Reanalysis of Janczyk (2016, Experiment 3). Mean diffusion model parameter values of Task 2 of the compatibility-based BCE task as a function of type in
Trial n− 1 (incompatible vs. compatible).
Table A5
Mean parameter values of, drift rate (v), non-decision time (t0), and threshold separation (a) for
Task 2 of the re-analysis of Janczyk (2016, Experiment 3) as a function of type in Trial n− 1.
(Note: DV=dependent variable).
DV Trial n− 1
Incompatible Compatible
v 2.30 2.94
t0 0.81 0.80
a 1.46 1.88
A.3. Discussion of Task 2 results
In the following we will briefly discuss Task 2 results, first for the compatibility-based BCE including the re-analysis of Janczyk (2016,
Experiment 3), followed by the no-go BCE. A more detailed and integrative discussion of Task 2 results can be found in the General discussion.
A.3.1. Compatibility-based BCE task
v was unaffected by the compatibility of Trial n− 1 in the data of the present study as well as in the reanalyzed data of Janczyk (2016) which
indicates that the information uptake was not slowed following incompatible compared to compatible trials. This suggests that Task 2 RA was not
suppressed following incompatible trials, but rather makes it more likely that Task 1 was shielded against influences of Task 2. t0 was larger following
incompatible than compatible Trials n− 1, but it was not affected in the data of Janczyk (2016). We thus tentatively interpret results for t0 as further
evidence against suppression of Task 2 RA and in favor of shielding of Task 1.
A.3.2. No-go BCE task
For Task 2, RTs were shorter following go than no-go trials and drift rate was larger following go than no-go trials, in line with an increased Task
2 preparation following go trials. Furthermore, t0 was smaller following go relative to no-go trials. This is in line with the idea that the motor
programming acquired in the previous trial was still active (Rosenbaum et al., 1986). Taken together, results for Task 2 suggest that cognitive control
in the no-go BCE task is adjusted via preparation for Task 2.
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Abstract 
A frequent observation in dual-task experiments is that performance of Task 1 is influenced by 
its dimensional overlap with features of Task 2. Such compatibility-based backward crosstalk 
effects (BCEs) occur when dimensional overlap exists between the responses in the two tasks 
– the R1-R2 BCE – or between the stimulus in Task 1 and the response in Task 2 – the S1-R2 
BCE. The present study investigated whether the two BCEs have a common processing locus 
or different ones. To this end, Experiment 1 used the additive factors method and excluded a 
perceptual locus for both BCEs. To further investigate whether the two BCEs are based on the 
same or different capacity-limited processes, Experiment 2 and 3 examined sequential 
modulations within and across the two BCEs. Since no such sequential modulations across the 
two BCEs were observed in these experiments, the two BCEs are likely based on two different 
and presumably subsequent capacity-limited processes.  
 
Keywords: dual-task; backward crosstalk; sequential modulation; Psychological Refractory 
Period; compatibility  
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Statement of public significance 
Humans often multitask, that is, they perform more than one task simultaneously. Interestingly, 
characteristics of Task 2 can influence processing of Task 1, in particular when they share 
common features between stimuli and/or responses. Two instances of such effects are known, 
one involving the relation between the two responses in Task 1 and 2, the other involving the 
Task 1 stimulus and the response in Task 2. The results of the present study suggest that both 
need to be carefully distinguished. Additionally, because both types of crosstalk are caused by 
capacity-limited processes, any performance decrements propagate to other subsequent tasks as 
well. These results are of interest for human multitasking research in general and for applied 
fields like human factors. 
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Two different types of compatibility-based backward crosstalk in dual-tasks 
One of the central debates in dual-task research concerns whether humans are able to perform 
two tasks simultaneously, or whether certain parts of the two tasks can only be carried out one 
after the other in a serial fashion. According to the latter view, perceptual and motor stages of 
two tasks can run in parallel, whereas the central stage of cognitive processing can only serve 
one task at any point in time. Thus, the second of two subsequently performed tasks has to wait 
in order to gain access to this capacity-limited stage (for exceptions, see Janczyk, Pfister, 
Wallmeier, & Kunde, 2014) and this waiting time is known as the cognitive slack. A widely 
accepted model assumes that the serial capacity-limited central stage is response selection, and 
thus has been termed the response selection bottleneck (RSB) model (Pashler, 1994; Welford, 
1952). Nevertheless, some evidence contradicting the notion of strictly serial processing has 
accumulated in the last years. A particularly crucial piece of evidence is the backward crosstalk 
effect (BCE), that is, the observation that certain aspects of Task 2 already influence 
performance in Task 1. This implies that the processes related to response selection in the two 
tasks are not entirely isolated from each other.  
Two types of compatibility-based BCEs. A compatibility-based BCE was first reported 
by Hommel (1998), who observed that RTs in Task 1 were shorter when certain task features 
of Task 1 were compatible with features of Task 2. Nowadays, it is important to distinguish 
between two types of such BCEs. First, a BCE can be observed when a (spatial) overlap 
between the responses of Task 1 (R1) and Task 2 (R2) exists – the R1-R2 BCE (Janczyk, Pfister, 
Hommel, & Kunde, 2014; Lien & Proctor, 2000; Watter & Logan, 2006; Thomson, Watter, & 
Finkelshtein, 2010; Miller & Durst, 2014, 2015). Second, a BCE can also be obtained when the 
Stimulus in Task 1 (S1) conceptually overlaps with R2 – the S1-R2 BCE (Hommel & Eglau, 
2002; Ellenbogen & Meiran, 2008; Lien, Ruthruff, Hsieh & Yu, 2007).  
As mentioned above, the R1-R2 BCE results from dimensional overlap of the two 
responses on each given trial. For example, in Experiment 1 of Hommel (1998), participants 
5 
 
were presented with colored letters, and instructed to respond to the color of the letter with a 
left versus right manual keypress and to respond to the identity of the letter by vocally uttering 
the word “left” versus “right”. When both responses were spatially compatible (e.g., a left 
manual keypress and a vocal “left” utterance), RTs of Task 1 (RT1s) were shorter than when 
both responses were spatially incompatible (e.g., a left manual keypress and a vocal “right” 
utterance). Several studies replicated the R1-R2 BCE with spatial overlap between two manual 
responses (Janczyk et al., 2014; Lien & Proctor, 2000; Watter & Logan, 2006; Thomson et al., 
2010; Miller & Durst, 2014, 2015), manual and pedal responses (Janczyk, 2016; Durst & 
Janczyk, 2019), and vocal and manual responses (Renas, Durst, & Janczyk, 2018). 
In further experiments, Hommel (1998) changed the instructions for Task 2. Now, 
participants were instructed to respond to the identity of the letter with the vocal utterance “rot” 
(German for “red”) versus “grün” (German for “green”). When S1 and R2 were conceptually 
compatible (e.g., a red letter and the utterance “rot”) RT1s were shorter relative to when S1 and 
R2 were conceptually incompatible (e.g., a red letter and the utterance “grün”). This S1-R2 
BCE has yet received relatively little attention in the literature. Only a few other studies reported 
instances of S1-R2 BCEs with conceptual overlap between the color of S1 and a vocal R2 
(Hommel & Eglau, 2002; Ellenbogen & Meiran, 2008) and spatial overlap between an auditory 
S1 and a manual R2 (Lien, Ruthruff, Hsieh & Yu, 2007). 
In sum, two types of compatibility-based BCEs can be conceptually distinguished: 
Compatibility in the R1-R2 BCE depends on overlap between the two responses, whereas the 
S1-R2 BCE depends on dimensional overlap between S1 and R2.  
Theoretical explanations for compatibility-based BCEs. To account for these BCEs, 
some authors made the additional assumption of a capacity-unlimited stage of response 
activation that immediately follows the perceptual stage and can run in parallel with all other 
stages (Hommel, 1998; Lien & Proctor, 2002). When the temporal overlap of the two tasks is 
sufficiently high (i.e., at a short stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA), response activation from 
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Task 2 can influence that of Task 1, resulting in a BCE (Hommel, 1998; Janczyk, 2016). 
According to this view, response activation is the locus of the compatibility-based BCEs. 
In contrast, recent studies identified the locus of the R1-R2 compatibility-based BCE in 
the capacity-limited central stage of Task 1 (Janczyk et al., 2018; Thomson, Danis, & Watter, 
2015).  According to this alternative view, response activation in Task 2 directly affects the 
central capacity-limited stage of response selection in Task 1. Important for the present study, 
Janczyk et al. also obtained evidence that the S1-R2 BCE requires capacity-limited processing 
similar to the R1-R2 BCE, even though – at first glance – the nature of the S1-R2 BCE rather 
suggests a perceptual locus of the effect. However, the results by Janczyk et al. (Experiment 3) 
exhibited a descriptive trend that would actually be consistent with a perceptual locus of the 
S1-R2 BCE.1 
The present study. The present three experiments aim to clarify whether the R1-R2 BCE 
and the S1-R2 BCE share a common processing locus. Experiment 1 was run to further 
investigate the possibility of a perceptual locus of the S1-R2 BCE (see Experiment 3 of Janczyk 
et al., 2018). To anticipate, the results did not support this possibility. Together with the results 
of Janczyk et al. it then appears that both BCEs have a locus in the capacity-limited stage of 
central processing. However, this does not necessarily mean that both BCEs involve the same 
processes, and arguably, the conceptual differences between the two BCEs cast doubt on that. 
This question was addressed in Experiments 2 and 3 by means of sequential modulations within 
and across the two types of BCEs. We will come back to this in more detail in the introduction 
to Experiment 2. 
 
                                                          
1 Janczyk et al. (2018) applied the locus of slack logic in an extended PRP paradigm comprising three instead of 
two tasks (Experiments 1-3). Task 1 was an unrelated binary tone discrimination task, while spatial or conceptual 
overlap was manipulated between Task 2 and 3, thus resulting in a BCE in Task 2. Following the locus of slack 
logic, an underadditive interaction of SOA and the BCE in Task 2 indicates that the BCE has its locus in a 
precentral stage, such as response activation. Additive effects of SOA and the BCE, however, would indicate a 
locus of the BCE at earliest in the capacity-limited central stage. While all experiments revealed additive effects 
of SOA and the BCE, a descriptive trend towards underadditivity was observed in Experiment 3, where conceptual 
overlap between S2 and R3 was realized. This leaves open the possibility of a precentral locus of the S2-R3 BCE. 
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Experiment 1 
This experiment was run to further rule out a perceptual locus of the S1-R2 BCE. To this end, 
participants performed separate blocks of R1-R2 BCE and S1-R2 BCE tasks. In both types of 
blocks, we varied the brightness of S1 on a trial-by-trial basis – a manipulation affecting the 
perceptual stage (see Pashler & Johnston, 1989). We expected shorter RT1s for bright compared 
with dark S1s, and R1-R2 and S1-R2 BCEs in the respective blocks. The crucial predictions 
rely on Sternberg’s (1969) additive factors logic. This logic predicts an interaction of two 
experimental factors if they affect the same processing stage. In contrast, additive effects of two 
factors are consistent with different processing loci. As the available evidence strongly suggests 
that the R1-R2 BCE has its locus in the central stage (Janczyk et al., 2018; Thomson et al., 
2015), it should yield an additive effect with S1 brightness. For the S1-R2 BCE, however, the 
trend towards underadditivity in Experiment 3 of Janczyk et al. (2018) leaves open the 
possibility of a perceptual locus. In this case, an interaction of the S1-R2 BCE with S1 
brightness is expected. Additionally, one would also expect a three-way interaction between S1 
brightness and the two types of BCEs. In contrast, if the S1-R2 BCE has its locus in the 
capacity-limited central stage as well as the R1-R2 BCE, the S1-R2 BCE should have an 
additive effect with S1 brightness, and the three-way interaction should not be significant. 
Method 
Participants. Fourty-eight students2 (34 female) from the University of Tübingen, aged 
19 to 45 years (M = 23.6 years, SD = 5.11), participated for monetary compensation (8€) or 
course credit. All participants provided written informed consent before the experiment and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
                                                          
2 The critical result is a two-way interaction between compatibility relation and S1 brightness. We conducted a 
power analysis for this interaction assuming a medium effect size with 𝛼 =  .05 and 1 − 𝛽 =  .9. This analysis 
yielded a minimum sample size of n = 44. 
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Apparatus and stimuli. A standard PC was used for stimulus presentation and response 
collection. Stimuli and instructions were presented on a 17-in. CRT monitor. Stimuli were the 
letters “H” or “S” surrounded by a frame colored in red or green, presented in the center of an 
otherwise black screen. The color of the frame served as S1 and was either bright or dark. The 
identity of the letter served as S2. R1s were given manually via two response keys, one to the 
left and one to the right of the participant. R2s were vocal utterances. 
Task and procedure. The trial structure and the tasks are illustrated in Figure 1. Task 1 
was to respond to S1 with a manual key-press of the left or right index finger (R1), and Task 2 
was to respond to S2 with a vocal utterance (R2). In R1-R2 BCE blocks, R2 was the vocal 
utterance “links” or “rechts” (German for “left” and “right”). In S1-R2 BCE blocks, R2 was the 
vocal utterance “rot” or “grün” (German for “red” and “green”). The S-R mappings of both 
tasks were counterbalanced across participants.  
Each trial started with a white fixation cross (250 ms), followed by a blank screen (250 
ms). Then, the letter surrounded by a bright or dark colored frame was presented at the center 
of the screen for a maximum of 4,000 ms or until both responses were registered. The next trial 
started after an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 1000 ms. In case of an error, a respective feedback 
message was presented on the screen for 1,000 ms before the ITI. 
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Figure 1. Trial structure and tasks of the two different block types in Experiment 1. In each trial, participants first 
responded to the color of the frame in a manual two-choice task by pressing a left or right key (Task 1). Then, 
participants responded to the identity of the letter in a vocal two-choice task (Task 2). In R1-R2 blocks, the 
responses were the words “left” and “right”, and in S1-R2 blocks, they were “red” and “green”. In the depicted 
example, Stimulus 1 is a green frame which requires a left index finger response in Task 1. In Task 2 of R1-R2 
blocks, the identity “H” requires a vocal utterance of the word “left”, while the letter “S” indicates a “right” 
utterance. In this trial, the R1-R2 relation is compatible. In Task 2 of S1-R2 blocks, the identity “H” requires a 
vocal utterance of the word “green”, while the letter “S” indicates a “red” utterance. In this trial, the S1-R2 relation 
is compatible. 
 
 
Half of the participants started with the R1-R2 BCE task blocks, the other half with the 
S1-R2 BCE task blocks. Participants first performed a short practice block of 20 randomly 
drawn trials of the respective BCE task, followed by six experimental blocks of 64 trials, 
resulting from eight repetitions of all combinations of 2 S1 × 2 S2 × 2 S1 brightness. All trials 
were presented in a random order within each half of the experiment. Participants received 
written instructions that emphasized speed and accuracy, and were asked to give R1 and R2 
successively in fixed order.  
Design and analysis. In R1-R2 BCE blocks, trials in which the required spatial position 
of R1 and the required vocal R2 matched (e.g., left index finger and the utterance “links”) were 
R1-R2 compatible, whereas the other trials were R1-R2 incompatible. In S1-R2 BCE blocks, 
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trials in which the color of S2 and the required vocal R2 matched (e.g., a red frame and the 
utterance “rot”) were S1-R2 compatible, whereas the other trials were S1-R2 incompatible. 
Data from practice blocks and trials with task-unspecific errors (missing responses, wrong 
response order, two responses in one task) were excluded, as were trials with an inter-response 
interval (IRI) of less than 100 ms. For the analysis of RTs, trials deviating more than 2.5 
standard deviations from the individual cell mean were considered as outliers and excluded 
from analysis. Mean correct RTs and error rates (ERs) were submitted to separate 2 × 2 × 2 
Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) with the within-subjects factors (1) compatibility (compatible 
vs. incompatible), (2) block type (R1-R2 BCE vs. S1-R2 BCE), and (3) S1 brightness (bright 
vs. dark).  
Results 
In the following, we focus on the Task 1 results (Task 2 results are provided in the 
Online Supplement3). Mean RT1s are visualized in Figure 3 (see also Table 1). RT1s (2.81% 
outliers) were 58 ms longer for incompatible (650 ms) compared to compatible trials (592 ms), 
F(1,47) = 50.91, p < .001, 𝜂p2  = .52. RT1s did not differ between R1-R2 BCE and S1-R2 BCE 
blocks, F(1,47) < 0.01, p = .999, 𝜂p2  < .01. As expected, RT1s were 23 ms longer when S1 was 
dark (633 ms) compared to bright (610 ms), F(1,47) = 67.50, p < .001, 𝜂p2  = .59. Importantly, 
none of the two-way interactions was significant, all Fs ≤ 0.96, all ps ≥ .333, and the three-way 
interaction was also not significant, F(1,47) = 1.99, p = .165, 𝜂p2  = .04. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Task 2 results for Experiment 1-3 are provided in the Online Supplement, as they are 
irrelevant for the respective research questions. 
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Figure 2. Mean RT2s as a function of compatibility (incompatible vs. compatible) and S1 brightness (bright vs. 
dark) in Experiment 1, plotted separately for R1-R2 blocks and S1-R2 blocks. Error bars are 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals for the respective BCE, calculated separately for bright and dark S1s (see Pfister & Janczyk, 
2013). 
 
Error rates are summarized in Table 1. Participants made more errors in incompatible 
(5.38%) than in compatible (2.95%) trials, F(1,47) = 30.04, p < .001, 𝜂p2  = .39. They also made 
more errors in R1-R2 BCE (4.53%) than in S1-R2 BCE (3.80%) blocks, F(1,47) = 6.86, p = 
.012, 𝜂p2 = .13. Parallelling the RT1 results, more errors occurred when S1 was dark (4.48%) 
relative to bright (3.86%), F(1,47) = 6.50, p = .014, 𝜂p2 = .12. The interaction of compatibility 
and blocktype was significant, F(1,47) = 6.94, p = .011, 𝜂p2  = .13. All other two-way interactions 
and the three-way interaction were not significant, all Fs ≤ 1.61, all ps ≥ .210. 
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Table 1. Mean RTs (in ms) / error rates (in %) for Task 1 in Experiment 1 as a function of compatibility 
(incompatible vs. compatible), block type (R1-R2 BCE vs. S1-R2 BCE), and S1 brightness (bright vs. dark).  
 Block type 
 R1-R2 BCE  S1-R2 BCE 
S1 brightness Incompatible Compatible  Incompatible Compatible 
Bright 661 / 6.77 607 / 3.16  660 / 4.46 603 / 3.51 
Dark 641 / 6.16 576 / 2.03  637 / 4.14 584 / 3.09 
 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we tested whether the S1-R2 BCE has its locus in the perceptual stage. 
To this end, S1 brightness was manipulated trial-by-trial in separate blocks of R1-R2 and S1-
R2 BCE tasks. Most importantly, both BCEs showed additive effects with the effect of S1 
brightness.4 This is consistent with the idea that the S1-R2 BCE does not arise at a perceptual 
level. Thus, the present results support the conclusion by Janczyk et al. (2018) that both the R1-
R2 BCE and the S1-R2 BCE have their locus in the capacity-limited central stage of Task 1 
processing.  
Experiment 2 
Even if one accepts that both compatibility-based BCEs have their locus in a capacity-
limited stage of processing (Janczyk et al., 2018), it is still possible that the capacity-limited 
process underlying both BCEs differs. In particular, in the case of the S1-R2 BCE it is hard to 
see how automatic response activation in Task 2 could interact with a response selection process 
in Task 1, because the compatibility of R2 is related to S1 and not to R1. Instead, Hommel 
(1998) suggested that “if S2-R2 translation is automatic, this verbal code should be available 
long before R2 selection eventually takes place and, thus, may affect S1 processing – or at least 
interact with the verbal code mediating S1-R1 translation” (p. 1374). Accordingly, it is possible 
                                                          
4 We also used the R-package BayesFactor (Morey, XXX) to calculate the Bayes factors for the comparison of the 
interactive model against the additive model (i.e., compatibility relation + S1 brightness vs. compatibility relation 
+ S1 brightness + compatibility relation × S1 brightness), separately for the R1-R2 BCE and the S1-R2 BCE. The 
resulting values were BF10 = 0.11 and BF10 = 0.03, respectively. 
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that another capacity-limited process of perceptual nature preceding response selection 
underlies the S1-R2 BCE (see Figure 3 for a first illustration). In other words, each BCE has its 
locus in different capacity-limited processes. Experiments 2 and 3 asked whether both types of 
BCEs could empirically be distinguished. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. A preliminary model in which the capacity-limited central stage (orange) comprises two subsequent 
processes (Process 1 and Process 2). The first process may be of perceptual nature and underlie the S1-R2 BCE, 
and is followed by the process of response selection, which underlies the R1-R2 BCE. Grey arrows indicate how 
response activation in Task 2 feeds into these different Task 1 processes.  
 
 
 In these experiments, we made use of the phenomenon that the size of the BCE in a 
current Trial n does not only depend on the compatibility in the current Trial n, but also on the 
compatibility of the previous Trial n-1. The R1-R2 BCE is usually present following compatible 
trials, but absent (and sometimes even reversed) following incompatible trials (Durst & 
Janczyk, 2019; Janczyk, 2016; Scherbaum, Gottschalk, Dschemuchadse, & Fischer, 2015; 
Renas et al., 2018; see also Schuch, Dignath, Steinhauser, & Janczyk, 2019). This sequential 
modulation is similar to that observed in conflict tasks (see e.g., Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 
1992; Praamstra, Kleine, & Schnitzler, 1999; see also Janczyk & Leuthold, 2018; Stürmer, 
Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002) and has frequently been interpreted as evidence 
for adaptation to a just experienced conflict (see Botvinick, Braver, Barch Carter, & Cohen, 
2001; for a review, see Egner, 2007). Following the logic of Botvinick et al. (2001), in an 
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incompatible Trial n-1 of a BCE task, conflict is experienced in the respective R1-R2 or S1-R2 
relation, leading to subsequent adjustments visible in a smaller BCE in Trial n.  
In Experiment 2, we manipulated both R1-R2 and S1-R2 compatibility within the same 
block of trials so that in each single trial a certain combination of R1-R2 and S1-R2 relation 
was realized. With this setup, we expected to observe sequential modulations within both BCEs. 
That is, the size of the R1-R2 BCE should depend on R1-R2 compatibility in Trial n-1, and the 
S1-R2 BCE should depend on S1-R2 compatibility in Trial n-1. Additionally, the present design 
allowed us to investigate sequential modulations across both BCEs. In other words, we were 
able to assess whether Trial n-1 compatibility in one of the BCEs causes a sequential 
modulation in the respective other BCE.  
The processing loci of the two BCEs can be distinguished from the processes that lead 
to the sequential modulations of the BCEs. Logically, both kinds of processes can be identical 
or different, and thus four different scenarios are conceivable (for an illustration see Figure 4). 
Scenarios A and B assume identical processing loci of the two BCEs, whereas in Scenarios C 
and D the processing loci differ. In addition, in Scenarios A and C, the same process is 
responsible for the sequential modulation, whereas Scenarios B and D involve different such 
processes. In all of these scenarios, sequential modulations within each BCE are expected. 
However, the different scenarios differ in their predictions regarding the sequential modulation 
across the two BCEs: the Scenarios A-C imply such modulations, but Scenario D does not. 
Figure 5 depicts the hypothesized result pattern for Scenarios A-C with the sequential 
modulation across both BCEs (left panel) and Scenario D with no such modulation (right panel).  
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Figure 4. Illustration of the possible scenarios when the processing loci of the two BCEs (white) and the processes 
that lead to the sequential modulation of these effects (red) are identical or different, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 5. Illustration of the hypothesized result pattern for Scenarios A-C (left panel) and Scenario D (right panel). 
The crucial difference between the predictions concerns the sequential modulations across both BCEs (highlighted 
in red). 
 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four students5 (20 female) from the University of Tübingen, aged 
18 to 36 years (M = 22.2 years, SD = 3.96), participated for monetary compensation (8€) or 
course credit. All participants provided written informed consent before the experiment and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
                                                          
5 The critical result is the sequential modulation, that is, the two-way interaction between compatibility relations 
in Trial n and Trial n-1. We conducted a power analysis for this interaction assuming a large effect size (based on 
previous studies, e.g., Janczyk, 2016) with 𝛼 =  .05 and 1 − 𝛽 =  .9. This analysis yielded a minimum sample size 
of n = 19. 
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Apparatus and stimuli. Stimuli were the letters “H” or “S” colored in red or green, 
presented above or below the center of an otherwise black screen. R1s were given via foot 
pedals, one to the left and one to the right of the participant. R2s were given via manual response 
keys. In total, there were six manual response keys, three on each side of the participant and 
operated by the respective left or right index finger. The central key on each side served as the 
home-key, the two other keys on each side were the response keys. The response keys and the 
home-key were aligned in a row of three keys from the participant towards the monitor. The 
response keys closest to the participant will henceforth be referred to as the lower keys, whilst 
the response keys closest to the monitor will be referred to as the upper keys (see also Figure 6 
for an illustration).  
 
 
Figure 6. Trial structure and tasks in Experiment 2. In each trial, participants first responded to the position of the 
letter in a pedal two-choice task (Task 1). Then, participants responded to the identity of the letter in a manual 
two-choice task by pressing an upper or lower key (Task 2): the color cue indicated whether the respective key 
should be pressed on the left or right side. In the depicted example, in Task 1 a red “H” presented above the screen 
center requires a right pedal response. In Task 2, the identity “H” requires a response on one of the upper keys, 
while the color red indicates a left hand response. In this trial, the R1-R2 relation is incompatible, as both tasks 
require responses on different sides. However, the S1-R2 relation is compatible, as a response with an upper key 
matches the upper position of the letter.  
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Task and procedure. The trial structure and the tasks are illustrated in Figure 6. Task 1 
was to respond to S1 with a pedal press of the left or right foot, and Task 2 was to respond to 
S2 with an index finger key-press on a lower or upper key. The color of the stimulus determined 
whether the key-press had to be given with the left or right index finger.  The stimulus-response 
mapping of all tasks was counterbalanced across participants.  
Participants started each trial by pressing and holding down the two home-keys. Each 
trial then started with a white fixation cross (250 ms), followed by a blank screen (250 ms). 
After that, the colored letter was presented below or above the fixation cross for a maximum of 
4,000 ms or until both, R1 and R2 were registered. The next trial started after an ITI of 1,000 
ms. In case of errors, specific error feedback was provided for 1,000 ms before the ITI. 
Participants first performed a short practice block of 24 randomly drawn trials, which 
was followed by twelve experimental blocks of 48 trials each, resulting from six repetitions of 
all combinations of 2 S1 × 2 S2 × 2 (color cue). All trials were presented in a random order. As 
in Experiment 1, participants received written instructions that emphasized speed and accuracy, 
and were asked to give R1 and R2 successively in fixed order.  
Design and analysis. Trials in which the two tasks required responses on the same side 
(e.g., left foot and left index finger) were R1-R2 compatible, whereas the other trials were R1-
R2 incompatible. Trials in which the vertical position of the stimulus and the response key of 
Task 2 matched (e.g., a stimulus above the screen center and a response with an upper key) 
were S1-R2 compatible, whereas the other trials were S1-R2 incompatible. Data from practice 
and trials including task-unspecific errors (missing responses, wrong response order, two 
responses in one task) were excluded, as were trials with an IRI of less than 100 ms. In all 
analyses, trials following incorrect trials and the first trial of each block were excluded. In 
addition, for the analysis of RTs, the same outlier procedure as in Experiment 1 was applied. 
Mean correct RTs and ERs were submitted to a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with the within-subjects 
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factors (1) R1-R2 relation in Trial n, (2) R1-R2 relation in Trial n-1, (3) S1-R2 relation in Trial 
n and (4) S1-R2 relation in Trial n-1 (for all factors: incompatible vs. compatible). 
Results 
Mean RT1s are depicted in Figure 7 (see also Table 2). In the following, we will first 
focus on the theoretically interesting main effects, and two-way interactions reflecting 
sequential modulations within and across both BCEs for Task 1 (see Figure 5 for the 
hypothesized result patterns). The whole set of inferential statistics is reported in Table A1 of 
the Appendix A. A respective analysis of Task 2 performance is provided in the Online 
Supplement.  
We excluded 2.38% of all trials as outliers. Focusing on the R1-R2 BCE, RT1s in Trial 
n were 41 ms longer for R1-R2 incompatible (813 ms) compared to R1-R2 compatible trials 
(772 ms), F(1,23) = 15.84, p = .001, 𝜂p2  = .41. RT1s were not affected by R1-R2 compatibility 
in Trial n-1, F(1,23) = 0.22, p = .643, 𝜂p2  = .01. The interaction of R1-R2 relation in Trial n and 
Trial n-1 was significant, F(1,23) = 79.00, p < .001, 𝜂p2  = .77, indicating a within BCE 
sequential modulation of the R1-R2 BCE: The R1-R2 BCE was present following compatible 
Trials (111 ms), t(23) = 8.17, p < .001, d = 1.67, and slightly inverted following incompatible 
Trials (-30 ms), t(23) = -2.47, p = .021, d = -0.50. The interaction of R1-R2 relation in Trial n 
and S1-R2 relation in Trial n-1 was not significant, F(1,23) = 0.53, p = .474, 𝜂p2   = .02, 
indicating that no across BCE sequential modulation occurred for the R1-R2 BCE. 
Regarding the S1-R2 BCE, neither the main effect of S1-R2 relation in Trial n, F(1,23) 
= 0.02, p = .902, 𝜂p2  < .01, nor in Trial n-1 were significant, F(1,23) = 0.03, p = .867, 𝜂p2  < .01. 
Thus, unexpectedly, there was no significant S1-R2 BCE. However, there was a significant 
interaction between S1-R2 relation in Trial n and in Trial n-1, F(1,23) = 15.62, p = .001, 𝜂p2   = 
.40, and thus a within BCE sequential modulation of the S1-R2 BCE was present: The S1-R2 
BCE was descriptively present following S1-R2 compatible trials (21 ms), t(23) = 1.67, p = 
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.109, d = 0.34, and inverted following incompatible trials (-23 ms), t(23) = -1.63, p = .117, d = 
-0.33. The interaction of S1-R2 relation in Trial n and R1-R2 relation in Trial n-1 was not 
significant, F(1,23) = 0.02, p = .895, 𝜂p2   < .01, indicating that no across BCE sequential 
modulation occurred.  
Concerning the relationship of the two BCEs in Trial n, the interaction between R1-R2 
and S1-R2 relation was not significant, F(1,23) = 0.01, p = .938, 𝜂p2 < .01. All three-way 
interactions were non-significant, all Fs ≤ 0.96, all ps ≥ .355. Finally, the four-way interaction 
was significant, F(1,23) = 9.11, p = .006, 𝜂p2 = .28 (for further information, see Figure B1 in the 
Appendix B). 
 
Figure 7. Mean RT1s as a function of (1) R1-R2 relation in Trial n, (2) R1-R2 relation in Trial n-1, (3) S1-R2 
relation in Trial n and (4) S1-R2 relation in Trial n-1 (for each factor: incompatible vs. compatible) in Experiment 
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2. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the respective BCE in Trial n, calculated separately 
for each relationship in Trial n-1 (see Pfister & Janczyk, 2013). 
 
 
Table 2. Mean RTs (in ms) / Error Rates (ER, in %) for Task 1 in Experiment 2  as a function of (1) R1-R2 relation 
in Trial n, (2) R1-R2 relation in Trial n-1, (3) S1-R2 relation in Trial n and (4) S1-R2 relation in Trial n-1. (Note: 
Inc = incompatible, Com = compatible) 
  R1-R2  
  Trial n-1 
  Inc Inc Com Com 
S1-R2 Trial n 
Trial n-1 Trial n Inc Com Inc Com 
Inc Inc 737 / 2.00 809 / 2.23 856 / 2.08 718 / 3.30 
Inc Com 787 / 6.28 800 / 1.41 834 / 1.88 767 / 1.07 
Com Inc 822 / 2.48 809 / 2.99 857 / 4.87 750 / 1.50 
Com Com 772 / 4.10 819 / 0.54 837 / 4.14 706 / 0.92 
 
The ER results largely mirrored the RT results (see Table 2). The ANOVA revealed that 
more errors occurred in R1-R2 incompatible (3.48%) relative to R1-R2 compatible (1.75%) 
trials, F(1,23) = 15.93, p = .001, 𝜂p2   = .41. The main effect of R1-R2 relation in Trial n-1 was 
not significant, F(1,23) = 2.40, p = .135, 𝜂p2   = .09. The interaction of R1-R2 relation in Trial n 
and in Trial n-1 was significant, F(1,23) = 37.07, p < .001, 𝜂p2   = .62, indicating a within BCE 
sequential modulation of the R1-R2 BCE: The R1-R2 BCE was present following compatible 
Trials (3.86%), t(23) = 6.31, p < .001, d = 1.29, and not present following incompatible Trials 
(-0.39%), t(23) = -0.70, p = .489, d = -0.14. The interaction of R1-R2 relation in Trial n and S1-
R2 relation in Trial n-1 was not significant, F(1,23) = 0.06, p = .810, 𝜂p2   < .01, and thus no 
across BCE sequential modulation occurred for the R1-R2 BCE. 
Neither the main effect of S1-R2 relation in Trial n, F(1,23) = 0.76, p = .394, 𝜂p2   = .03, 
nor in Trial n-1 was significant, F(1,23) = 2.60, p = .120, 𝜂p2   = .10. Further, the interaction of 
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S1-R2 relation in Trial n and in Trial n-1 was not significant, F(1,23) =  0.16, p = .691, 𝜂p2   = 
.01, as was the interaction of S1-R2 relation in Trial n and R1-R2 relation in Trial n-1, F(1,23) 
= 0.04, p = .848, 𝜂p2   < .01. Thus, neither a within BCE sequential modulation, nor an across 
BCE sequential modulation was present for the S1-R2 BCE in error rates. 
As for RT1s, the interaction between R1-R2 relation in Trial n and S1-R2 relation in 
Trial n was not significant, F(1,23) = 0.44, p = .513, 𝜂p2  = .02. There was a significant interaction 
between S1-R2 relation in Trial n, S1-R2 relation in Trial n-1, and R1-R2 relation in Trial n-1, 
F(1,23) =  4.97, p = .036, 𝜂p2  = .18. All other three-way interactions, Fs ≤ 2.15, all ps ≥ .156, 
and the four-way interaction were not significant, F(1,23) =  0.21, p = .654, 𝜂p2  = .01. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 demonstrates sequential modulations within the S1-R2 as well as the R1-
R2 BCE (Janczyk, 2016). Further and in line with the assumptions of Scenario D (see Figure 
4), no across BCE sequential modulations were obtained. In other words: The R1-R2 BCE in 
Trial n was modulated only by the R1-R2 relation, but not by the S1-R2 relation, in Trial n-1. 
The same pattern was observed for the S1-R2 BCE in Trial n. That is,  the S1-R2 BCE in Trial 
n was modulated only by the S1-R2 relation, but not by the R1-R2 relation, in Trial n-1. In 
addition, none of the three-way interactions was significant, providing further evidence that the 
sequential modulations as indicated by the two-way interactions were not further modulated. 
One unexpected result was the lack of a S1-R2 BCE in Trial n, which may have been 
overshadowed by its sequential modulation. Another aspect of the present design which might 
have contributed to this result was that the special role of the color cue with respect to the R1-
R2 relation might have reduced the salience of the S1-R2 compared to the R1-R2 relation. 
Despite this, the present results can be taken as first evidence that the two BCEs can be 
distinguished empirically and perhaps are based on different capacity-limited processes.  
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Experiment 3 
The results of Experiment 2 fit well with the idea that the two BCEs emerge from 
different underlying processes. To corroborate and generalize these results, we replicated 
Experiment 2 with a larger sample size and a minor change of the design. Specifically, we 
changed the role of the color cue so that it now determined S1-R2 instead of R1-R2 
compatibility. With this change, we attempted to invert the possible asymmetry regarding the 
salience of the S1-R2 and R1-R2 relation in Experiment 2.  
Method 
Participants. Fourty-eight students (33 female) from the University of Tübingen, aged 
18 to 29 years (M = 22.8 years, SD = 3.84), participated for monetary compensation (8€) or 
course credit. All participants provided written informed consent before the experiment and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Apparatus and stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 2.  
Task and procedure. The trial structure and tasks are illustrated in Figure 8. Task 1 was 
to respond to S1 with a pedal press of the left or right foot, and Task 2 was to respond to S2 
with an index finger key-press of a left or right key. The color of the stimulus determined 
whether the index finger key-press had to be given on a lower or upper key. Otherwise, the 
procedure was the same as in Experiment 2. 
Design and analysis. Design and data analysis were the same as in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 8. Trial structure and tasks in Experiment 3. In each trial, participants first responded to the position of the 
letter in a pedal two-choice task (Task 1). Then, participants responded to the identity of the letter in a manual 
two-choice task by pressing a left or right key (Task 2): The color cue indicated whether the respective upper or 
lower key should be pressed. In the depicted example, in Task 1 a red “H” presented above the screen center 
requires a right pedal response. In Task 2, the identity “H” requires a response with one of the left keys and the 
color red indicates a response on the respective upper key. In this trial example, the R1-R2 relation is incompatible, 
as both responses are required on different sides. However, the S1-R2 relation is compatible, as a response with 
an upper key matches the upper position of the letter. Note that the role of the color cue changed from Experiment 
2. 
 
Results 
Mean RT1s are depicted in Figure 8 (see also Table 6 for mean RTs and ERs in Task 
1). As for Experiment 2, the whole set of inferential statistics is summarized in Table A1 of 
the Appendix A, and a respective analysis of Task 2 performance is provided in the Online 
Supplement.  
We excluded 2.34% of all trials as outliers. Regarding the R1-R2 BCE, RT1s were 24 
ms longer for R1-R2 incompatible (885 ms) than for R1-R2 compatible trials (861 ms), F(1,47) 
= 15.50, p < .001, 𝜂p2  = .25. RT1s were not affected by R1-R2 relation in Trial n-1, F(1,47) = 
1.06, p = .309, 𝜂p2  = .02. The interaction of R1-R2 relation in Trial n and in Trial n-1 was 
significant, F(1,47) = 38.91, p < .001, 𝜂p2  = .45, indicating a within BCE sequential modulation 
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of the R1-R2 BCE: The R1-R2 BCE was present following compatible trials (72 ms), t(47) = 
7.72, p < .001, d = 1.11, and inverted following incompatible trials (-24 ms), t(47) = -2.33, p = 
.024, d = -0.34. The interaction of R1-R2 relation with S1-R2 relation in Trial n-1 was not 
significant, F(1,47) = 0.74, p = .395, 𝜂p2 = .02, indicating that no across BCE sequential 
modulation occurred for the R1-R2 BCE. 
Concerning the S1-R2 BCE, neither the main effect of S1-R2 relation in Trial n, F(1,47) 
= 0.16, p = .693, 𝜂p2  < .01, nor in Trial n-1 was significant, F(1,47) = 0.21, p = .651, 𝜂p2  < .01. 
The interaction of S1-R2 relation in Trial n and in Trial n-1 was significant, F(1,47) = 58.14, p 
< .001, 𝜂p2  = .55, indicating a within BCE sequential modulation of the S1-R2 BCE: There was 
a significant S1-R2 BCE following compatible trials (53 ms), t(47) = 4.32, p < .001, d = 0.62, 
and an inverted one following incompatible trials (-61 ms), t(47) = -4.61, p < .001, d = -0.66. 
The interaction of S1-R2 relation in Trial n and R1-R2 relation in Trial n-1 was not significant, 
F(1,47) = 2.36, p = .131, 𝜂p2  = .05, indicating that no across BCE sequential modulation for the 
S1-R2 BCE was present.  
Regarding the relationship of the two BCEs in Trial n, the interaction was not 
significant, F(1,47) = 0.02, p = .891, 𝜂p2 < .01. All three-way interactions were not significant, 
all Fs ≤ 1.89, all ps ≥ .175. However, the four-way interaction was significant, F(1,47) = 11.70, 
p = .001, 𝜂p2  = .20 (for more information, see Figure B1 in the Appendix B). 
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Figure 9. Mean RT1s as a function of (1) R1-R2 relation in Trial n, (2) R1-R2 relation in Trial n-1, (3) S1-R2 
relation in Trial n and (4) S1-R2 relation in Trial n-1 (for each factor: incompatible vs. compatible) in Experiment 
3. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the respective BCE in Trial n, calculated separately 
for each relationship in Trial n-1 (see Pfister & Janczyk, 2013). 
 
The ER results again mirrored the RT results. The ANOVA revealed that more errors 
were made in R1-R2 incompatible (0.03%) than in R1-R2 compatible (0.02%) trials, F(1,47) = 
10.88, p = .002, 𝜂p2  = .19. More errors also occurred following R1-R2 compatible (3.06%) 
compared to incompatible trials (2.48%), F(1,47) = 7.99, p = .007, 𝜂p2  = .15. The interaction of 
R1-R2 relation in Trial n and Trial n-1 was significant, F(1,47) = 24.11, p < .001, 𝜂p2  = .34, 
indicating a within BCE sequential modulation of the R1-R2 BCE: The R1-R2 BCE was 
significant following compatible trials (0.02%), t(47) = 4.63, p < .001, d = 0.67, but not 
following incompatible trials (0.00%), t(47) = -0.55, p = .586, d = -0.08. The interaction of R1-
26 
 
R2 relation in Trial n and S1-R2 relation in Trial n-1 was not significant, F(1,47) =  1.45, p = 
.235, 𝜂p2  = .03.  
 There was no main effect of S1-R2 relation in Trial n, F(1,47) =  0.30, p = .586, 𝜂p2  = 
.01, nor in Trial n-1, F(1,47) =  0.30, p = .584, 𝜂p2  = .01. The interaction of S1-R2 relation in 
Trial n and in Trial n-1 was significant, F(1,47) = 22.14, p < .001, 𝜂p2  = .32, indicating a within 
BCE sequential modulation of the S1-R2 BCE: The S1-R2 BCE was significant following 
compatible trials (1.2%), t(47) = 3.24, p = .002, d = 0.47, and inversed following incompatible 
trials (-0.91%), t(47) = -2.75, p = .008, d = -0.40. The interaction of S1-R2 relation in Trial n 
and R1-R2 relation in Trial n-1 was not significant, F(1,47) = 0.02, p = .882, 𝜂p2  < .01, indicating 
that no across BCE sequential modulation occurred for the S1-R2 BCE. 
The interaction between R1-R2 relation in Trial n and S1-R2 relation in Trial n was not 
significant, F(1,47) = 0.15, p = .703, 𝜂p2  < .01. There was a significant interaction between S1-
R2 relation in Trial n, S1-R2 relation in Trial n-1, and R1-R2 relation in Trial n-1, F(1,47) =  
4.95, p = .031, 𝜂p2  = .10. All other three-way interactions, all Fs ≤ 1.49, all ps ≥ .228, and the 
four-way interaction were not significant, F(1,47) =  0.27, p = .608, 𝜂p2  = .01. 
Table 3. Mean RTs (in ms) / and Error Rates (ER, in %) for Task 1 in Experiment 3  as a function of (1) R1-R2 
relation in Trial n, (2) R1-R2 relation in Trial n-1, (3) S1-R2 relation in Trial n and (4) S1-R2 relation in Trial n-
1. (Note: Inc = incompatible, Com = compatible) 
  R1-R2  
  Trial n-1 
  Inc Inc Com Com 
S1-R2 Trial n 
Trial n-1 Trial n Inc Com Inc Com 
Inc Inc 804 / 1.94 871 / 2.98  899 / 2.72  791 / 3.10  
Inc Com 920 / 3.51  902 / 1.08  923 / 4.90  864 / 2.44  
Com Inc 902 / 2.72  904 / 2.48  925 / 2.04  873 / 1.82  
Com Com 830 / 5.36  875 / 2.65  876 / 3.61  809 / 0.93  
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 were remarkably similar to those of Experiment 2. Again 
and consistent with Scenario D of Figure 4, across BCE sequential modulations were observed. 
Also, there was again a sequential within S1-R2 modulation, even though no significant S1-R2 
BCE in Trial n occurred. Thus, our attempt to change a possible asymmetry in the salience of 
the two BCEs proved insufficient. Nevertheless, Experiment 3 provides further evidence for 
different processing loci of the two BCEs.   
 
General Discussion 
The present study set out to investigate the processing loci of the S1-R2 and the R1-R2 
compatibility-based BCEs. Experiment 1 built on a result reported by Janczyk et al. (2018, Exp. 
3) and tested whether the locus of the S1-R2 BCE is perceptual or not. S1 brightness, which 
was manipulated trial-by-trial in separate blocks of R1-R2 BCE and S1-R2 BCE tasks, 
interacted neither with R1-R2 nor with S1-R2 compatibility. This result is inconsistent with a 
perceptual locus of the S1-R2 BCE (see Sternberg, 1969). Together with the results of Janczyk 
et al., both BCEs thus seem to have their loci in the capacity-limited central stage.  
However, although both BCEs likely reflect capacity-limited processing, it remains 
possible that different processes underlie the two effects. Experiment 2 and 3 thus investigated 
whether the processing loci of the two BCEs can be further distinguished. To this end, we 
investigated possible across BCE sequential modulations in a setup where both S1-R2 and R1-
R2 compatibility varied within the same block of trials. The crucial question was whether the 
compatibility relation in one type of BCE would cause sequential modulations of the other type. 
Such across BCE sequential modulations would suggest similar underlying processes for both 
types of BCEs and/or their sequential modulations (Scenarios A-C in Figure 4). An absence of 
such modulations, however, would suggest different underlying processes for the two BCEs 
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(Scenario D in Figure 4). Results of Experiment 2 and 3 are in line with the latter prediction: In 
both experiments, we obtained sequential modulations within but not across the two BCEs. 
Thus, the present results indicate that the two BCEs should be conceived of as two different 
types of compatibility-based BCEs. 
How are the compatibility-based BCEs different? The present results can be accounted 
for by a model assuming that two different processes occur in the capacity-limited central stage, 
each responsible for the emergence of one type of compatibility-based BCE (see Figure 3). 
Previous studies have attributed the R1-R2 BCE to interference between Task 1 response 
selection and simultaneous Task 2 response activation. This appears reasonable, because there 
is a spatial overlap between the two responses and therefore Task 2 response activation can 
facilitate Task 1 response selection in compatible trials and counteract it in incompatible trials 
(see Durst & Janczyk, 2019, for a more detailed account). For the S1-R2 BCE, however, the 
dimensional overlap is not between the two responses, but between the stimulus in Task 1 and 
the response in Task 2. 
How, then, can the underlying processes of the S1-R2 BCE be specified? Consider an 
experiment in which the color of a letter requires a manual response with the left or right index 
finger as Task 1. In Task 2, the identity of the letter requires a vocal utterance of the words 
“green” or “red” (Task 2; see also, Hommel, 1998, Experiment 2), conceivably leading to an 
activation of the associated color feature (e.g., the stimulus “H” is associated with the color 
“green”). This activation may affect ongoing Task 1 processes. However, it is unlikely that this 
activation influences response selection, as there is neither spatial nor semantic overlap with 
the spatially defined response in Task 1. It appears more plausible that the color activation 
affects an earlier capacity-limited Task 1 process that still deals with S1 (see also Hommel, 
1998, p. 1374). 
A plausible candidate for such a process is stimulus categorization, which has been 
shown to be a capacity-limited process (Johnston & McCann, 2006). Furthermore, semantic 
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category-response rules instead of stimulus-response rules appear to be held in working 
memory for both the S1-R2 BCE (Ellenbogen & Meiran, 2008) and the R1-R2 BCE (Thomson, 
Watter, & Finkelshtein, 2010), and semantic memory retrieval in Task 2 can run in parallel with 
Task 1 central stage (Fischer, Miller, & Schubert 2007; Oriet, Tombu, & Jolicoeur, 2005). For 
our example, this means that the automatic Task 2 activation of “green” adds to the activation 
resulting from categorizing the relevant Task 1 stimulus as green or red. Then, in compatible 
trials, a sufficient amount of activation for decisive categorization is reached earlier, whereas 
in incompatible trials it is reached later (see Figure 9, for an illustration). 
 
Figure 10. Illustration of a model in which the capacity-limited central stage (orange) comprises two processes 
separated by a dashed line. Task 2 (the identity task) is illustrated separately for the S1-R2 BCE and the R1-R2 
BCE. Note that the stimuli and responses shown here are taken from Experiment 1 (R1-R2 BCE) and 2 (S1-R2 
BCE) by Hommel (1998). The model assumes that the locus of the S1-R2 BCE is in the first capacity-limited 
process of stimulus categorization (SC), whereas the locus of the R1-R2 BCE is in the second capacity-limited 
process of response selection (RS). Grey arrows indicate the source of the two BCEs in response activation (RA) 
of Task 2. (P = perceptual stage, M = motor stage, the subscript indicates Task 1 and 2, respectively) 
 
The present results indicate that the two BCEs have their loci in different capacity-
limited processes, that is, stimulus categorization and response selection, respectively. A further 
question is whether these processes run (partially) in parallel or whether they proceed in a 
strictly serial manner within Task 1. The present data do not support the former notion. We 
suggest that stimulus categorization gets a head start over response selection, because the latter 
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necessarily requires at least some output from stimulus categorization to initiate application of 
the category-response rule. As soon as stimulus categorization is fully finished, response 
selection can run at full efficiency. Similar category-response translations seem to be involved 
also in a category-match effect, that is, shorter RT1s when S1 and S2 belong to the same rather 
than different semantic categories (e.g., when both stimuli are digits compared to when S1 is a 
letter and S2 is a digit; e.g., Logan & Schulkind, 2000; Thomson et al., 2010). Whether and to 
what extent the category-match effect is similar to the R1-R2 and the S1-R2 BCE remains an 
open question.  
Caveats and limitations. An unexpected observation of the present study was the 
absence of an S1-R2 BCE in Experiments 2 and 3, whereas a clear S1-R2 BCE was observed 
in Experiment 1. One obvious difference between these experiments is the type of S1-R2 
relation: In Experiment 1, the relation was conceptual (i.e., the color of S1 and the utterance of 
a color word as R2; e.g., Hommel, 1998), whereas in the other experiments, the relation was 
spatial (i.e., the vertical position of S1 and R2; see also Lien et al., 2007). This change in the 
design was necessary in order to investigate potential sequential modulations across the two 
BCEs in Experiments 2 and 3 (see also below). Second, we hypothesized that the special role 
of the color cue in the present design might have contributed to this result. However, changing 
the role of the color cue in Experiment 3 did not affect the result pattern. Third, the S1-R2 
relation in Experiments 2 and 3 was based on the vertical position of the stimulus and the 
required response, as participants were instructed to press an upper or lower key. One might 
argue that the arrangement of the response keys was not vertically aligned but rather according 
to the sagittal axis of the body (i.e., near and far response keys). While this might have reduced 
the dimensional overlap between S1 and R2, instances of orthogonal spatial compatibility 
effects have also been reported (e.g., Koch & Jolicœur, 2007; Nishimura & Yokosawa, 2006). 
Importantly, we believe that the absence of an S1-R2 BCE in Trial n does not undermine our 
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conclusions, because a clear within S1-R2 BCE sequential modulation was observed in 
Experiments 2 and 3.  
It should also be noted that the design of Experiments 2 and 3 was slightly unusual in 
that both BCE were investigated within the same blocks of trials. Alternatively, it would have 
been possible to present the two BCEs in alternating runs (see Rogers & Monsell, 1995), in 
which two trials of one BCE are followed by two trials of the other BCE. We decided not to 
employ such a procedure for several reasons. First, this would have required participants to 
switch between different tasks rules for Task 2 every second trial. Second, we reasoned that a 
stronger separation of the two tasks could have possibly counteracted sequential modulations 
(for a discussion of the potential influence of task characteristics on sequential modulations, see 
Braem, Abrahamse, Duthoo, & Notebaert, 2014).  
Conclusion. The present results indicate that even though both compatibility-based 
BCEs have their locus in the capacity-limited stage, they are nonetheless based on different 
processes. As a working hypothesis, we suggest that response activation in Task 2 affects 
response selection in Task 1 in case of the R1-R2 BCE, but stimulus categorization in case of 
the S1-R2 BCE.  
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Appendix A: Inferential statistics for Task 1 in Experimens 2 and 3. 
Table A1. ANOVA results for Task 1 RTs in Experiment 2 and 3. 
Effect Experiment 2 (see Fig. 7) 
Experiment 3 
(see Fig. 9) 
R1-R2 Trial n F(1,23) =15.84, p = .001, 𝜂p2 = .41 F(1,47) = 15.50, p < .001, 𝜂p2 = .25 
R1-R2 Trial n-1 F(1,23) = 0.22, p = .643, 𝜂p2 = .01 F(1,47) = 1.06, p = .309, 𝜂p2 = .02 
R1-R2 Trial n 
× 
R1-R2 Trial n-1 
F(1,23) =  79.00, p < .001, 𝜂p2 = .77 F(1,47) = 38.91, p < .001, 𝜂p2 = .45 
R1-R2 Trial n 
× 
S1-R2 Trial n-1 
F(1,23) = 0.53, p = .474, 𝜂p2 = .02 F(1,47) = 0.74, p = .395, 𝜂p2 = .02 
S1-R2 Trial n F(1,23) = 0.02, p = .902, 𝜂p2 < .01 F(1,47) = 0.16, p = .693, 𝜂p2 < .01 
S1-R2 Trial n-1 F(1,23) = 0.03, p = .867, 𝜂p2 < .01 F(1,47) = 0.21, p = .651, 𝜂p2 < .01 
S1-R2 Trial n 
× 
S1-R2 Trial n-1 
F(1,23) = 15.62, p = .001, 𝜂p2 = .40 F(1,47) = 58.14, p < .001, 𝜂p2 = .55 
S1-R2 Trial n 
× 
R1-R2 Trial n-1 
F(1,23) =   0.02, p = .895, 𝜂p2 < .01 F(1,47) = 2.36, p = .131, 𝜂p2 = .05 
R1-R2 Trial n 
× 
S1-R2 Trial n 
F(1,23) = 0.01, p = .938, 𝜂p2 < .01 F(1,47) = 0.02, p = .891, 𝜂p2 < .01 
R1-R2 Trial n-1 
× 
S1-R2 Trial n-1 
F(1,23) =   6.54, p = .018, 𝜂p2 = .22 F(1,47) = 0.02, p = .881, 𝜂p2 < .01 
R1-R2 Trial n 
× 
S1-R2 Trial n 
× 
R1-R2 Trial n-1 
F(1,23) = 0.00, p = .979, 𝜂p2 < .01 F(1,47) = 1.81, p = .184, 𝜂p2 = .04 
R1-R2 Trial n 
× 
S1-R2  Trial n 
× 
S1-R2  Trial n-1 
F(1,23) = 0.24, p = .629, 𝜂p2 = .01 F(1,47) = 1.89, p = .175, 𝜂p2 = .04 
R1-R2  Trial n 
× 
R1-R2  Trial n-1 
× 
S1-R2  Trial n-1 
F(1,23) = 0.89, p = .355, 𝜂p2 = .04 F(1,47) = 1.43, p = .238, 𝜂p2 = .03 
S1-R2  Trial n 
× 
R1-R2  Trial n-1 
× 
S1-R2  Trial n-1 
F(1,23) = 0.02, p = .898, 𝜂p2 < .01 F(1,47) = 0.71, p = .405, 𝜂p2 = .01 
R1-R2  Trial n 
× 
S1-R2  Trial n 
× 
R1-R2  Trial n-1 
× 
S1-R2  Trial n-1 
F(1,23) = 9.11, p = .006, 𝜂p2 = .28 F(1,47) = 11.70, p = .001, 𝜂p2 = .20 
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Appendix B: Four-way interaction pattern in Experiments 2 and 3 
 
 
Figure B1. Within BCE sequential modulation of the R1-R2 BCE and the S1-R2 BCE in ms (incompatible minus 
compatible) as a function of the four possible sequences of the respective other type of BCE. The results suggest 
that the within BCE sequential modulations were largest when there was no simultaneous change in the other type 
of BCE (compare solid and dotted lines).    
 
